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ABSTRACT

Three Essays on Systematic Information Flow between Credit Derivative and Equity Markets (December
2016)
William John Procasky, Jr., B. A., Dickinson College; M.B.A., University of Pittsburgh
Chair of Committee: Dr. George Clarke

I undertake a comprehensive analysis of the lead-lag relationship between the systematic investment
grade and high yield credit derivative and equity markets and their sub-indices within a robust differenced
VAR, asymmetrical Granger causality and VARMA framework. I operationalize a broad set of liquidly
tradable CDX credit derivative indices produced by Markit and compare them to closely matched equity
portfolios from which I construct indexes. Prior efforts studying informational flow between these two
markets have focused almost exclusively on the unsystematic (firm-specific) relationship. I observe a
distinct heterogeneity in the pattern of informational flow across the different market segments studied.
In the systematic investment grade markets, I document a persistent semi-strong form of capital market
efficiency in which information, irrespective of whether it is positive or negative, is impounded in a quick
and timely manner in both markets. In the high yield market, I observe a two-way causality, meaning that
certain types of information are impounded more efficiently in each market. The lead-lag relationship
from the credit to the equity market is regime dependent, with causality more prevalent under adverse
market conditions and the effects hold most strongly for the aggregated high yield and BB-rated indices.
Finally, I document a persistent causality flowing from the equity to the credit sectors with no causality in
the opposite direction in the investment grade rated sub-indices, meaning that sector based credit
investors are reactive to developments in the equity market. These distinctly different results across
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market segments suggest very different behavior on the part of investors in how they use credit
derivatives indexes and have practical for implications for arbitrageurs seeking to exploit cross market
informational efficiencies.
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INTRODUCTION

1.1

Overview

This document examines cross market informational flow between systematic credit derivative and equity
markets. Credit derivatives and in particular credit default swaps (“CDS”) and their contribution to the
health and efficiency of financial markets is an oft debated subject eliciting a diverse range of viewpoints,
depending on the stakeholder polled. In some circles, they are viewed as extremely useful and innovative
tools by which to decouple the holding of credit risk from actual underlying cash bond instruments. By
virtue of this dynamic, credit risk can be segregated from interest rate risk, enabling the more efficient
sharing of these different types of risk across financial markets. However, in others they may be
considered to be the vehicle of choice by which questionably motivated speculators use dark investment
pools to manipulate markets for their own selfish benefit. As a result, their actions are viewed as
detrimental to borrowers, other investors, interconnected banking systems and even entire nations of
peoples. A good discussion of the dichotomy of these views can be found in Stulz (2010).
To be sure, the deleterious role that certain categories of CDS played in the recent Great Financial Crisis,
which eventually spilled over from Wall Street to Main Street (thereby morphing into the pain of the Great
Recession), significantly influenced the public’s general perception of these instruments. This attention in
turn, also caught the eye of politicians and regulators. However, while certain criticisms of CDS are
completely justifiable, if not absolutely necessary, the reality of what transpired during the crisis involving
CDS is often different than the rhetoric employed. In this regard, the asset class as a whole tends to get
targeted and blamed for helping to first create the crisis, and then exacerbate it. However, in reality it was
a very highly specialized, new generation type of CDS linked to a non-traditional class of assets - pools of
often highly toxic mortgage-backed securities - which created most of the problems and not the original
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instruments as incepted1. Therefore, it is incorrect to unilaterally condemn CDS as inimical to the efficient
functioning of financial markets.
Why is this? Because the purpose for which they were originally developed and related market need they
served is still very relevant today, a full seven years after the end of the crisis2. In fact, while some believed
that the 2007-2009 credit crisis would effectively mark the end of these instruments, CDS remain a
significant force in the financial world today, as evidenced by $16 trillion in gross notional exposure
worldwide as of December 31, 2014 (BIS, December 2014). Moreover, while the size of the current market
is much smaller than its pre-crisis peak, some of this shrinkage has been due to beneficial reforms with
respect to the mechanics underpinning how they are traded. Two such examples as discussed by Augustin,
Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) are the compression of gross interdealer exposure into net exposure (via the
netting across multiple buy and sell positions on a single counterparty, creating one net position) and the
migration of bilateral over-the-counter trading to centralized clearinghouses (in essence opting for futures
over forwards to eliminate counterparty risk). In addition, the specific type of trading activity which helped
fuel the housing and financial crisis, namely CDS linked to pools of subprime mortgage backed securities,
no longer is material (BIS, December 2014). As a result of these actions, CDS are positioned to play an
ongoing salutary role in the facilitation of economic growth through risk management3.
So against that backdrop, just what are CDS? For what purpose were they then created? How did the
market develop? Are all CDS created equal? What went wrong and what is still right? Have any changes
been made to prevent another crisis? In the next two subsections, these fundamental questions as well

1

“Credit Default Swaps: An Update,” Arjyo Mitra, Seven Pillars Institute for Global Finance and Ethics, April 14th,
2015.
2
“Why would anyone want to restart the credit default swap market?” Tracy Alloway, Bloomberg, May 11th, 2015;
end of crisis date defined as 7/8/09, the day on which high yield premiums permanently dropped below 1,000 bps.
3
“Deriving the economic impact of derivatives: growth through risk management,” Milken Institute, March 2014.
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as others are examined in order to provide a contextual framework for the research questions explored
in the document.

1.2

What are CDS?

At their very basic level, CDS are a type of insurance product a buyer can purchase in order to protect
against the potential economic loss associated with an uncertain future event. In this regard, they are
similar in many respects to car insurance (Augustin, Subrahmanyam et al. 2014) whereby the owner of a
physical asset, the car, purchases insurance to protect against the risk of loss incurred as the result of
specified contingent events. A basic schematic of how credit default swaps work is presented in Figure 1
and discussed below.
Figure 1: Credit Default Swap Basics

Examples of such contingent events include the car being involved in a fender bender and needing to be
repaired or in the most extreme case, totaled as a result of a catastrophic accident. As with all insurance,
the buyer must pay a premium to protect against such loss to the underwriter, who specializes in assessing
the probability of the uncertain event occurring and subsequently charging a fee commensurate with the
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risk/likelihood of occurrence. Conceptually, this fee should cover underwriting losses while earning an
acceptable rate of return on capital. Also, consistent with the risk/reward tradeoff in finance, the greater
the risk of the contingent event occurring, the more the underwriter will charge in terms of premium.
Therefore, to use an extreme example for illustrative purposes, the premium paid to protect a new red
sports car against theft or collision likely is different than to insure a vintage 1970s used Ford Pinto.
In the specific case of CDS, the physical asset the buyer generally wants to protect against the risk of loss
is a bond in which it has invested (analogous to the car). This bond has been issued by a corporation and
is generally of the senior unsecured variety in the capital structure, thus representing pure default risk.
Investment related losses generally occur when the bond issuer defaults on its contractual obligations
under the indenture, although not all defaults are created equal since there are different categories of
default. The specific senior unsecured bond identified in the CDS contract (insurance policy) on the basis
of maturity, coupon, CUSIP, etc. is called the reference obligation (the year and model of the car) and the
issuer of the bond (or borrower) is referred to as the reference entity (the make of the car). The uncertain
events that could result in default and economic loss against which the CDS buyer wants to protect are
known as contingent credit events (e.g., theft, collision, liability). While the specific events can be
individually tailored into the contract based on the needs of the buyer (much like a buyer of car insurance
can choose the level and extent of coverage meeting its specific needs in the rider), they generally consist
of the following three foundational aspects:


Restructuring (a severe collision), which typically occurs when a company and its creditors agree
to exchange the reference obligation for a new bond issued at a par amount lower than the
original amount and/or longer maturity (resulting in greater sensitivity to interest rate risk and
default risk given the term structure of credit spreads),
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Failure to pay (theft), either on the reference obligation or any other debt obligation in an amount
above a certain negotiated threshold, which causes a cross-default to the reference obligation, or



Bankruptcy of the reference entity (analogous to the car being totaled), during which time the
reference obligation is subject to the automatic stay under the bankruptcy code and could be
swapped for a combination of equity and notes under the plan of reorganization.

The fee which the seller of the CDS charges to bear the risk of the uncertain occurrence of a credit event
(car insurance premium) is called the fixed rate in the contract, although it’s generally referred to
vernacularly as the credit spread. This rate is expressed as an annualized percentage rate much like the
associated coupon of the reference obligation bond, for example 2.50% (or 250 basis points, as is generally
quoted by market makers). However, the CDS fixed rate differs from that of the bond coupon in that it is
constructed to be a pure measure of default risk, whereas bond coupons are also based on the general
level of interest rates in the economy (hence giving rise to interest rate risk) on top of which a default risk
premium is then added. As a simplified example in a no-arbitrage, law of one price environment, if the
risk of default related to an issuer requires a 1.00% spread to compensate for bearing that risk and the
general level of interest rates at the point on the interest rate curve is 6%, the bond’s coupon rate would
be set at 7.00% whereas the CDS fixed rate simply will be 1.00%.
Payments are generally due quarterly on dates specified in the agreement. The absolute amount in CDS
premium payments exchanged between the buyer and the seller is based off of the notional amount of
the CDS contract (level of coverage), which corresponds to the amount in par value of the reference
obligations the buyer seeks to insure. For example, if a buyer buys $10 mln in notional protection and the
market quote for CDS on the reference entity/obligation is 100 bps (1.00% p.a.), the buyer will pay $25,000
in quarterly installments per year to the seller for the life of the CDS contract (the maturity of the contract
may be 1, 3, 5, 7 or 10 years, although 5 years is most common and therefore, the focus of this study).
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In the event of a default covered under the credit events (again, analogous to the rider), the seller of the
CDS is obligated to make the buyer whole on the notional amount of the underlying contract. To illustrate
the mechanics of the contingent settlement, suppose that after default, the reference obligation bonds
are trading at $0.60 for every $1.00 of par value. In this instance, the seller of the protection would be
obligated to pay the buyer $0.40 for every $1.00 of par value, or $4 mln based on the $10 mln in notional
value in our example4. If the bonds had been trading at $0.30 per $1.00 of par value, the payment would
be $0.70, or $ 7mln based on the $10 mln notional value.
In practice, there are two methods under which CDS contracts can be settled (and which can impact
trading value), one being physical delivery of the reference obligation and the other cash settlement.
Under physical delivery, the buyer of the protection is obligated to deliver the actual reference obligation
bond to the seller, who must buy it for the full face value of the contracted amount. This is analogous
taking the damaged car to the insurance company, which reviews it and cuts a check to make you whole.
Cash settlement simply entails the exchange of a net cash payment to settle the contract, which in the
example above would be $4 mln. While this method is logistically simpler, it also results in the capacity to
create naked positions beyond those supported by the physical bond market (called synthetic exposure
since investors don’t actually own the cash asset). While this is typical for any functioning derivatives
market, i.e., speculators are needed since there are not enough natural sellers of protection to satisfy
buyer demand, in the instance of CDS, this caused considerable controversy. This is due to the levels of
synthetic exposure created during the housing credit crisis as well as perceived role that CDS played in
Eurozone sovereign crisis, which eventually led to a ban on certain types of synthetic activity.

4

To be sure, declaration of a credit event and valuation for settlement are involved processes which are beyond the
scope of this document and as such, have been simplified here for illustrative purposes
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Given the mechanics of CDS, the linkage between them and the bond market is clear, as ostensibly they
measure the same default risk and hence, should trade at the same levels in their respective marketplaces.
This view is in line with Merton (1974) as well as the structural pricing model and principle of arbitrage
with respect to CDS discussed by Duffie (1999). This arbitrage pricing framework can be illustrated with a
simplified example assuming physical delivery. If the credit spread embedded in a bond is trading at 2.50%
in the cash market while in the CDS derivatives market, the swap with that bond as the underlying
reference obligation is quoted at 2.25%, investors can earn a riskless profit by buying the CDS (a short
position in the credit in trading parlance) and buying the bond (a long position in the credit), thereby
locking in and pocketing the 0.25% differential in spread.
Why is this strategy risk-free? Because in the event the issuer of the bond defaults, the long and short
positions cancel out, since the buyer can simply deliver the defaulted bond to the seller, who then must
pay him full par value. As a result of this ability to earn arbitrage profits, there will be an increase in
demand for the CDS protection, which in turn will drive up the price of the swap (expressed as the spread)
in the synthetic market. At the same, the natural increase in demand for the underlying bond will drive
up the price of that asset in the cash market, thereby lowering its embedded credit spread (since bond
prices move inversely to the risk of default).
Eventually (and in the absence of frictions, very quickly), these simultaneous actions will result in the
credit spreads between the two markets equaling out (or in other words, the basis moving to zero), at
which time riskless profits are not achievable. The converse of the above situation naturally holds when
the CDS market spread is higher than the cash bond spread, whereby arbitrageurs simply sell the CDS (a
long position in the credit) and short sell the bonds (a short position in the credit, which incidentally can
be difficult to create) in order to earn riskless profits.
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As a result of these balancing mechanisms, the oft referenced CDS-Bond basis, which is defined as the
differential in spread between the CDS and bond markets, should always be zero (in our two examples,
the basis was -0.25% and +0.25%, respectively). However in practice the basis typically deviates from zero
as discussed by Duffie (1999) and Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam et al. (2011) can vary quite significantly
across time, especially during systemic crises (Fontana 2011). Thus, the notion that CDS are a type of
redundant asset making it possible to replicate the exact payoffs in cash markets without actually having
to invest in and own the cash instruments (thereby being more capital friendly) is largely theoretical
(Bolton and Oehmke 2013). Still, they do allow investors to buy and sell the bonds synthetically and in
many respects, are like put options on the bonds whereby the maximum the seller can earn is the
premium while the potential loss can be up to the face amount of the contract. For this reason, they are
categorized as fixed-income derivatives.
However, because they do not provide the same exact same investment opportunity as the bond market,
significant interest has developed in examining whether one of these markets is more efficient than the
other in impounding information. Naturally, given that under the Merton model, equities are impacted
by the same underlying value driving factors as credit market instruments (thus making arbitrage
conceptually non-feasible), this interest in pricing efficiency has extended beyond the bond market into
the stock market as well, which is the subject of this study.
Before moving on to the history and market structure of CDS, there is one more foundational aspect to
cover that is essential in understanding the development of the market. This is the form of contract
underlying CDS transactions. As indicated, CDS are derivative instruments and more specifically, primarily
of the over-the-counter (“OTC”) variety, (not traded on an organized exchanges) which had significant
implications for their growth and development. This is because as OTC derivatives, they fall under the
general ISDA Master Agreement promulgated by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, a
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legal agreement broadly used for a wide range of financial derivative asset classes, of which the most
common include interest rate, foreign currency and commodity related derivatives.
Why is this significant? Because as with all trading related markets, usage of a standardized contractual
framework facilitates a significantly greater volume of transactions given that base terms and conditions
do not have to be renegotiated with every new deal. Owing to this framework, a theoretically unlimited
number of individual transactions can be documented easily via trade confirmations housed under the
master agreement5.
The catalytic function of the ISDA is further augmented/supplemented by the ISDA Credit Derivatives
Definitions, which provide a standardized frame of reference for the specialized credit related concepts
inherent in CDS transactions and not expressly laid out in the more boiler plate ISDA for all financial
derivative transactions. Examples of such terms and concepts include restructuring, modified
restructuring, credit event notice, physical auction settlement, etc.

1.3

CDS Market Structure

The first CDS was transacted in 1994 and while the size of the market has grown since that time to $16
trillion in terms of gross notional volume, the development and growth of that market has not been linear
(see Figure 2 based on BIS data). Against that backdrop, in this subsection I discuss the major events which
have impacted the growth of the market, the array of CDS product innovation utilizing the basic
instruments as building blocks (off of which the research questions explored in this document build) and
the regulatory changes occurring in response to the market’s growth and development.

5

In reality, transactional appetite with respect to a given counterparty customarily is limited to a prudent level of
unsecured credit threshold amount plus an assessed capability to post margin based on liquidity resources.
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Figure 2: Total Volume All CDS

Comparison of Total Volume of CDS and Multiname
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Source: BIS, December 2014

The basic plain vanilla CDS described in the prior section was developed by banks in order to give them
the ability to transfer credit risk associated with their corporate loan portfolios to other banks. Typically,
these loans were to large corporate borrowers (who had the critical mass to issue bonds which could be
used as reference obligations) and funded by a large syndicate of banks. Within the context of managing
their risk based capital budgets and appetite, these banks were looking for an efficient way to obviate
having to be locked into a buy and hold position for the life of the loan (which could be up to seven years)6.
Prior to the inception of CDS, banks only had available to them the option of the secondary loan market
into which they could offload credit risk, of which the mechanics were comparatively less efficient (Duffee
and Zhou 2001). In addition, one of the main idiosyncrasies of the secondary loan market was that once

6

The J.P. Morgan Guide to Credit Derivatives, 1999
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the loans were sold, the buying banks formally became part of the lending syndicate, meaning that the
transaction was transparent to and even had to be signed off on by the underlying borrower as per the
loan agreement7. This dynamic had potential competitive implications for the selling bank’s relationship
with the borrower, as the customer may not have been pleased with the possible negative signal the sale
sent to the market, i.e. perception the bank was not comfortable holding its credit risk. Furthermore, the
borrower may not have appreciated the potential for downward price pressure on the value of the loan
by the sale, thereby in effect raising its marginal cost of borrowing8. For this reason, one of the popularly
perceived advantages of CDS when the market first started was the ability to transfer credit risk without
disclosing the transaction to the borrower, thus preserving the underlying client-bank relationship.
While CDS are now over 20 years old, initial growth was tepid, with the market only beginning to gain
critical mass and liquidity at the end of the 1990s. To illustrate, from 1994 to 1997 gross notional volume
only grew to $180 bn. However, as discussed in Augustin, Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) and referenced in
the prior section, two seminal events thereafter initiated by ISDA helped markedly in catalyzing the
market, namely the issuance of the standardized CDS contract/annex in 1999 followed by the
standardized credit definitions in 2003. A further seminal event providing impetus to the market was the
exemption granted to CDS with respect to oversight by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
contained in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act passed in 2000. Together these events provided
the contractual, legal and regulatory confidence required to underpin increased trading and liquidity, the
result being that the market grew to $6 trillion in gross notional volume by 2004, a compound annual
growth rate of 65%.

7

Unless for example, it was a silent risk participation which precluded contact between the buyer and the borrower,
thus created agency related risk with respect to the selling bank.
8
In fact, I was once told point blank by a CFO in 2000, “we will not be awarding our next bond underwriting to
somebody dumping our loans in the secondary market.”
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With this transactional framework in place, innovation also began to occur with respect to the types of
CDS products available, resulting in the creation of a broader set of credit derivatives beyond the plain
vanilla variety. While much of this innovation was beneficial, some also proved to be deleterious in how
the instruments were used (or misused, as it were). Specifically, multi-name credit derivatives were
created, which in their simplest form, entailed the grouping of multiple reference entities into a basket
and the selling of a single CDS against that basket. Practically speaking, this meant that a buyer who was
concerned about the credit risk posed by a group of companies, yet did not have specific insight into which
one was most likely to default, could simply buy protection on the whole group of companies instead of
six individual CDS, and get made whole in the event one defaulted. While less costly, this approach also
is more efficient in that the buyer does not have to successfully predict which borrower will default.
A more complex multi-name credit derivative that was created and the one that is the subject of the
analyses in this document is the CDS index, which is analogous to the broader indices created for other,
more mature asset classes such as stocks (S&P 500), bonds (Merrill Lynch Global Bond Index) and
commodities (S&P GSCI). With this product, a buyer, typically a large investment fund manager, could buy
protection in or invest in a large portfolio of pooled CDS in a given country, region, industry, credit rating
etc., (the available categories are extensive and continue to proliferate).
Figure 3: CDS Index Construction
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The mechanics of how CDS indexes are constructed are illustrated in Figure 3. In the example, CDS written
on 100 different reference entities are pooled and weighted equally by 1% in the calculation of the value
of the composite index. Hedgers and speculators can then invest more efficiently in this cross-section of
100 firms rather than buying each single name CDS separately. A fund manager might want to do so in
order to hedge exposure to a broad category of systematic risk or increase the investment opportunity
set by speculating in a synthetic asset to enhance yield.
However, the importance of such indices extends well beyond the realm of professional investment
managers. This is due to the fact that CDS indices also function as important indicators of the general
health of the credit markets, economies, industry sectors, regions of the world, etc. and thus are looked
to as a bellwether leading indicators by the general business community communicating important
information. A recent example is illustrated below in Figure 4 and involves Bloomberg’s headline story
on February 8th, 2016 entitled “Credit Market Risk Surges to Four-Year High amid Global Sell-Off,” in
which a bellwether CDS index produced by Markit was highlighted as representative of the credit market.
Figure 4: Bloomberg Headline from 2/8/16
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Finally, in terms of major product innovation, the most complex and as fate would have it, most infamous
multi-name creation was the synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO). With synthetic CDOs, a
special purpose corporation, or entity (SPE) would be created to house a portfolio of CDS chosen by the
SPE creator, typically an investment bank experienced in issuing securities. The SPE subsequently
marketed the CDS risk exposure to investors looking to receive the quarterly premiums by taking a short
position in the underlying credit risk represented by the pool. In this regard, the investors were acting as
sellers insuring the value of the portfolio of CDS transferred into the SPE by the buyer(s). To attract a
broad range of investors, the SPE issued multiple tranches of notes with different priorities in the cash
flows of the CDO, thus creating a waterfall structure. However, as the US housing market heated up, banks
also started creating CDO’s with residential mortgage backed securities (MBS) as the underlying reference
obligations/securities, which in turn were backed by pools of funded residential home mortgages.
Synthetic CDOs written against these MBS as reference obligations resulted in the creation of substantial
amounts of toxic synthetic subprime mortgage exposure well beyond the cash market. This usage of a
non-traditional asset, namely MBS linked to the default risk of home buyers as the reference entities, was
a significant paradigmatic shift in the development of the market away from corporate credit risk.
This shift ultimately paved the way for synthetic CDOs and CDS indices backed by these assets to play a
material contributing role in the housing crisis, although they did not create it (Stulz, 2010). However, it is
important to realize that the problem was primarily an issue of financial over-engineering and misuse
occurring during an overheating housing market and not with the derivatives themselves, for as can be
seen the original purpose for which they were created differed with respect to how they were ultimately
deployed during the housing crisis.
Concurrent with this advent and proliferation of multi-name credit derivatives, the CDS market grew
exponentially as evidenced by an increase from the 2004 level of $6 trillion comprised mostly of single-
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name CDS (80%), to almost $60 trillion by 2007 by which time the market was spilt relatively evenly
between single-name and multi-name credit derivatives (55% vs. 45%). However, as per Chen, Fleming et
al. (2011), most of this volume was concentrated in the interdealer market, with a relatively small number
of banks (14) accounting for approximately 85% of all deals based on an analysis of 2010 data9. In addition,
the four most active dealer banks within that subset were involved in 50% of all buys and sells, a level of
concentration leaving the market quite susceptible to systemic risk.
To illustrate, a default by one dealer can cause a material loss in another which then subsequently
defaults, thereby creating a cascade of further defaults that eventually impact the entire economy. As
the crisis unfolded in 2008, transactional volume began to decline in light of the contributing role these
derivatives played and the risk that sellers would not be able to perform under the contract. This process
accelerated after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, after which time regulators, whose auspices did not
extend into the market, began to focus on the systemic risk that had been created by these instruments.
Accordingly, they began to take steps to mitigate this risk and as a result, total gross notional volume
dropped to $33 trillion by the end of 2009, an almost 50% decrease in just two years. From there, volume
essentially held steady for a few years (through the first half of 2011), from which point it gradually
declined to the $16 trillion figure as of December 2014 referenced earlier.
Of course, as also stated earlier, these historical figures are not directly comparable since they are
expressed as gross notional amounts and significant efforts have been undertaken since the crisis to
reduce these gross amounts. In addition to portfolio compression, one of the primary efforts has been the
migration of OTC bilateral trading to multilateral clearinghouses known as Central Clearing Counterparties
(CCP). In fact, as a result of legislation contained in the Dodd-Frank Act, 29% of all CDS trades as of

9

For more recent context, see Getmansky, M., et al. (2015). "Interconnectedness in the CDS market." Vanderbilt
Owen Graduate School of Management Research Paper(2436634&).
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December 2014 had been done on CCPs (BIS, December 2014), a figure which likely will increase in the
future, as legislation mandating that all new CDS index trading move to on- exchange takes effect.
On the basis of these factors, which have enhanced the safety of the market and as pointed out in
Augustin, Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) and (2015), CDS have proven to be resilient, with a baseline
demand still existing. Also, as seen in Figure 5, the multi-name segment of the market, the focus of the
research questions explored in this document, accounts for approximately half of overall volume, making
it a substantial segment. Finally, it is important to note that innovation in credit derivatives continues,
especially with respect to indexes as evidenced by the August 2014 launch of ProShares’ CDS Short North
American HY Credit and North American HY Credit ETFs based off of the CDX High Yield index.10 Against
that backdrop, CDS remain a very relevant research topic and in particular, CDS indexes, which are all the
more attractive given few historical papers have dealt specifically with multi-name derivatives.
Figure 5: Relevance of Multi-name Segment

Distribution of Notional Amount Outstanding for
All CDS in billions of US dollars

7358, 45%
9041, 55%

Single CDS

10

Mutiple CDS

“Finally, Credit Default Swap ETFs,” David Nadig, ETF.com, August 7th, 2014
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1.4

The Data Set

The historical credit default swap index data utilized in this analysis was sourced from Markit, which
produces the CDX family of indexes studied in these essays. Specifically, Markit owns and operates these
indices, including their licensing, marketing, administration and calculation on a daily basis (which it
publishes on its website). In calculating the value of a specific index, Markit collects mid, or bid/offer
spreads (and applicable prices) from licensed CDX index market makers and calculates the arithmetic
average of the mid-points of these spreads after dropping the highest and lowest quartile11.
The indices are constructed based on a defined set of rules and cover a multitude of sectors and
maturities12. In this analysis, I focus on two of the headline indices produced for North America, namely
the Markit CDX North American Investment Grade (CDX.NA.IG) and Markit CDX North American
Investment Grade (CDX.NA.HY) indexes. In addition, I analyze seven sub-indices derived from these two
headline indexes comprised of five industry sector based indices constituting the CDX.NA.IG and two
ratings based ones from the CDX.NA.HY, bringing the total number of credit indices examined to nine. As
such, within the context of the overall CDS Index opportunity set, the focus in this document is on the
area indicated in Figure 6.
Beyond that, while the primary focal point of the examination is the bellwether five-year maturity of these
indices, in two instances in which data is available on the 10-year maturity (the two headline indices), I
also employ them to study the potential for heterogeneity in the longer maturity, bringing the total
numbers of discrete Markit produced credit indices examined in this study to 11.

11

Markit Credit Indices: a Primer, October 2012
For specifics relative to the rules, please refer to Markit CDS High Yield and Markit CDX Investment Grade Index
Rules, March 2013.
12
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`Figure 6: Markit CDS Index Investment Opportunity Set

Research
Focus

Based on availability of data, the timeframe covered begins on 11/29/04 and ends on 9/18/2015,
encompassing Series 3 through 24 of the set of indices. Different series are produced given that indices
are rebalanced every six months. During this process, constituents may be removed and replaced based
on various rules governing the construction process, including but not limited to the level of trading
liquidity of individual CDS, change in credit rating or occurrence of a credit event. Once a new series is
issued (sequentially one number higher), it replaces the prior one as the on-the-run, or most recent index.
In addition to the formal rebalancing process, while a series is outstanding new versions may be issued
based on interim credit events, mergers, delisting, etc., with the new version replacing the prior one as
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the on-the-run version of the index (when series are newly issued, the version number is 1). In all instances
across all panel studies in this document, the data utilized corresponds to the on-the-run series of the
index and within each such series, the on-the-run version based on specific dates provided by Markit. This
aspect of the data is critical in the study of cross market efficiency given that liquidity typically drops-off
once a series or to a lesser extent, version of a series is no longer on-the-run. As this reduction in liquidity
equates to fewer investor views and/or information being impounded in the value of the index, failure to
keep the data current with respect to the on-the-run series/version would bias the results.
Equity related data used in this analysis is sourced primarily from CRSP. Exceptions consist of a handful
of stocks for which data is taken from the Yahoo Finance and the equally weighted S&P 500 index data
taken from S&P/Dow Jones’ website. Data is adjusted for stock splits and Canadian stocks are converted
into US Dollars, although such stocks comprise less than 1% of total data. S&P 500 data is utilized as is,
since it already represents an aggregated systematic index. For the closely matched portfolios, I manually
construct equity portfolios of individual stocks and calculate daily equally weighted index values for each
closely matched index. Also, I rebalance each portfolio every six months in conjunction with the newly
issued series of the corresponding CDX index to ensure constituents remain closely matched. To my
knowledge, this is the only study employing daily data for such an extended period of time which
rebalances this frequently.
In identifying the constituents of each CDS index, I use information available on the Bloomberg terminal.
This service not only lists the constituents of each index but also indicates which reference entities have
been removed and added within the context of the issuance of each new series. Due to the fact that some
reference entities included in CDX indexes are not publicly listed on stock exchanges, it is not possible to
achieve a 100% match throughout the life of the analysis between the subject CDX and stock indices.
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However, the issue is not material since on average, a 96% match is achieved with respect to the
investment grade sector, with a 90% match achieved in the high yield sector.
As a point of clarification, the average lower level of match in the high yield indices is due to the incidences
of leveraged buyouts in which companies are taken private and delisted. With such transactions, debt
burdens are substantial, naturally weighing on the credit profile of the target. As part of the debt financing
package, a material amount of bonds are often issued which are then ideal candidates to become
reference obligations for the writing of credit default swaps. Thus, there typically will be more non-public
reference entities in the high yield index, especially during periods of high leveraged buyout activity.
In general, the time series data provided by Markit enables an uninterrupted perspective on the nature
of informational flow between the systematic credit and equity markets. The one exception can be found
in the sector based sub-indexes of the CDX.NA.IG for a portion of time during the financial crisis.
Specifically, there are no reported settlements associated with the three month period from January 1 st,
2008 to March 26th, 2008 and the ten-month period from May 23rd, 2008 to March 15th, 2009 across all
five of sectors. However, this does not necessarily mean the data is missing but rather, in my estimation
is indicative of the nature of trading during that time for these generally less liquid instruments. Thus, the
very absence of data is relevant to cross informational flow analysis. In addition, because this is the only
instance of systematically omitted CDX data across all three chapters, it does not have a material impact
on the high level conclusions drawn with respect to observed patterns of flow and heterogeneity related
to the different types of instruments employed in each chapter.
Beyond this exception, there are a few other minor data idiosyncrasies. Specifically, observations with
respect to the 10-year CDX high yield index operationalized in the second essay begin on 1/11/07, or 25
months later than the five year maturity and thus do not exactly match the five-year analysis. However,
given the tangential focus given to the 10-year maturity in this document as well as the clear pattern of
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results associated with them, this shorter data span does not impact the general findings. In addition,
data on the equally weighted S&P 500 index starts on 3/31/2006, making the time period shorter than
that of the market capitalization weighted index. However again, this does not impact the general findings
due to the nature of the research question examined when this data is used (detection of any size bias).
Finally, observations related to the days on which rebalancing occurs are removed to avoid potential bias
associated with index movements attributed solely to changes in the constituents, as opposed to
underlying market movements. This issue is particularly relevant for matching equity portfolios. However,
because such days account for less than 1% of total data, there is no impact on the empirical results.
Descriptive statistics for the individual credit and equity related index data can be found in Table X. In
general, most observations dropped in preparing the data are related to holidays on which either equity
markets were closed but bond markets were open, or CDX settlements were reported due to the Canadian
firms. However, given that trading on these days was generally either light or only impacted the Canadian
names, little to no movement was observed in the CDX indexes. As such, removing these days has no
impact. When credit and equity indexes are paired, any remaining non-matching days are dropped.
In looking at Table 1, there are several aspects of the data worth highlighting. As expected, the mean
credit spread for the five-year CDX.NA.IG (87 bps) is much lower than that of the CDX.NA.HY (515 bps),
with the maximum values characterized by an even greater differential (279 bps vs. 1,910 bps). These
differentials naturally reflect the much greater risk of default represented by high yield firms and also
underscore the need to split the sample into investment grade and non-investment grade sectors.
Interestingly, the standard deviation of returns for the CDX.NA.IG (2.9%) is somewhat higher than that of
the CDX.NA.HY (2.63%). Also, the credit index standard deviations generally are much higher than their
corresponding matched investment grade (IG PORT: 1.24%) and high yield (HY PORT: 1.72%) indexes.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Entire Data Set

Time Series

Obs

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

Returns
Mean
Std Dev

CDS
CDX.NA.IG 5Y
CDX.NA.IG 10Y
CDX.NA.IG.CONS
CDX.NA.IG.ENRG
CDX.NA.IG.FIN
CDX.NA.IG.INDU
CDX.NA.IG.TMT
CDX.NA.HY 5Y
CDX.NA.HY 10Y
CDX.NA.HY.BB
CDX.NA.HY.B

2,680
2,671
2,433
2,432
2,436
2,435
2,435
2,686
2,071
2,648
2,668

87.0
108.8
70.7
78.5
101.5
74.9
82.9
515.7
532.5
317.1
494.3

42.6
31.45
21.5
41.4
82.2
29.2
33.5
284.9
191.2
145.6
267.7

28.8
53.6
35.4
12.6
17.1
23.2
31.7
208.5
268.1
129.4
211.8

279.7
250.5
203.3
207.6
674.6
235.3
249.2
1,910.1
1,464.4
1,006.9
1,936.2

0.000505
0.003110
-0.000620
-0.000350
-0.000600
-0.000180
-0.000380
0.000421
0.000351
0.000611
0.000358

0.02949
0.02974
0.01954
0.02216
0.02365
0.02252
0.02209
0.02633
0.02109
0.03214
0.02378

2,684
2,353
2,680
2,433
2,432
2,436
2,435
2,435
2,686
2,648
2,668

1,399.0
1,424.9
51.5
52.0
52.4
55.3
59.2
44.7
22.3
30.4
17.6

322.9
337.1
11.7
14.8
7.3
11.9
12.0
12.5
5.6
7.9
4.4

676.5
676.5
22.6
30.4
31.4
14.4
26.7
20.6
8.2
12.5
4.5

2,130.8
2,130.8
79.2
92.6
71.7
80.9
87.6
72.3
32.6
48.2
26.4

0.000189
0.000157
0.000175
0.000533
0.000385
0.000560
0.000580
0.000473
0.000201
0.000112
0.000435

0.01240
0.01303
0.01243
0.00889
0.01263
0.01417
0.01216
0.01041
0.01726
0.01721
0.01939

EQUITY
S&P 500
S&P 500 Equal
IG PORT
CONS IG PORT
ENRG IG PORT
FIN IG PORT
INDU IG PORT
TMT IG PORT
HY PORT
HY BB PORT
HY B PORT

With respect to the investment grade sub-indices, the industry with the highest mean credit spread (101.5
bps) and return standard deviation (2.37%) is the financial sector (CDX.NA.IG.FIN), which also has the
highest sector equity index standard deviation (FIN IF PORT: 1.41%). This is not surprising given that the
timeframe covered by the sample includes the financial crisis. The consumer cyclical sector
(CDX.NA.IG.CONS) has the lowest average credit spread (71 bps) and return standard deviation (1.95%)
as well as the lowest equity sub-index standard deviation (CONS IG PORT: 0.89%). The second highest
average credit spread can be found in the technology, media and telecommunications sector
(CDX.NA.IG.TMT: 83 bps). Not surprisingly, the sector also has the second highest average maximum

23
spread (249 bps), although the standard deviation of the corresponding equity index’s return is the second
lowest (TMT IG PORT: 10.41%) and materially lower than the other three. This makes the sector somewhat
anomalous amongst the sub-indices with respect to the consistency of cross market risk metrics.
Regarding the high yield sector sub-indices, the means of the credit spreads are as expected, with the
CDX.NA.HY.BB (317 bps) being materially lower than the CDX.NA.HY.B (494 bps), as are the maximum
spreads (1007 vs. 1,936). Interestingly, the standard deviation of the return of the BB-rated credit index
(3.2%) is higher than that of the B-rated one (2.3%), although those of the corresponding equity indexes
of at 1.72% and 1.9%, respectively. are consistent with an upward sloping risk/return curve.
As a final note, the mean credit spreads of the ten-year maturities of the CDX.NA.IG and CDX.NA.HY are
higher than those of their five-year counterparts. Although this is to be expected, the percentage
difference between the two maturities is much greater for the investment grade (15%) than the high yield
(3%) sector. Also, the return based standard deviation of the 10-year CDX.NA.IG is substantially the same
as that of the five-year while the 10-year CDX.NA.HY’s (2.1%) is significantly lower than the five-year’s
referenced above.

1.5.

Contributions of the Dissertation

The unique contributions of this document to the cross market informational flow literature on credit
default swap and equity markets include (i) extension of the general research on relative differential price
discovery in the CDS and stock markets to the present time (the majority of papers do not extend much
beyond the financial crisis), (ii) coverage of a broader aggregate time period (11 years); (iii) focus on the
systematic as opposed to non-systematic relationship and for a more extended period of time (the one
paper most related, Fung Sierra et al covers the time period from 2001-2007), (iv) testing of the broad
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CDX family of indices on a more comprehensive basis, including testing of the sub-indexes of both headline
CDX indexes for the first time (most examples have focused only on the headline CDX.NA.IG), (v)
differentiation of high yield firms based on underlying credit quality (prior studies have categorized noninvestment grade firms into a single high yield category), (vi) rebalancing of Markit CDX indexes every six
months for an extended period of time, (vii) extension of index related research to include the entire
financial crisis (Fung, Sierra et al’s paper ended in December 2007 and called for more fulsome crisis
related research); (viii) operationalization of equally weighted S&P 500 indexes for the first time to test
for size effect; (ix) investigation on a more rigorous basis of the differing impact on price discovery of
market conditions and (x) utilization of an event flexible methodological framework on a more
comprehensive basis (historical efforts either examine much shorter time periods or discrete events which
are not generalizable).
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ABSTRACT

In this chapter, I examine a series of research questions related to systematic cross-market informational
efficiency and flow in the investment grade credit and equity markets within a robust differenced VAR
framework. Prior efforts in the literature have focused almost solely on non-systematic information flow
which is based on individual firm characteristics as opposed to systematic factors. Almost without
exception, I observe a persistent semi-strong form of capital market efficiency between the subject
markets in which information, irrespective of whether it is positive or negative, is impounded in a quick
and timely manner. While this result is consistent with the Merton model of pricing assuming one unified
price, it is also in direct contravention to the general observation found in the prevailing VAR- based leadlag literature that investment grade rated equity markets lead credit markets. As a result, this finding that
systematic risk is traded differently than non-systematic has significant implications for practitioners
seeking to exploit perceived cross market informational inefficiencies.
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CHAPTER 1
SYSTEMATIC INFORMATION FLOW IN THE INVESTMENT GRADE MARKETS
This chapter explores cross-market informational efficiency and flow in the systematic investment grade
credit derivative and equity markets. Almost all of the relevant published credit derivative related
research has focused on non-systematic, or firm specific risk. This is due largely to the nature in which the
market developed. Specifically, the construction and proliferation of liquid, aggregate indices covering
broad exposures to systematic risk could only occur once the synthetic market, which began in 1994 and
started gaining momentum in 2000, had achieved sufficient critical mass in 2004. Also, given the unique
events of the last decade (US subprime mortgage crisis morphing into broader global financial crisis),
much of the early index related work centered on asset backed indices such as the ABX (Augustin,
Subrahmanyam et al. 2014), which derived its value from subprime mortgages precipitating the crisis.
As a result, research into aggregated systematic indices backed by corporate credit quality has remained
an underdeveloped area of inquiry within the CDS construct. However, given the significant size of this
segment vs. the overall $16 trillion market (approx. 50%)13, greater relative liquidity of the instruments
vis-à-vis single name CDS (Chen, Fleming et al. 2011), they trade 5x more frequently), primary focus with
respect to new product innovation14 and importance to the efficient functioning of financial markets15,
this area is a particularly auspicious candidate for both current and future research.
Regarding the last point, this importance is rooted in the dual salutary function of these indices, serving
as both as an indicator of the level of systematic risk in an economy, sector of an economy or region of

13

BIS Bank for International Settlements Statistic BIS Bank for International Settlements Statistical Release: OTC
Derivatives at end-December 2014, April 2015.
14
15

“Finally, Credit Default Swap ETFs,” David Nadig, ETF.com, August 7th, 2014
“Deriving the economic impact of derivatives: growth through risk management,” Milken Institute, March 2014

27
the world as well as an investable and liquidly tradable instrument with which investors can either hedge
their portfolio or diversify risk exposure to systematic factors. In this dual capacity, CDS indexes fulfill a
function analogous to aggregate indices in more mature financial markets such as the S&P 500 in the
equity market and Merrill Lynch High Yield Master II in the bond market.

Practically speaking, indices

backed by corporate credit derivatives linked to default risk are important indicators of systematic risk
because they are an aggregation of the individual risk premiums related to a large pool of single name
CDS covering reference entities active in a diverse cross section of economic sectors. Moreover, as has
been discussed, these particular risk premiums are considered to be a more pure and hence, efficient
measure of underlying default risk than those observed in the bond market (not to mention more
comparable across reference entities since they are standardized from a duration perspective).
To cite one of the most common examples, the bellwether CDX investment Grade Index is an aggregation
of the individual risk premiums of 125 large investment grade firms (rated BBB- and above) in North
America on which CDS have been written (“CDX.IG.NA”). Each firm’s individual risk premium is weighted
by 0.8% in the calculation of the overall weighted average risk premium of the index constituents (125 *
.08% = 100%), making it an equally weighted index mitigating the potential for large cap bias to affect the
measure of the general systematic default risk underlying an economic sector.
By aggregating such a diverse pool of constituents into an aggregate index, individual firm risk, or
idiosyncratic risk, ostensibly is diversified away, leaving only non-diversifiable or systematic risk to high
level factors linked to the probability of default such as interest rates and GDP growth. As a result of this
elimination of firm-specific risk, properly constructed measures can function as an effective gauge of the
overall default risk inherent in an economy and hence, are highly valued by a diverse set of financial
market related stakeholders for their informational content.

In addition, because of the broad

diversification benefits, investors can utilize them to hedge systematic country, region and/or industry
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sector risk exposures in their portfolios and/or expand the general investment opportunity set available
in the construction of efficient portfolios.
Against that backdrop, this chapter seeks to add to this strand of literature on cross-market informational
efficiency and flow by examining hypotheses/research questions pertaining to the CDX.NA.IG and equity
market counterparts.

1.1

Literature Review

So are CDS in general and CDS indices in particular more efficient than other financial markets from an
informational content perspective? Theoretically as per the Merton (1974) model, which essentially views
equity as a long call option on the value of a firm’s assets with debt being viewed as a short put option,
this should not be possible. This is because the risk adjusted return that can be generated from CDS should
equal that available by taking corresponding cash positions in the equity and/or bond markets since under
the conceptual framework, pricing in the different markets related to these instruments is driven by the
same set of determinant factors. In other words, these markets should react in the same manner to the
same news at the same time. However, this set of circumstances assumes a frictionless environment in
which seamless linkages between capital markets exist, whereas in practice and as has been generally
documented in various strands of financial market related research, for example by Duffie (1999), various
frictions can and often do occur. For this reason as well as the fact that CDS ostensibly are a less
convoluted measure of credit risk, a natural area of inquiry has evolved regarding the investigation of the
relative informational content provided by these synthetic instruments, and related speed of price
discovery vis-à-vis other capital markets. A summary of this relevant literature vis-à-vis the equity markets
is presented in Table 2.
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Table 2 : Summary of Relevant Lead-Lag Literature and Findings
Authors/Year

Timeframe

Sample Studied

Methodology

Observed Results

Longstaff, Mithal et al. (2003)

2001-2002

68 N. American firms

VAR

No relationship

Norden and Weber (2004)

2000-2002

90 Euro. & U.S. firms

Event Study

CDS lead stocks

Byström (2006)

2004-2006

Itraxx Europe IG Indices

Univariate

Implied CDS lead stocks

Acharya and Johnson (2007)

2001-2004

79 N. American firms

Univariate

CDS lead stocks

Fung, Sierra et al. (2008)

2001-2007

CDX IG & HY Indices

VAR

IG: Stocks lead, HY: 2-way

Norden and Weber (2009)

2000-2002

58 International firms

VAR

Stocks lead CDS

Forte and Pena (2009)

2000-2002

58 International firms

VECM

Stocks lead CDS

Ni and Pan (2011)

2008

19 Financial Institutions

Univariate

CDS lead stocks

Han and Zhou (2011)

2002-2009

695 U.S. firms

Univariate

CDS lead stocks

Marsh and Wagner (2012)

2004-2008

193 U.S. firms

VAR

Stocks lead CDS

Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013)

2004-2009

Financial Sector risk

VAR

CDS lead stocks

Narayan, Sharma et al. (2014)

2004-2012

212 S&P 500 firms

VECM

Stocks lead CDS

Hilscher, Pollet et al. (2015)

2001-2007

800 U.S. firms

VAR

Stocks lead CDS

Xiang, Chng et al. (2015)

2005-2009

174 U.S. IG firms

VECM

Implied CDS lead stocks

Based on the cumulative results, there is no definitive consensus as to which market is more efficient in
terms of price discovery. To be sure, certain studies find that the CDS market may lead the stock market
while others suggest that it is the other way around, or both markets invariably impact each other.
However, a close review of the papers reveals that much of this disagreement is attributable to
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heterogeneity in the methodological frameworks. As such, these studies differ significantly with respect
to sample sizes (often quite small); time periods, (often very narrow in scope and not extending beyond
2008), econometric methodologies, (event study vs. VAR framework or usage of observed vs. model
implied spreads in a VECM framework), geographies (in some cases) and credit quality of sample
(weighted heavily towards investment grade and as discussed, often combining investment and noninvestment grade firms).
Nonetheless, a few general observations can be made regarding observed informational flow. First, the
CDS market often appears to contain incremental information vis-à-vis the stock market, although the
findings suggest that the interactive effect could be time-varying in nature, regime dependent (or
asymmetrical) and heterogeneous across reference entity attributes. In addition, with respect to studies
employing multivariate time series data in a vector-based framework, stocks tend to lead CDS. However
these studies generally only investigate investment grade rated firms. Finally, given that only two of the
studies involve systematic risk, Byström (2006) and Fung, Sierra et al. (2008), and only Fung, Sierra et al
utilizes CDX indices, systematic risk remains a largely unexplored component of the market and therefore,
a particularly auspicious candidate for further research.

1.2

Hypotheses Development and Econometric Methodology

The research questions in this chapter focus on the cross market informational flow between the
bellwether CDX Investment Grade index (CDX.NA.IG) and related investment grade rated equity markets.
As stated, the CDX.NA.IG index is an equally weighted index comprised of 125 reference entities located
in North America and rated investment grade by at least two of the major rating agencies. This rating
distinction is particularly relevant given that investment grade rated credits have been shown to be
characterized by comparatively less default risk and thus under the Merton model construct, a much
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greater distance to default. This point is all the more relevant given the observation made by Norden and
Weber (2004) that the distance between the average implied probability of default between two
successive rating categories, for example, A and BBB or BB and B, increases as credit ratings deteriorate,
meaning that the default risk progression is not linear. This asymmetrically lower probability of default
for higher rated names has significant potential implications for how investors relate to news associated
with this sector.
In empirically investigating the CDX.NA.IG, I first examine the relationship for the full time series of
available data from 2004-2015 vis-à-vis the general S&P 500 equity index. This is done in order to ascertain
if one market generally leads the other in terms of price discovery. While the S&P 500 index contains more
companies than the CDX.NA.IG and is calculated on a market capitalization basis, this initial pass at the
relationship has practical relevance for two reasons. The first is that the S&P 500 consists primarily of
higher quality investment grade constituents and as such, if the two indices are effectively capturing
systematic risk, the nature of this relationship may be important from an informational content
perspective.
The second and more relevant in my estimation is that the S&P 500 index also is a much watched
bellwether indicator with respect to the perceived general health of the economy and therefore, likely an
equity related component of high-level financial market “dashboards” constructed by investors. Because
these dashboards are designed to quickly and efficiently gauge the overall health of the financial markets,
they generally also include indices like the CDX.NA.IG as a bellwether gauge of the salubriousness of the
credit markets. For this reason, the relationship between the two bellwether indices is important to
understand in a broader context. Furthermore and beyond this informational content usage, the S&P 500
index like the CDX.NA.IG index also is a liquidly tradable index. As a result, investors who want to take
advantage of perceived arbitrage opportunities between the two markets, or express their general views
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on the future directionality of either one can use them as efficient tools to do so since they represent
bundled packages of risk. Owing to this dynamic, research must therefore balance the needs between
absolute theoretical soundness and practical reality, which often results in cross hedges, or “dirty” hedges
such as this one, in financial parlance.
After examining this “headline” high-level systematic relationship, I then construct a closely matched
portfolio of equities consisting of firms included in the CDX.NA.IG, and calculate its value on an equally
weighted basis. This approach allows for the matching of both the systematic credit quality and weighting
methodology across the two markets, thus enabling a more direct comparison than with the S&P 500
(although it is less practical since it necessitates the aggregation of individual stocks). The index and
matching equity portfolio are examined in the exact same manner as in the first step in order to ascertain
any differences between the two. Robustness testing is then performed with respect to the potential for
exogenous factors affecting both the stock and CDS markets to influence the results (for example, implied
volatility, slope of the yield curve, etc.), or omitted variable bias.
Additionally and for the very first time in the literature, I also examine the relative informational content
advantage of the CDX.NA.IG and S&P 500 equity indices calculated on the basis of equal weighting. This
perspective is particularly interesting given that in addition to being a general robustness test for the initial
result, it can also detect the presence of any size related effect (Banz, 1981), or anomaly in the
informational flow between the two markets. This is because the traditional S&P 500 calculation
methodology gives greater weight to large firms in its construction whereas under the equally weighted
construct, each firm contributes equally to the overall index, irrespective of size. The rare instances in the
literature examining the issue of size bias are mixed in their conclusion. Specifically, Narayan, Sharma et
al. (2014) observed a size related effect and posited the potential for a large cap bias in informational flow
while Marsh and Wagner (2012) did not document any such relationship. In operationalizing this analysis,
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I analyze the same CDX indexes in conjunction with an equally weighted S&P 500 index constructed and
managed by S&P/Dow Jones.
In conjunction with the general price discovery relationship over the aggregate 2004-2015 time period, I
also investigate whether observed relationships are persistent or time-varying in nature by dividing the
overall sample into four distinct temporal subsamples. These periods are based on the different
characteristics of the CDS market prevailing at the time, e.g., associated regulatory framework, relative
age of market, product variety, and notional size of market. Based on these different characteristics, it is
reasonable to expect that a level of heterogeneity may exist within temporal subsamples.
The first period is called Growth and covers much of the exponential expansion and innovation in the
market in the run-up to the financial crisis. As the market was still new, investors were still learning how
to employ credit derivatives. Specific days covered begin at inception of the data on November 29th, 2004
and extend to June 7th, 2008, the day on which the Bear Stearns Enhanced Leveraged Credit Strategies
fund imploded (signaling the beginning of the mortgage crisis). This period is followed by Crisis, during
which the financial crisis started in the mortgage market and spread to the broader financial markets,
resulting in extreme systematic distress. The period extends through July 8th, 2009, the day on which the
average risk premium in the high yield credit markets crossed backed below 1,000 bps for good. This is
followed by the Pullback period, during which the CDS market began to decrease in notional size, certain
product categories virtually disappeared and many regulatory reforms were debated, with some being
enacted. This period runs through the end of 2011 after which the New Normal period takes effect, during
which more change came to the market with additional regulatory reforms enacted.
I then build off of and extend prior analyses of the potential for asymmetrical effects in price discovery.
Related studies in this regard include Norden and Weber (2004), Acharya and Johnson (2007), Fung, Sierra
et al. (2008), Ni and Pan (2011) and Marsh and Wagner (2012). In performing this analysis, I follow the
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methodology of Fung, Sierra et al most closely, investigating the presence of asymmetry within the
context of different prevailing market conditions, or what the authors term investor sentiment. Fung,
Sierra et al specifically examined the effects of price discovery on the basis of daily market movements,
dividing the data into three subsamples based on the directional movement of the S&P 500 on a given
day, namely up, down and flat and then employing the VAR framework within these three discrete sets.
However, I take a more a modified and comprehensive view with respect to this issue by defining up and
down markets in terms of the performance of the CDS market, while checking for robustness by also
examining the relationship in the context of down equity markets. Finally, I perform a robustness test for
the base form of model to ensure it is correctly specified.
On the basis of the foregoing approach, the specific hypotheses examined in this chapter are as follows:
H1: There is a persistent lead-lag relationship in the CDX.NA.IG and S&P 500
H2: There is a lead-lag relationship between the CDX.NA.IG and a closely matched portfolio of
stocks and it differs from that observed in the S&P 500
H3: The lead-lag relationship in the CDX family of investment grade indices and equity markets is
time-varying in nature
H4: There a size related effect in the lead-lag relationship in the CDX.NA.IG and S&P 500
H5: The lead-lag relationship in the CDX.NA.IG and related equity markets is regime dependent
based on investor sentiment
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Summary statistics from the description of the overall data set contained in the Introduction for the
specific indexes employed in this section are reflected in Table 3.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for First Chapter

Time Series

Obs

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

Returns
Mean
Std Dev

CDS
CDX.NA.IG 5Y
CDX.NA.IG 10Y

2,680
2,671

87.0
108.8

42.6
31.45

28.8
53.6

279.7
250.5

0.000505 0.02949
0.003110 0.02974

2,684
2,353
2,680

1,399.0
1,424.9
51.5

322.9
337.1
11.7

676.5
676.5
22.6

2,130.8
2,130.8
79.2

0.000189 0.01240
0.000157 0.01303
0.000175 0.01243

EQUITY
S&P 500
S&P 500 Equal
IG PORT

In examining the relative price discovery relationship(s) between the systematic CDS and equity markets.
I employ a vector autoregression model (VAR) well ensconced in the lead-lag literature. Examples include
Longstaff, Mithal et al. (2003), Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013), Fung, Sierra et al. (2008), Norden and
Weber (2009) and Hilscher, Pollet et al. (2015). The model was developed by Sims (1980) in order to
identify and capture the inter-temporal lead-lag dependencies between multiple sets of stationary time
series variables, in this instance the first difference of daily returns associated with credit derivative and
stock related indices. Furthermore, as noted by Norden and Weber (2009), this form of model has the
advantage of being a simultaneous equation estimation, meaning it is not necessary to estimate single
equations in isolation containing lags and leads as independent variables, which can make Granger
causality interpretation difficult. An overview of the differenced VAR based methodological framework is
given below in Table 4.
The first step in the methodological process for any vector based informational flow study is to check
whether the data is stationary. In instances in which co-integration may exist in time series variables, an
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alternative vector model must be utilized known as a vector error correction model (VECM). A good
example of this would be the relationship between CDS and bond market levels.
Table 4: Summary of Methodological Framework
Step in Determining:

Methodological Process

Stationarity of data

Dickey Fuller Test

Order of lagged VAR system

Schwarz Bayersian and Hannan Information criterion

VAR system coefficients

VAR system in (1)

General lead-lag relationship

Granger Causality and Wald tests applied to aggregate sample

Robustness to omitted variable bias

Addition of exogenous factors to VAR system applied to aggregate sample

Time variance of lead-lag relationship

Granger Causality test and Wald tests applied to temporal subsamples

Market conditions asymmetry

Addition of up and down market dummies to VAR system

VAR Robustness

Addition of moving average process to VAR system in (1) to form VARMA

Asymmetry during crisis

Addition of up and down market dummies to VAR system to crisis subsample

As such, I first subject the differenced time series data to a Dickey-Fuller test in which the null hypothesis
of a unit root is rejected, meaning that the data does not have a stochastic trend16. As a result, the choice
of an unrestricted differenced VAR model for this document is appropriate. Within this general VAR
framework, the variation in each time series variable is parsimoniously specified as a function of both its
own lagged variables and lagged variables of the other variable(s). This is known as a reduced form model
and the specific form of VAR used in this document is given as follows:

16

Results of the Dickey Fuller tests are not included in this document for the sake of brevity given the large
number of data sets tested; in all instances, unit roots were rejected at the 1% level of significance.
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Δ CDXt = a1 + ∑kj=1 b1j Δ Stockt-j + ∑kj=1 c1j Δ CDXt-j + ԑ1

(1)

Δ Stockt = a2 + ∑kj=1 b2j Δ Stockt-j + ∑kj=1 c2j Δ CDXt-j + ԑ2
where Δ CDXt: contemporaneous CDS index return, Δ Stockt: contemporaneous equity index return, Δ
CDXt-j: lagged CDS index return with lag order j, Δ Stockt-j: lagged stock index return with lag order j, ԑt:
disturbance term.
I then select the appropriate order for the VAR model, i.e. optimize its number of lags in specifying the
autoregressive relationship. This is accomplished through the application of information criterion
designed to select the best fit among a finite set of competing models. Since this analysis employs daily
data, I set the maximum lag equal to five given that this number represents one week of trading (setting
it longer crosses over into weekly periodicity). Given the size and liquidity of the markets studied, five
days should also be more than sufficient to capture any associated lead-lag dynamics. Finally, this is the
process followed by Norden and Weber (2009) in their work that included daily as well as weekly data.
There are multiple information criterion methodologies, or selection-order statistics used in the literature
from which to choose to specify the optimal lag of a VAR model. The objective of all of these statistics is
to choose the lag order achieving the best balance between model over-fitting (too many lags) and model
inadequacy (too few). Because the information criterion seeks to minimize the penalized in-sample fit
associated with the lagged values, it chooses the lag length corresponding to the lowest information
criterion value as the one representing the best fit17. In this document, I focus on the results given by the
Schwarz Bayesian (SBC) and to a somewhat lesser extent, Hannon-Quinn (HQC) information criterion
statistics, as these have been found to have theoretical advantages in avoiding over-parameterization,
while some of the other statistics may actually overestimate the true lag order18. Furthermore, the SBC

17

Excerpt from Stata manual found on stata.com pertaining to information criterion
Excerpt from Stata manual found on stata.com and referencing pgs. 148-152 of Lütkepohl, H. (2005). New
introduction to multiple time series analysis, Springer Science & Business Media.
18
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imposes the stiffest penalty with respect to the inclusion of additional lags to the model, making it more
conservative in that it minimizes the general statistical issue of additional parameterization spuriously
adding to explanatory power (e.g., R-Squared vs. R-Squared argument).
Once the optimal order is determined, I perform a Granger Causality Wald test (Granger 1969) to ascertain
whether one time series variable in the VAR system “Granger-causes” the other. A given variable, x is said
to Granger-cause another variable y if based on the past values of y in the data set, lagged values of x are
useful in predicting y19. The null hypothesis is that all lagged coefficients of x modeled in the VAR system
equation featuring y as the dependent variable equal zero. If the null hypothesis is rejected, causality is
observed and x is deemed to be useful in predicting y. If the null is not rejected, there is no apparent cross
variable lead-lag relationship between x and y. Based on the tested coefficients of the VAR specifications
given in (1), there are three possible outcomes, (i) no causality running from either market to the other,
(ii) causality running from one subject market to another, in which case, one market appears to have an
informational advantage or (III) two-way causality, in which both markets affect each other, ostensibly by
impounding certain types of information more efficiently than the other.
If Granger causality is determined, I then go a step further and test each VAR equation via a Wald test to
ascertain whether any observed causality is robust to inclusion of the lags of the dependent variable as
well (y in the above example) in the null hypothesis in each specification. While this step is generally not
required, it provides a layer of robustness with respect to the initially observed Granger causality. As such,
to be conservative I only document causality if observed in both the Granger and Wald tests. Still, one of
the potential limitations of Granger causality is that it is not necessarily true causality in that it involves
the checking of pairs of time series variables. Therefore, if the two subject variables are driven by a

19

Excerpt from Stata manual found on stata.com pertaining to Granger causality tests

39
common third (or more) factor, or variable(s) with different lags, the result may be spurious20. Therefore,
as a critical part of the methodological framework, I also test the headline Granger result for the existence
of omitted variable bias related to systematic factors in the economy not modeled in (1).
Procedurally, I explicitly model these presumably exogenous factors in the endogenous system in (1) and
rerun the test. I then compare the two sets of results and determine whether the initial Granger causality
has changed. If so, I conclude that the initial result was spurious due to the exclusion of endogenous
variables. In choosing an appropriate set of systematic exogenous factors, I draw conceptually on the
factors employed by Norden and Weber (2009) and Fung, Sierra et al. (2008) in their robustness checks,
who based their variables off of factors identified by Collin‐Dufresne, Goldstein et al. (2001) as
determinants of credit spreads. Specifically, I include changes in the 3-month T-bill rate (DTRATE) to
control for the general level of interest rates, slope of the Treasury curve (DSLOPE) to take into account
points along the economic cycle, lagged 5-year swap spread (DSWAP) to control for the general level of
default risk in the economy and lagged implied volatility of the equity market (DVIX) to gauge the level of
fear in the market21. As a result, the form of VAR tested in this step is as follows:
Δ CDXt = a1 + ∑kj=1 b1j Δ Stockt-j + ∑kj=1 c1j Δ CDXt-j + X1tEXOt + ԑ1

(2)

Δ Stockt = a2 + ∑kj=1 b2j Δ Stockt-j + ∑kj=1 c2j Δ CDXt-j + X2tEXOt + ԑ2
where EXO: a vector of exogenous variables consisting of DTRATE, DSLOPE, DSWAP and DVIX, with all
other factors remaining the same as in (1).
Because Granger causality tests assume a stable vector, I also test for potential asymmetrical effects based
on market conditions. To my knowledge, this type of test has been performed only one other time within

20

Eichler, M. (2012). "Causal inference in time series analysis." Causality: Statistical perspectives and applications:
327-354.
21

Exogenous factor data sourced from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/

40
a VAR framework in the literature (Fung, Sierra et al. 2008). However, the need has been increasingly
highlighted in econometrics research, most relevantly by Hatemi-j (2012) who suggested a process
whereby cumulative positive and negative shocks to variables are evaluated separately, which I do in this
document. In performing this test I generally build off of the procedure outlined by Fung, Sierra et al. To
illustrate, I bifurcate the data into up and down market days based on the sign of the return and run the
same tests on each set of data. I then compare the down market result with the initial headline result as
well as the up market test. Logistically, the segregation of the data into up and down market days is
accomplished via an interaction term created by multiplying the time series variable CDX and Stock by the
dummy variable Sign. So that relevant days flow through to the causality tests, the dummy variable is
assigned a value of 1 when the return is positive and zero otherwise in the down market test, and 1 when
the return is negative and zero otherwise in the up test. As such, the form of VAR in this step is as follows:
Δ CDXt = a1 + ∑kj=1 b1j Δ Stockt-j + ∑kj=1 c1j Δ CDXt-j + ∑kj=1 d1j Δ Stockt-j x Signt

(3)

+ ∑kj=1 e1j Δ CDXt-j x Signt + ԑ1
Δ Stockt = a2 + ∑kj=1 b2j Δ Stockt-j + ∑kj=1 c2j Δ CDXt-j + ∑kj=1 d2j Δ Stockt-j x Signt
+ ∑kj=1 e2j Δ CDXt-j x Signt + ԑ2
where Sign = 1 when Δ CDXt > 0 in the down market test and Sign = 1 when Δ CDXt < 0 in the up market
test. All other variables remain as in (1).
Again, while this process is largely based off the formula followed by Fung et al, there are a few substantive
differences. Most relevantly for this chapter, while Fung et al define down market conditions/negative
investor sentiment based solely on the sign of returns in the equity market (Δ Stockt), I use the credit
market (Δ CDXt) as the benchmark for investor sentiment. This approach allows for enhanced detection
of any ability of the credit market to asymmetrically pick up adverse news, as has been observed in some
of the prior research. However, in addition to this, I also rerun the analysis represented in (3) using Fung,
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Sierra et al’s equity market centric definition based on Δ Stockt in order to get a more fulsome perspective
on the cross market impact investor sentiment and determine whether it persists under both sets of
conditions.
The last step in the VAR framework involves robustness testing. The first test is for form of model in which
I add a moving-average process (MA) to the VAR system in (1) to ascertain whether the true form should
also include lagged unobserved shocks (lagged error terms) in addition to the current one (ԑ1). This type
of model is known as a VARMA and can have theoretical advantages over the more widely used VAR
specification under certain circumstances (Dufour and Pelletier 2002) (Dias and Kapetanios 2014)
(Lütkepohl 2006). As such, I add lagged error terms to the system in (1) consistent with the order of the
model, with the form of model becoming as follows:
Δ CDXt = a1 + ∑kj=1 b1j Δ Stockt-j + ∑kj=1 c1j Δ CDXt-j + ∑kj=1 d1j ԑ t-j + ԑ1

(4)

Δ Stockt = a2 + ∑kj=1 b2j Δ Stockt-j + ∑kj=1 c2j Δ CDXt-j + ∑kj=1 d2j ԑ t-j + ԑ2
where d1j ԑ t-j and d2j ԑ t-j are moving average processes of order j (order of the model) and all other factors
remain as in (1).
In determining whether the model has been correctly specified, I compare the results of the VAR and
VARMA for the aggregated samples. If the results are different, the time series relationship may be better
expressed as a VARMA. If they are substantially the same, I conclude the VAR specification is correct.
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1.3

Results

CDX.NA.IG 5Y and S&P 500 Indexes
In testing H1, I examine the bellwether five-year CDX.NA.IG and S&P 500 indices in a comprehensive series
of panels. The empirical results of the analysis are reflected below in Table 5. All autoregressive panels
were specified as VAR (1) models by the applied information criterion.
Table 5: CDX.NA.IG 5-Year Index and S&P 500

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2004-2015
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

Lagged CDS Index Lagged Equity Index Lagged VAR System
b
b
S&P 500t-1 p-value S&P 500t-1 p-value
chi2
p-value
0.002
(0.18)
0.121 **(0.03)

Panel B: High Growtha
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

-

Panel C: Crisis
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

0.034
(0.13)
0.056 **(0.03)

Panel D: Pullback
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

-

-0.039
(0.18)
0.133 **(0.05)

Panel E: New Normal a
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

-

Panel F: Down Market
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

0.021
(0.16)
0.152 ***(0.00)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

0.059
0.101

Panel H: Exogenous Vars
S&P 500t
CDX IGt
Panel I: VARMA
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

-

-0.104
-0.018
-0.507
-0.002

*(0.06)
(0.81)
(0.67)
(0.98)

27.01 ***(0.00)
18.14 ***(0.00)
-

13.79 ***(0.00)
7.62 **(0.03)

-0.147 **(0.03)
0.152
(0.17)
-

-

-

5.32
4.11

*(0.07)
(0.13)

-

-

0.138
0.544

(0.71)
(0.61)

21.36 ***(0.00)
22.1 ***(0.00)

0.078
-0.112

(0.66)
(0.49)

20.16 ***(0.00)
7.68
(0.11)

0.004
(0.66)
0.135 ***(0.00)

-0.104 ***(0.00)
-0.066
(0.59)

33.14 ***(0.00)
37.5 ***(0.00)

0.003
(0.82)
0.118 ***(0.00)

-0.095 ***(0.00)
0.064
(0.30)

55.21 ***(0.00)
55.21 ***(0.00)

*(0.06)
(0.13)

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Time period is not autoregressive
b
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded
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As can be seen from the p-values in the bordered cells in the “Lagged CDX Index” and “Lagged Equity
Index” columns, for the aggregate time period covering 2004-2015 (Panel A), there is no systematic leadlag relationship between the markets observed. This result is very interesting given that prior multivariate
vector based investigation of investment grade rated single name CDS generally indicated that the stock
market lead the synthetic credit market in terms of price discovery, e.g., Fung, Sierra et al. (2008), Norden
and Weber (2009), Narayan, Sharma et al. (2014) and (Hilscher, Pollet et al. 2015). This indicates that the
autoregressive characteristics of the specification are coming solely from the lagged values of the
dependent variables and there is no cross-market effect.
In examining H3, this general result is also robust to the different temporal subsamples investigated (see
Panels B - E) and in fact, in two of the periods -- High Growth and New Normal -- no auto-regression is
observed, meaning that the returns are not “sticky” when viewed within these sub-contexts. In addition,
as reflected in Panel H the result is robust to the inclusion of a broad specification of systematic exogenous
factors in the VAR system, meaning that the foregoing result is not due to omitted variable bias and based
on the results in Panel I, the specification of the base model as a VARMA does not change the observed
efficiency.
Furthermore and providing additional credence to the result, in the panel testing investor sentiment
related to H5 (Panel F), which divides the data into “up” and “down” days, there is no observable
asymmetry in the causality pattern as both of the p-values are insignificant. This indicates that the lack of
cross-market information flow is independent of the general mood of the market. Interestingly however,
during the crisis period there was a measure of Granger causality running from the credit to the equity
markets on down days based on the p-value = 0.06 (Panel G). This suggests that negative news was more
efficiently impounded in the pricing of the credit markets vis-à-vis the systematic equity ones during this
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time of great distress. This is not surprising given the general extreme level of duress and panic
experienced during that temporal subsample, a dynamic which ultimately manifested itself in an
exponential increase in probabilities of default priced in by investors. However, as can be seen this result
is the exception as opposed to the rule within the broader context of this comprehensive panel study. As
such, viewed in totality, the systematic credit and equity markets appear to be equally efficient in
impounding investor information. This result suggests a general level of capital market efficiency with
respect to the investment grade sector and as such, supports the theoretical construct of the “one price”
argument underpinning the Merton model. Accordingly, H1, H3 and H5 do not hold. This result is
particularly interesting given that prior tests of mostly unsystematic risk generally documented a lead-lag
relationship flowing from the equity to the credit market.
CDX.NA.IG 5Y and Matched Portfolio of Investment Grade Stocks
I then investigate H2 (and with that, H3 and H5) using the CDX.NA.IG index and a closely matched portfolio
of investment grade rated stocks comprised of the constituents of the CDX index, which is equally
weighted (IG PORT). This analysis is undertaken to eliminate the general mismatch between the
constituents of the CDX.NA.IG and S&P 500 index while also controlling for the different weightings given
to the underlying constituents of the S&P 500 (which is weighted based on market capitalization). By
eliminating these incongruities, one can control for potential bias in the previous result. The empirical
results of the analysis are reflected in Table 6. Once again, where price stickiness was observed all
autoregressive panels were specified as VAR (1) models as per the applied information criterion methods.
Interestingly, the results mirror those of the prior section, suggesting a consistency in how the systematic
investment grade related capital markets impound information, irrespective of the constituents included
in the systematic measure. Specifically, based on the relevant p-values reflected in the bordered cells in
the aggregate sample (Panel A), there is no general lead-lag relationship between the CDS and equity
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markets in either direction. Furthermore, this result is robust to all temporal periods under examination
(Panels B - E) with once again, the High Growth and New Normal sub-periods not being affected by lagged
values, irrespective of the market, the controlling for of relevant exogenous variables which could
conceivably bias the result (Panel H) and the splitting of the data into up and down markets reflecting
investor sentiment (Panel F) and the specification of the model as a VARMA (Panel I).
Table 6: CDX.NA.IG 5-Year Index and Matched Portfolio of IG Stocks

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2004-2015
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

Lagged CDS Index Lagged Equity Index Lagged VAR System
b
b
CDX IGt-1 p-value IG PORTt-1 p-value
chi2
p-value
0.009 (0.412)
0.875 ***(0.00)

-0.558
-0.019

(0.33)
(0.79)

Panel B: High Growtha
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

-

Panel C: Crisis
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

0.026
0.056

(0.13)
(0.37)

-0.507
-0.019

(0.67)
(0.873)

-0.033
0.112

(0.25)
*(0.09)

-0.133
0.162

(0.43)
(0.28)

Panel D: Pullback
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

-

Panel E: New Normal a
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

-

Panel F: Down Market
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

0.021
(0.16)
0.152 ***(0.00)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

0.054
0.129

-

-

-

-

-

13.98 ***(0.00)
16.41 ***(0.00)
-

7.78
6.86

**(0.02)
**(0.03)

4.63
*(0.98)
16.41 ***(0.00)
-

-

0.138
0.544

(0.71)
(0.61)

21.36 ***(0.00)
22.1 ***(0.00)

*(0.09)
*(0.07)

0.052
-0.077

(0.51)
(0.65)

11.52 ***(0.02)
8.09
*(0.09)

Panel H: Exogenous Vars
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

0.009
(0.41)
0.125 ***(0.00)

0.031
-0.066

(0.11)
(0.36)

18.79 ***(0.00)
34.28 ***(0.00)

Panel I: VARMA
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

0.011
(0.35)
0.103 ***(0.00)

-0.535 **(0.04)
0.034
(0.58)

38.93 ***(0.00)
38.93 ***(0.00)

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Time period is not autoregressive
b
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded

In addition, there is a slight level of causality observed during the structural break that was the mortgage
crisis which runs from the credit to the equity market on down days (Panel G), however again, as with the
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prior panel study the significance is weak (although to be fair, the chi2 stat for the VAR specification with
the equity index as the dependent variable is significant at p=0.02 whereas the chi2 stat for the CDX index
equation is only weakly significant at p=0.09). Again, this result suggests a level of efficiency in the capital
markets in which investors in both markets are generally equally aware of news related to the factors
which affect returns, which under the Merton model are assumed to be identical. And once again, this
result differs from those observed by researchers who studied the non-systematic relationship between
the two markets under study and found that the investment grade market often lead the credit market.
In fact, even Fung, Sierra et al, who employed indexes in their studies and concluded the same. H2 also
does not hold as well as H3 and H5.
CDX.NA.IG 10Y and S&P 500 Indexes
Modifying the juxtaposition of the first two panels slightly, I retest H1 by replacing the 5-year maturity of
the CDX.NA.IG index with the 10-year index and run the same tests to ascertain whether there is any
asymmetry at this longer dated point along the credit curve. This is the first VAR based study which
examines the 10-year maturity. Why is this index worth looking at it as well? Given that the 10-year
maturity is not as liquid as the bellwether 5-year (BIS December 2014), it is reasonable to expect that the
result will differ in some respects. In addition, although almost all of the research done on CDS is focused
on the five-year point along the curve, the 10-year derivative remains relevant in that one can make the
argument that the longer average life better matches that of a stock’s which is it indefinite. The empirical
results of this analysis are reflected in Table 7. As with the panel, where price stickiness was observed all
autoregressive panels were specified as VAR (1) models as per the applied information criterion methods.
Interestingly, in the aggregated headline result (Panel A) a relatively strong level of cross-market causality
is observable, flowing from the S&P 500 index to the credit markets (Granger p-value =.04 and Wald test
= .00). However, based on the Granger p-values in Panels B - E, such causality is not evident in any four of
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the temporal subsamples representing different market structure regimes, raising some concerns about
the robustness of the initial headline result.
Table 7: CDX.NA.IG 10-Year Index and S&P 500

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2004-2015
S&P 500 t
CDX IGt

Lagged CDS Index
CDX IGt-1 p-value
0.001
(0.42)
-0.097 ***(0.00)

Lagged Equity Index Lagged VAR System
S&P 500 t-1 p-value
chi2
p-value
-0.091 ***(0.00)
-0.588 **(0.04)

23.32 ***(0.00)
27.97 ***(0.00)

Panel B: High Growth*
S&P 500 t
CDX IGt

-

Panel C: Crisis
S&P 500 t
CDX IGt

0.034
0.074

(0.19)
(0.18)

-0.101
-0.156

Panel D: Pullback
S&P 500 t
CDX IGt

-0.052
0.063

(0.11)
(0.27)

-0.141 **(0.02)
-0.894
(0.38)

Panel E: New Normal
S&P 500 t
CDX IGt

-0.033
(0.26)
0.163 ***(0.00)

-0.024
0.117

(0.65)
(0.24)

1.81
(0.41)
13.07 ***(0.00)

Panel F: Down Market
S&P 500 t
CDX IGt

0.008
-0.176

(0.83)
(0.24)

-0.186 ***(0.01)
0.074
(0.35)

15.36 ***(0.00)
9.25 **(0.05)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
S&P 500 t
CDX IGt

-0.005
0.003

(0.74)
(0.98)

-0.141 ***(0.00)
-0.655
(0.18)

29.71 ***(0.00)
3.31
(0.51)

Panel H: Exogenous Vars
S&P 500 t
CDX IGt

0.001
(0.41)
-0.097 ***(0.00)

-0.091 ***(0.00)
-0.147
(0.73)

31.25 ***(0.00)
30.86 ***(0.00)

Panel I: VARMA
IG PORT t
CDX IGt

0.001
(0.41)
-0.097 ***(0.00)

-0.090 ***(0.00)
-0.583 **(0.04)

50.91 ***(0.00)
50.91 ***(0.00)

-

-

*(0.07)
(0.17)

-

-

23.32 ***(0.00)
9.09 **(0.01)
6.13
6.93

**(0.05)
**(0.03)

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Time period is not autoregressive
b
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded

In addition, I note that there is no cross market relationship evident when investor sentiment is negative
in the aggregated sample (Panel F), which is surprising when viewed against the backdrop of the ostensibly
quicker impounding of information in equities.
This result is all the more curious given that no down market asymmetry was observable during the
mortgage crisis (Panel G). During that time, it would have been reasonable to expect the presence of a
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negative feedback mechanism originating in the equity market and then being picked up by the less liquid
10-year market. However, these seemingly contradictory results appear to be adjudicated in the
robustness test which includes presumably exogenous factors which could be impacting the result (Panel
H). Specifically, when I include the standard slate of systematic factors testing for omitted variable bias,
the equity marked related causality completely disappears (Granger p-value = .73), indicating that the
initial result may have spuriously attributed a causal relationship between the two markets. This result
underscores the importance of modeling such factors in a robustness test and leads to the general
conclusion that the systematic investment grade capital markets are also efficient at this maturity. H1 also
does not hold with the 10-year maturity along with H3 and H5.
CDX.NA.IG 10Y and Matched Portfolio of Investment Grade Stocks
I then retest H2 using the 10-year maturity to eliminate potential mismatch and/or weighting basis. Again,
it is reasonable to expect some heterogeneity based on the differences in the construct of the indices,
although given the results of the first three panels, a general level of efficiency would not be surprising.
The empirical results of the analysis are reflected in Table 8. All autoregressive panels were specified as
VAR (1), with the High Growth period not being characterized by auto-regression.
In essence, a rather similar pattern of results is observable as in the prior panel examining this index with
respect to the S&P 500. In the test for the aggregate sample from 2004-2015 (Panel A), a very significant
level of cross-market Granger causality is observed originating in the equity market and flowing through
to the synthetic credit market (Granger p-value =.001; Wald test =.000). However, when I examine the
aggregated sample more granularly in the testing of H3, I do not observe any cross-market causality in
either direction in three of the four temporal subsamples, with the only exception being the Crisis
subsample. However, even in this subsample, the level of significance is not strong (Granger p-value =.07;
Wald test .05), raising some concerns about the robustness of the headline result.
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Table 8: CDX.NA.IG 10-Year Index and Matched Portfolio of IG Stocks

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2004-2015
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

Lagged CDS Index Lagged Equity Index Lagged VAR System
CDX IGt-1 p-value IG PORTt-1 p-value
chi2
p-value
0.001
(0.34)
-0.098 ***(0.00)

-0.062 ***(0.00)
-0.724 ***(0.01)

11.81 **(0.03)
30.25 ***(0.00)

Panel B: High Growtha
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

-

Panel C: Crisis
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

0.038
0.061

(0.15)
(0.27)

-0.054
-0.201

(0.36)
*(0.07)

6.74
10.45

**(0.03)
**(0.05)

Panel D: Pullback
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

-0.037
0.003

(0.23)
(0.49)

-0.121
-0.144

(0.03)
(0.15)

4.67
7.81

*(0.09)
**(0.02)

Panel E: New Normal
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

-0.027
(0.31)
0.144 ***(0.00)

-0.036
0.085

(0.47)
(0.38)

1.05
(0.59)
12.11 ***(0.00)

Panel F: Down Market
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

0.001
(0.40)
-0.098 ***(0.00)
\

-0.128 ***(0.00)
0.381
(0.44)

26.57 ***(0.00)
33.11 ***(0.00)

0.021
(0.77)
0.398 ***(0.00)

9.06
*(0.06)
14.82 ***(0.01)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
IG PORTt
CDX IGt
Panel H: Exogenous Vars
IG PORTt
CDX IGt
Panel I: Exog/Crisis/Down
IG PORTt
CDX IGt
Panel J: VARMA
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

0.048
0.043

-

(0.21)
(0.57)
\

0.002
(0.34)
-0.098 ***(0.00)

-

-0.461
-0.451

-

-

-

*(0.10)
(0.27)

18.45 ***(0.00)
31.87 ***(0.00)

(0.39)
(0.37)

0.106
(0.22)
-0.326 *(0.059)

32.57 ***(0.00)
60.70 ***(0.00)

0.001
(0.34)
-0.098 ***(0.00)

-0.062 ***(0.00)
-0.718 ***(0.01)

41.71 **(0.03)
41.71 ***(0.00)

0.031
0.066

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Time period is not autoregressive
b
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded

Furthermore, in testing H5 the lack of cross-market causality is evident in the examination of down
markets in Panel F, although I note that the down market test during the crisis suggests a strong level of
causality flowing from the systematic equity to the credit markets. To be fair, such a result would not be
surprising in light of the general market conditions and relative lower liquidity levels associated with the
10-year maturity, meaning that it would be logical for it to react ex post facto to events in the much more
heavily traded equity index.
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With the demonstrated need for adjudication in this study as with the prior one, I then focus on the
robustness test involving the inclusion of exogenous variables and in fact, note that the headline
aggregated result is not robust to the controlling for of these factors (the p value = 0.27, indicating that
the null hypothesis of no Granger causality cannot be rejected). Still, I believe that the investigation must
be taken one step further before a general conclusion can be made and to that end, include an additional
panel test heretofore not included in the prior panels. Specifically, I test the down market during the crisis
with the inclusion of the exogenous variables since these impacted the headline result (Panel I). Based on
the p-value =.059, a weak level of cross-market causality flowing from the equity market is still observable,
although to be sure, it is much less significant than the headline result. The final test involving the
modeling of the autoregressive relationship as a VARMA (Panel J) indicates that the VAR specification is
correct.
As a cumulative result of these studies, I conclude that there is no general level of Granger causality in
either direction in the 10-year maturity, although there was a slight lead-lag relationship during the
mortgage crisis during down days only. This result substantially supports the view that the investment
grade rated systematic capital markets are efficient and also provides the first documentation of an
asymmetry related to investor sentiment, albeit a limited one. H2, H3 and H5 substantially do not hold.

CDX.NA.IG 5Y and Equally Weighted S&P 500 Indexes
In the direct testing of H4, I examine the relationship between the five-year CDX.NA.IG and the equally
weighted S&P 500 index produced by S&P/Dow Jones. As such, any bias in the initial result related to firm
size can be eliminated. Because large companies tend to have more information flow and greater market
efficiencies (Hong, Lim et al. (2000)), the broader underlying trend in causality could be masked by this
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dynamic. The empirical results are reflected in Table 9. Once again, where price stickiness was observed
all autoregressive panels were specified as VAR (1) as per the applied information criterion methods.
Table 9: CDX.NA.IG 5-Year Index and Equally Weighted S&P 500

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2006-2015
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

Lagged CDS Index Lagged Equity Index Lagged VAR System
CDX IGt-1 p-value S&P 500t-1 p-value
chi2
p-value
0.002
(0.89)
0.115 ***(0.00)

Panel B: High Growth*
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

-

Panel C: Crisis
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

0.034
(0.18)
0.121 **(0.03)

Panel D: Pullback
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

-

-0.039
(0.19)
0.133 **(0.05)

-0.097 ***(0.00)
-0.053
(0.42)
-0.104
-0.002

*(0.06)
(0.98)

23.27 ***(0.00)
23.84 ***(0.00)
-

-

13.79 ***(0.00)
7.62 **(0.03)

-0.147 **(0.03)
0.211
(0.16)

5.36
4.10

*(0.07)
(0.13)

Panel E: New Normal*
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

-

Panel F: Down Market
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

0.006
(0.59)
0.116 ***(0.00)

-0.027
-0.008

(0.76)
(0.99)

56.61 ***(0.00)
43.66 ***(0.00)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

0.052
0.146

0.022
-0.024

(0.78)
(0.88)

20.69 ***(0.00)
10.35
(0.04)

Panel H: Exogenous Vars
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

0.004
(0.75)
0.136 ***(0.00)

-0.102 ***(0.00)
-0.054
(0.49)

28.92 ***(0.00)
33.71 ***(0.00)

Panel I: VARMA
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

0.002
(0.89)
0.116 ***(0.00)

-0.096 ***(0.00)
-0.056
(0.40)

47.33 ***(0.00)
47.33 ***(0.00)

-

(0.11)
(0.04)

-

-

-

-

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Time period is not autoregressive
b
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded

Comparing Table 9 with Table 6, it is apparent that there is little to no bias in the initial result, indicating
market efficiency related to size. In fact, with the exception of the down market analyses, the results are
almost the exact same. Specifically, there is no causality in either direction in the aggregate sample (Panel
A – please note that the total time period covered is somewhat shorter), nor in any of the temporal
subsamples (Panels B - E), reflecting an independence in calculation methodology. In addition, the results
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are very robust to the inclusion of the comprehensive set of exogenous factors, with once again, the VAR
character of the specification being derived solely from the lagged values of each dependent variable.
Moreover, the absence of causality observed with respect to the test for asymmetry in down markets in
the aggregate sample indicates a persistence in the general result independent of investor sentiment and
the time series data is correctly specified as a VAR model.
The only difference in the result is given by Panel G in which down markets are examined more granularly
within the context of the mortgage crisis subsample.

Whereas in the first study a weak level of

significance in terms of causality was observed (p=.06) flowing from the credit to the equity markets, in
the equally weighted study such causality is rejected (p=.11), although it fell just short of the 10%
significance threshold. This asymmetry suggests that the initial result was affected somewhat by the
contribution of the movements of larger companies in the S&P 500 in how they reacted to negative
developments in the credit markets, which because of their comparatively greater size weighed more
heavily on the minds of investors. Such a dynamic could be explained theoretically by the heightened level
of fear which was pervasive in the financial markets during that time, as evidenced by an average VIX level
of 30.85 during the crisis, compared to 19.61 for the overall sample. At any rate, I do not attribute much
significance to any size bias especially given the relative closeness of the p-values involved and for this
reason, categorize it as slight. In sum, the overall result of the study gives further credence to the
efficiency of the investment grade related capital markets. H4 does not hold nor do any of the other
hypothesis tested tangentially.
CDX.NA.IG 10Y and Equally Weighted S&P 500 Indexes
As a final study in this chapter I test H4 again, this time using the 10-year CDX.NA.IG maturity alongside
the equally weighted S&P 500 index. This approach investigates the potential for asymmetry given the
different liquidity and duration of the credit index and weighting methodology of the equity index. The
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empirical results of the analysis are reflected in Table 10. All panels were deemed to be of an
autoregressive nature and specified as VAR (1) models by the applied information criterion methods.
Table 10: CDX.NA.IG 10-year Index and Equally Weighted S&P 500

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2006-2015
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

Lagged CDS Index Lagged Equity Index Lagged VAR System
CDX IGt-1 p-value S&P 500t-1 p-value
chi2
p-value
0.018
(0.22)
0.052 **(0.05)

-0.037
(0.17)
-0.179 ***(0.00)

9.19 ***(0.01)
46.61 ***(0.00)

Panel B: High Growth
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

0.028
0.039

(0.32)
(0.45)

0.029
(0.61)
-0.855 ***(0.00)

1.11
(0.58)
72.87 ***(0.00)

Panel C: Crisis
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

0.043
0.054

(0.15)
(0.33)

-0.041
(0.45)
-0.201 **(0.05)

6.02 **(0.05)
10.63 ***(0.01)

Panel D: Pullback
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

-0.045
0.057

(0.21)
(0.32)

-0.106
-0.092

*(0.06)
(0.31)

Panel E: New Normal
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

-0.037
(0.23)
0.162 ***(0.00)

-0.023
0.109

(0.67)
(0.25)

2.17
(0.34)
31.12 ***(0.00)
21.64 ***(0.00)
61.35 ***(0.00)

3.47
7.20

(0.17)
**(0.03)

Panel F: Down Market
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

0.019
0.051

(0.19)
*(0.06)

0.011
(0.75)
-0.259 ***(0.00)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

0.052
0.003

(0.22)
(0.53)

0.024 (0.752)
0.141 **(0.02)

Panel H: Exogenous Vars
S&P 500t
CDX IGt

0.017
0.049

(0.26)
*(0.07)

-0.023
(0.49)
-0.184 ***(0.00)

16.28 ***(0.01)
58.24 ***(0.00)

Panel I: VARMA
IG PORTt
CDX IGt

0.018
(0.21)
0.054 **(0.04)

-0.036
(0.18)
-0.176 ***(0.00)

55.76 ***(0.00)
55.76 ***(0.00)

8.17
12.55

*(0.09)
**(0.02)

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Time period is not autoregressive
b
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded

Interestingly and in direct contravention to the prior panel, I observe a marked size bias vis-à-vis the
results in the section in which the same CDX index was examined alongside the S&P 500 index, although
the bias appears to have dissipated with time. Specifically, based on the relevant p-values of the Granger
causality and Wald test of 0.00 in Panel A there is a strong level of one-directional cross market Granger
causality running from the equity to the credit market during the aggregate time period (slightly shorter
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than in the analysis reflected in Table 6), while in the opposite direction no causality is observed (Granger
p-value = .22).
This one-directional lead-lag relationship between the equity and credit markets is also evident in two of
the four temporal samples examined, namely the High Growth (Panel B: Granger p-value = 0.00; Wald test
=0.00) and Crisis subsamples (Panel C: Granger p-value = 0.05; Wald test =0.01), although the effect is
somewhat less during the crisis and not at all evident in the two latter temporal cuts, Pullback and New
Normal. Interestingly, the VAR system observed during the High Growth period was the only one identified
in all of the High Growth subsamples contained in this chapter. In addition, the lead-lag relationship is
observed during down market days, both for the entire sample during which time it was as strong (Panel
F: Granger p-value = 0.00; Wald test = 0.00) and during the crisis subsample (Panel G: Granger p-value =
0.02; Wald test = 0.02), albeit at a lower level of significance of 5%. Finally, the result is robust to the
inclusion of exogenous factors which could have conceivably biased the headline findings and in fact, are
at the same level of significance (Panel H), while the model is correctly specified (Panel I). Viewed in
totality, the study indicates that the market efficiency evident in the prior panel samples is not present
within the 10-year CDX/Equal S&P 500 Index construct, although this cross-market inefficiency does
appear to dissipate with time.
Where does the observed inefficiency come from? For one, the greater informational flow and market
efficiency associated with larger firm size and by extension, analyst coverage, as documented by Hong,
Lim et al. (2000). Once the disproportionate impact of the more efficient components of the S&P 500
index is removed, the underlying trend of the firms in the index is normalized. As such, any inefficiencies
related to smaller companies with less of an investor and analyst following can more representatively flow
through to the return calculation.
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This is the one of the main potential shortcomings in an index like the S&P 500 in that it is sensitive to a
large capitalization stock bias. This shortcoming is all the more relevant in a comparative study such as
this one in which the CDX indices employed are not subject to such bias, at least as far as there calculation
methodologies are concerned. This size bias is then exacerbated by the relative illiquidity of the 10-year
CDX.NA.IG maturity vis-à-vis the 5-year bellwether measure of default (based on DTCC Trade Information
Warehouse data), meaning that investors who want to take a view on the creditworthiness of investment
grade rated companies generally opt for an instrument other than the 10-year index. As a result, less
information is impounded in the price and accordingly, it may be more susceptible to reacting to the
equity market as opposed to being as efficient, or even leading it. Of course, based on the temporal
subsample analysis, this inefficiency does not appear to be as prevalent as it once was and so one can
argue that even this cross-market segment of the capital markets has become more efficient. Still, I
conclude that it has been much less efficient historically than the other segments investigated in this panel
study, although clearly, the observed inefficiency is the exception as opposed to the rule. H4 holds along
with H3 and H2, while H5 does not.

1.4

Conclusions

In this first chapter, I have examined a series of research questions related to systematic cross-market
informational efficiency and flow in the investment grade credit and equity markets with respect to its
persistence, regime dependence, sensitivity to investor sentiment and robustness to exogenous capital
market factors. In examining this relationship, I have employed a differenced VAR system consistently and
comprehensively across six different panel studies, each of which is comprised of at least nine distinct
empirical tests.
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Almost without exception, I observe a persistent semi-strong form of capital market efficiency between
the two subject markets in which information, irrespective of whether it is positive or negative, is
impounded in the respective systematic indexes in a quick and timely manner. This result is consistent
with the Merton model of pricing which assumes one unified price and is in direct contravention to the
general observation found in the prevailing VAR based lead-lag literature which documents that
investment grade rated equity markets lead credit markets.
Why does this result differ from that of the previous literature? There are two primary reasons. First, as
stated earlier prior research has focused almost solely on non-systematic information flow between the
two markets which is based on individual firm characteristics and thus, is different in nature than
aggregated systematic flow. Second, the main historical effort examining systematic flow analyzed data
from 2001-2007 and with respect to the 2001-2004 period, relied on manually constructed and calculated
credit indexes to mimic the bellwether CDX indexes since these were first incepted in 2004. As a result
(and through no fault of the authors) over half of the credit derivative data employed in that study is
comprised of individually traded non-systematic risk backfilled into a manually constructed index proxy,
as opposed to liquidly traded and settled packages of systematic risk. As such, this characteristic of the
data may have biased the cumulative results towards the conclusion that the equity market leads the
credit by introducing a significant non-systematic component into the analysis.
Regardless, this interesting and unexpected result in light of prior studies has significant implications for
academicians and investors alike as it implies that investors tend to view and trade systematic credit risk
differently than non-systematic credit risk. Whereas investors in non-systematic investment grade single
name CDS appear to react in general to developments in individual stocks, or put another way impound
information into the price of their CDS based on events in the stock market, those focused on and trading
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systematic risk indexes would appear to be more proactive in pricing in such events. This would imply that
such investors are more aware of developments in real-time.
As a result, arbitrage profits based on the lagged values in either market are not possible given the lack of
predictive power associated with prior day settlement. In addition, despite the fact that investment grade
credit markets are characterized by much lower default risk than non-investment grade markets, the
CDX.NA.IG indexes and more particularly, the five-year maturity, should be viewed as very efficient
indicators of the systematic health of the credit markets (the overall efficiency observed in the 10-year
maturity is somewhat less, largely due to an apparent size bias). While to be fair, this index already has a
high profile in terms of its visibility in headline news and reports related to the credit markets (such as
those on Bloomberg), its efficiency vis-à-vis other financial markets had yet to be empirically
demonstrated. This finding can only underscore its relevance in a post mortgage crisis/Dodd Frank world.
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ABSTRACT

In this second chapter, I examine a series of research questions related to systematic cross-market
informational efficiency and flow in the high yield credit and equity markets within a robust differenced
VAR framework. Specifically, I investigate CDX indices produced by Markit in conjunction with matched
equity portfolios. There is a very significant difference in informational flow than evidenced in the
systematic investment grade sector, where in the first chapter market efficiency. A two-way causality is
documented, meaning certain types of information are impounded more efficiently in each market. Also,
the lead-lag relationship from the credit to the equity market is regime dependent, with causality more
prevalent under adverse market conditions. Finally, the effects hold most strongly for the aggregated high
yield and BB-rated indices, as the B-rated index generally lags the equity market. This marked
heterogeneity vis-à-vis the investment grade market suggests there is often incremental default risk
related information found in synthetic high yield credit markets and the resultant lead-lag relationship is
primarily the result of adverse news.
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CHAPTER 2
SYSTEMATIC INFORMATION FLOW IN THE HIGH YIELD MARKETS
In the second chapter, I examine the systematic lead-lag relationship between Markit’s CDX.NA.HY index
and the high yield equity sector. The CDX.NA.HY is an equally weighted bellwether high yield credit
derivative index for North America comprised of 100 of the most liquid non-investment grade reference
entities traded in the CDS market. In order to be considered for the index, an entity must be included on
the DTCC’s 6 month Analysis Top 1,000 Single Names of the most liquid CDS (the indexes are rebalanced
every six months) and assigned a long-term credit rating below BBB- (or Baa3) by a major rating agency.
This headline index is further subdivided into two sub-indexes based on the differential credit quality of
the constituents, namely the CDX.NA.HY.BB comprised of BB-rated entities, and the CDX.NA.HY.B
reflecting B-rated entities22, which I also examine in this chapter.
While the procedure in investigating the relationships is similar to that performed on the CDX.NA.IG index
in the first essay, it is necessary to separate the high yield sector from the investment grade when studying
informational flow and pricing efficiency. This is due to the asymmetrical sensitivities that these two
sectors have with respect to the implied probability of default embedded in their pricing. Specifically, the
implied probability of default is much higher for high yield firms, making the distance to default under the
Merton (1974) pricing model (and thus, associated payout on CDS written on the firms) much shorter. In
addition, the distance function is not linear but rather curvilinear, meaning that it becomes smaller at an
increasing rate as credit quality deteriorates, making it all the more sensitive to changes in the factors
impacting value. Expressed mathematically, this means that the second derivative of the default function
increases at an increasing rate as the distance to default decreases. As a result, asymmetries may exist

22

Markit CDX High Yield & Markit CDX Investment Grade Index Rules, March 2013
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regarding incremental default-related informational content, as investors ostensibly monitor this segment
more attentively than the lower risk investment grade sector one due to this greater sensitivity (Fung,
Sierra et al. 2008). However, despite this difference in default risk sensitivity, very few studies have
examined this potential for asymmetry as discussed in the literature review and only Fung, Sierra et al,
used actual index data (for three years ending in 2007), while the high yield sub-indexes have never been
examined.

2.1

Literature Review

A summary of relevant papers in the overall lead-lag literature can be found in Section 1.1 of the first
essay. These works include Longstaff, Mithal et al. (2003), Norden and Weber (2004), Byström (2006),
Acharya and Johnson (2007), Norden and Weber (2009), Forte and Pena (2009), Ni and Pan (2011), Han
and Zhou (2011), Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) and Xiang, Chng et al. (2015). However, with respect
to this essay, the most relevant efforts are reflected below in Table 11 and discussed in more detail in this
section. This relevance is based on the fact that to one extent or another, they subdivide data on the basis
of differential credit quality.
Table 11: Most Relevant Lead-Lag Literature and Findings for Second Chapter
Authors/Year

Timeframe

Sample Studied

Methodology

Observed Results

Fung, Sierra et al. (2008)

2001-2007

CDX IG & HY Indices

VAR

IG: Stocks lead, HY: 2-way

Marsh and Wagner (2012)

2004-2008

193 U.S. firms

VAR

Stocks lead CDS

Narayan, Sharma et al. (2014)

2004-2012

212 S&P 500 firms

VECM

Stocks lead CDS

Hilscher, Pollet et al. (2015)

2001-2007

800 U.S. firms

VAR

Stocks lead CDS
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In this regard, the Fung, Sierra et al. (2008) paper is most related and the one off of which this paper
builds. Specifically, the authors studied movements in both the CDX Investment Grade CDX.NA.IG and CDX
High Yield CDX.NA.HY indices, first with respect to movements in the bellwether S&P 500 index and
portfolios of matching names. In addition, they examined the potentially differing reaction with respect
to investor sentiment, or up and down markets as they called it which were defined as positive and
negative return days.
To summarize, the documented systematic relationships were heterogeneous, with the stock market
leading the investment grade CDS market, and a two-way interactive feedback mechanism observed
between the high yield CDS and matched equity portfolios (but not the S&P 500). In addition, the high
yield CDX and equity indices experienced a two-way interactive lead-lag relationship on down market days
but not in the up market (where no relationship was observable), while there was no interactive
relationship observed on either type of return day in the investment grade segment. However, two
caveats are in order. First, because results for the 2001-2003 timeframe had to be backfilled since the
indexes did not exist then, the methodology introduces a single-name bias into the study. In addition, the
method used to examine investor sentiment is not as comprehensive as the one employed herein.
The next paper, Marsh and Wagner (2012) concluded that equities lead CDS in terms of impounding
information into daily pricing, also observing that the primary advantage was related to positive
information. This latter finding gives credence to the view that CDS market reaction is sensitive to the
nature of underlying news. However, the authors also stated that the finding was not sensitive to
differential credit quality, contradicting Fung, Sierra et al. (2008). However, In this regard it is important
to note there is a significant potential for bias in the result on the basis of how data was categorized
regarding credit quality. Specifically, all firms were assigned into one of two very broad ratings categories,
either AAA-A comprised of all highly rated investment grade firms with low probabilities of default or the
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other BBB-B, containing both investment grade and non-investment grade firms. Regardless, the authors
attributed the documented greater efficiency of the equity market to the more concentrated presence of
hedgers in the CDS market, who ostensibly are less motivated to trade in and out of positions to generate
income since their goal to offset risk elsewhere in their portfolios.
In the third paper, Narayan, Sharma et al. (2014) divided the S&P 500 index into its ten constituent
industry sectors and constructed sector based CDS portfolios of matching names using information
available on Bloomberg. However, of the 212 firms in the S&P 500 index for which CDS data was found,
only 25 were rated non-investment grade, limiting the high yield analysis. Interestingly, while the authors
observed that stocks generally lead CDS, the observed effect was stronger for the investment grade rated
firms in the study, also in contravention to Fung, Sierra et al. (2008)23. They also documented that the
stock market was comparatively more dominant during the financial crisis. However, the small high yield
sample coupled with the non-systematic nature of the study precludes generalization of the findings and
underscores the relevance of this paper.
Finally, Hilscher, Pollet et al. (2015) concluded that the stock market leads the CDS market for both the
investment grade and high yield segments, although the effect was weaker on days in which particularly
salient news announcements were made, for example earnings announcements. They also studied the
relative size of movements and found no asymmetry. The authors attributed their main finding to greater
inattentiveness on the part of CDS traders with respect to news, for which they cite comparatively larger
bid-ask spreads as evidence, a theoretical explanation which jibes somewhat with Marsh and Wagner’s.
However, as with the prior two papers this result is with respect to non-systematic risk only.

23

They also observed a large cap bias
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2.2

Hypothesis Development and Econometric Methodology

As with the CDX.NA.IG index, I first study the relationship between the CDX.NA.HY and S&P 500 indexes.
Although the latter is comprised primarily of investment grade stocks and the argument can be made that
a direct comparison is less relevant than in that sector, it is still useful to do so. This is because both are
liquidly traded indexes and as such, can be used to express systematic cross market related views by
investors. Also, the high yield synthetic index often is used by practitioners to monitor the level of default
risk in the overall economy as components of risk related dashboards. This study includes both the
bellwether five-year maturity as well as the less liquid but still potentially relevant ten-year maturity.
I then perform the same panel study on the CDX high yield credit index and a closely matched index of
equally weighted high yield stocks. While the index is constructed manually, it has several theoretical
advantages over the S&P 500 index. First, it is comprised of equities of the same credit quality as the CDX
index, eliminating any bias contributed by investment grade rated stocks. Second, its constituents closely
match those contained in the CDX index, mitigating any bias resulting from the mismatch in specific firms.
Finally, it eliminates any size bias inherent in the calculation methodology of the S&P 500, which weights
companies’ contributions to the index on the basis of their market capitalizations. Regarding this potential
for size bias, I also repeat the tests in the first study using an equally weighted S&P 500 index.
I also examine the two sub-indices derived from the CDX.NA.HY based on differential credit quality of the
constituents, the CDX.NA.HY.BB and CDX.NA.HY.B. These instruments allow for the investigation of
asymmetries within more granularly defined rating categories, an important perspective given that the
generically termed high yield market implicitly assumes ratings homogeneity. This is all the more relevant
given the prior discussion relating to the non-linearity of the default probability function. Once again, I
construct closely matched indexes of stocks separately for the BB-rated and B-rated reference entities
contained in the CDX.NA.HY against which to test them. As with the sub-indices of the CDX.NA.IG studied
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in the third chapter, this is the first time they have been operationalized in the literature. Beyond this, this
is also the first time any lead-lag study involving CDS and equity markets has differentiated in the intracategory credit quality of high yield firms, i.e., the few instances in which the high yield market has been
studied has lumped all firms into one ratings category.
Based on the above theoretical context, I hypothesize that the systematic lead-lag relationship between
the respective markets is heterogeneous, depending on the underlying credit quality of the firms in the
sub-index. Put another way, there could be heterogeneity within any heterogeneity observed between
the broader systematic high yield and investment grade sectors. Interestingly, also as with the sub-indices
of the CDX.NA.IG studied in the third chapter, the only available data is for the five-year maturity,
suggesting a different investor preference vis-à-vis the headline index and underscoring the need for
separate examination.
Within the context of all of these studies, I test for temporal asymmetries in subsamples of the data
divided into the same four periods used in the first chapter. These periods are based on the different
characteristics of the CDS market prevailing at the time, e.g., associated regulatory framework, relative
age of market, product variety, and notional size of market. Based on these different characteristics, it is
reasonable to expect that a level of heterogeneity may exist within temporal subsamples.
I also once again examine the lead-lag relationship between the market sectors in up and down markets.
This is not only relevant given the potential for asymmetries based on general prevailing investor
sentiment but also due to the ostensibly different investor sensitivity to news based on the lower credit
quality of the non-investment grade indices (Fung, Sierra et al. 2008). Such sensitivity has been
documented by Acharya and Johnson (2007) and complemented by Marsh and Wagner (2012). Within
that context, I expect to observe heterogeneity with respect to both the investment grade sector as well
as within the high yield ratings categories themselves. In addition to the baseline up/down analysis, I take
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the investigation of market conditions a step further by examining the potential for asymmetries within
any observed relationship originating in the credit markets. This is done by investigating whether the
headline trend(s) is sensitive to the magnitude of the market movement, e.g., does it occur consistently
on down days or only when the movement is very large? To my knowledge, this is the first time this type
of asymmetrical causality has been examined within a Granger framework.
Wrapping up the study, I perform a set of robustness tests, first the standard and indispensable test with
respect to the inclusion of the standard set of exogenous factors used in the first chapter to control for
any omitted variable bias. Again, these factors are the changes in the 3-month T-bill, US Treasury curve,
5-year swap spread and VIX. In addition, I perform the test for the base form of model used in the prior
chapter to ensure it is correctly specified. Finally, I include a robustness test not operationalized in the
first essay related to the weekend effect on pairings in which a down market asymmetry was documented.
This is done in order to determine whether observed Granger causality is driven primarily by trading on
Mondays. The test is relevant in that it is designed is control for any potential overlap and concomitant
bias/influence associated with that particular day-of-the-week anomaly as first studied by French (1980).
Against this backdrop, the specific hypotheses examined in this paper can be summarized as follows:
H6: There is a persistent lead-lag relationship in the CDX.NA.HY and S&P 500 and it differs from
that observed in the investment grade sector
H7: There is a persistent lead-lag relationship in the CDX.NA.HY and a closely matched portfolio of
stocks and it differs from that observed in the S&P 500 and investment grade sector
H8: The lead-lag relationship in the CDX family of high yield indices and equity markets is timevarying in nature
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H9: The lead-lag relationship in the CDX family of high yield indices and related equity markets is
regime dependent based on investor sentiment and different from the investment grade sector
H10: There a size related effect with respect to the CDX.NA.HY and S&P 500
H11: There is heterogeneity in the lead-lag relationship between the CDX.NA.HY.BB and
CDX.NA.HY.B and their respective matching portfolios of stocks vis-à-vis the CDX.NA.HY
H12: There is heterogeneity in the lead-lag relationship within the CDX.NA.HY.BB and CDX.NA.HY.B
and their respective matching portfolios of stocks
H13: There is heterogeneity in regime dependence based on the size of the market movement

Summary statistics for the specific indexes employed in this section from the description of the overall
data set contained in the general introduction section are reflected in Table 12.
Table 12: Summary Statistics for Chapter 2 Data

Time Series

Obs

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

Returns
Mean
Std Dev

CDS
CDX.NA.HY 5Y
CDX.NA.HY 10Y
CDX.NA.HY.BB
CDX.NA.HY.B

2,686
2,071
2,648
2,668

515.7
532.5
317.1
494.3

284.9
191.2
145.6
267.7

208.5
268.1
129.4
211.8

1,910.1
1,464.4
1,006.9
1,936.2

0.000421
0.000351
0.000611
0.000358

0.02633
0.02109
0.03214
0.02378

2,684
2,353
2,686
2,648
2,668

1,399.0
1,424.9
22.3
30.4
17.6

322.9
337.1
5.6
7.9
4.4

676.5
676.5
8.2
12.5
4.5

2,130.8
2,130.8
32.6
48.2
26.4

0.000189
0.000157
0.000201
0.000112
0.000435

0.01240
0.01303
0.01726
0.01721
0.01939

EQUITY
S&P 500
S&P 500 Equal
HY PORT
HY BB PORT
HY B PORT
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Methodologically, I follow the same general process as outlined in Table 4 in the first essay with the
addition of a few steps summarized in Table 13 below. These steps mainly relate to the further testing of
observed down market asymmetries not documented in the first essay.
Table 13: Summary of Additions to Base Methodological Framework for Second Chapter
Step in Determining:

Methodological Process

Robustness of Down Market Asymmetry

Alternative definition of down market as per Fung, Sierra et al (2008)

Robustness of Down Market Asymmetry

Joint testing of significance of up and down interaction dummies

Robustness of Down Market Asymmetry

Comparison of juxtaposed up and down market results

Asymmetrical Down Market Causality

Threshold analysis using V-STAR system in (5) applied to down market days

Weekend Effect

Addition of Friday dummy to VAR system in (6)

Specifically, while I once again employ the VAR models from the first essay reflected in (1), (2), (3) and (4)
to ascertain the nature of the lead-lag relationship, I take the analysis a few steps further as discussed
below in instances in which down market asymmetries are observed in order to examine these
asymmetries more closely.
First, I perform a series of tests to check the robustness of the initially observed down market result. As
mentioned in the first essay, while this process is based off Fung, Sierra et al, there are a few substantive
differences adding to the robustness of the procedure. While the authors define down market conditions
based on the sign of equity market returns (Δ Stockt), I first use the credit market (Δ CDXt) as the
benchmark for investor sentiment. This allows for enhanced detection of any ability of the credit market
to asymmetrically pick up adverse news, as has been observed in certain prior research. However, I also
rerun the analysis using Fung, Sierra et al’s equity market definition (Δ Stockt). This enables a more fulsome
perspective on the impact of investor sentiment, ensuring it persists under both sets of conditions. I also
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run and report the Granger causality results of the up market test in order to compare the results sideby-side. If the result is the same, then initially observed asymmetry is not robust. Finally, I test the joint
significance of the down market dummies employed in the up market test via a Wald test to ensure they
are significant24. Only when initially observed asymmetry passes all three tests, do I conclude regime
dependence.
I then take the examination of asymmetrical Granger causality further by investigating whether any robust
down market asymmetry is sensitive to the size of the market movement. In other words, I explore
whether asymmetrical informational flow is generally persistent under all adverse conditions or only
during particularly bearish times. Only one other paper has explored the potential for this effect (Marsh
and Wagner 2012) and it did so within the context of the entire data set, not a bifurcated subsample.
In performing this analysis, I manually transform the equation in (3) into a type of non-linear time series
model known as a smooth-transition threshold autoregressive model, or TAR (Tong and Lim 1980) which
when implemented within the context of a VAR system, becomes a V-TAR. The transformation occurs
through the modification of the down market dummy to only include observations above (or below given
that I am only examining the effect of negative returns) an identified negative return threshold. However,
because I gradually change the level of the threshold in the analysis, the TAR portion of the model is
further transformed into a STAR, or smooth-transition threshold autoregressive model (Enders 2008),
making the overall specification a V-STAR.
Logistically, I create a dummy variable for the dummy variable incepted in (3) in which credit market
movements are interacted with the sign of the movement, which picks up only those returns meeting the
threshold criteria. As such, the form of model becomes as follows:

24

This actually is the only procedure used by Fung, Sierra et al, as they did not report Granger causality levels.

69

Δ CDXt = a1 + ∑kj=1 b1j Δ Stockt-j + ∑kj=1 c1j Δ CDXt-j + Dt x ∑kj=1 d1j Δ Stockt-j x Signt

(5)

+ Dt x ∑kj=1 e1j Δ CDXt-j x Signt + ԑ1
Δ Stockt = a2 + ∑kj=1 b2j Δ Stockt-j + ∑kj=1 c2j Δ CDXt-j + Dt x ∑kj=1 d2j Δ Stockt-j x Signt
+ Dt x ∑kj=1 e2j Δ CDXt-j x Signt + ԑ2
where: Dt = 1 if and only if Δ CDXt x Signt >= I x I, with the absolute value of x starting at 0.5% and increasing
stepwise thereafter by increments of 0.5% up to and including the 4.0% level, after which it is increased
one final time by an increment of 1.0% to 5.0%.
This procedure results in nine gradual increases in levels of down market causality, with each level
systematically excluding the smaller absolute value movements before it. As such, a pattern can emerge
with respect to the general impact of smaller vs. larger movements. However, it is important to note this
process of creating threshold related dummies is not designed to identify precise inflection points in
asymmetry, but rather provide a high level perspective on the difference -- if any -- in the cross market
informational flow related to very large vs. smaller movements. To be sure, a precise analysis of exact
thresholds at which asymmetries occur requires such identification endogenously, as opposed to
exogenous modeling of dummies and is beyond the scope of this document. In addition, it is not necessary
in order to draw general conclusions from the data.
The final additional step to the VAR methodological framework in this chapter involves robustness testing
for the day-of-the-week anomaly known as the weekend effect first identified by French (1980). This step
ensures that in instances where causality is observed running from the credit to the equity market, the
result has not been biased by this anomaly. As this would manifest itself in the form of different results
on Mondays, I cleanse the data of the relevant lagged trading days and compare the results to the original
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ones. To do so, I create a dummy variable Day which I set = 1 when the lagged day is consistent with the
order of the model, otherwise it is set to zero. The form of VAR model in this step becomes as follows:
Δ CDXt = a1 + ∑kj=1 b1j Δ Stockt-j + ∑kj=1 c1j Δ CDXt-j + ∑kj=1 d1j Δ Stockt-j x Dayt-j

(6)

+ ∑kj=1 e1j Δ CDXt-j x Dayt-j + ԑ1
Δ Stockt = a2 + ∑kj=1 b2j Δ Stockt-j + ∑kj=1 c2j Δ CDXt-j + ∑kj=1 d2j Δ Stockt-j x Dayt-j
+ ∑kj=1 e2j Δ CDXt-j x Dayt-j + ԑ2
Where: Day = 1 when the lagged day “j” is consistent with the order of the VAR model as per the applied
information criterion, e.g., Friday if the order is 1, Thursday if it is 2, etc.

2.3 Results
CDX.NA.HY 5Y and S&P 500 Indexes
To test H1, I juxtapose the bellwether CDX.NA.HY and S&P 500 indexes. While the constituents are mostly
incongruous in credit quality and weighted differently, the examination is made relevant by their roles as
prominent systematic indices with which investors express views on aspects of the economy. This is also
the procedure followed by Fung, Sierra et al. (2008) in comparing systematic informational flow. The
empirical results are reflected in Table 14.
All models in which an autoregressive relationship is detected are specified as VAR (1), implying a rather
fast adjustment to information in prior prices. As per the table, there is a clear departure in the findings
relative to the bellwether investment grade index discussed in the first chapter, where efficiency was
observed. In the aggregated sample (Panel A), a strong two-way Granger causality is observed, with the
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level running from the credit to the equity market stronger at 1% significance (Granger p-value = .006;
Wald test = .000) than in the opposite direction, documented at 5%. (Granger p-value = .040; Wald test =
.000).
Table 14: CDX.NA.HY 5Y Index and S&P 500

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2004-2015
S&P 500t
CDX HYt
Panel B: High Growthb
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

Lagged CDS Index
a
CDX HYt-1 p-value
-0.029 (***0.006)
0.071 **(0.002)
-

-

Lagged Equity Index
a
S&P 500t-1 p-value

Lagged VAR System

-0.14 ***(0.00)
-0.098 (***0.040)

38.53 ***(0.00)
29.02 ***(0.00)

-

-

chi2

-

p-value

-

Panel C: Crisis
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-0.001
0.147

(0.97
(0.00)

-0.161 ***(0.00)
-0.163 (***0.008)

13.20 ***(0.00)
26.41 ***(0.00)

Panel D: Pullback
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-0.042
0.116

(*0.059)
*(0.07)

-0.168 **(0.013)
0.109
(0.48)

4.59 *(0.100)
7.19 **(0.028)

Panel E: New Normal b
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-

-

-

-

-

-

Panel F: Down Marketc
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-0.037 (***0.003)
0.047 **(0.04)

-0.159 ***(0.00)
-0.037
(0.32)

592.79 ***(0.00)
811.70 ***(0.00)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-0.029 (***0.006)
0.071 **(0.002)

-0.140 ***(0.00)
-0.098 (**0.040)

38.53 ***(0.00)
29.02 ***(0.00)

Panel H: Up Marketd
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

0.010
-0.011

(0.41)
(0.64)

-0.152 ***(0.00)
-0.061 (*0.098)

60.13 ***(0.00)
184.20 ***(0.00)

Panel I: Exogenous Vars
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-0.029 (***0.010)
0.091 ***(0.00)

-0.140 ***(0.00)
-0.202 (***0.001)

38.53 ***(0.00)
29.02 ***(0.00)

Panel J: VARMA
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.029 (***0.006)
0.071 **(0.002)

-0.14 ***(0.00)
-0.098 (***0.043)

68.24 ***(0.00)
68.24 ***(0.00)

Panel K: Weekend Effect
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.028 (**0.012)
0.061 **(0.012)

-0.140 ***(0.00)
-0.099 (***0.039)

40.67 ***(0.00)
30.64 ***(0.00)

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded
b
- Time period is not autoregressive
c
- Results are robust to defining down market days = the equity market is down a la Fung et al (2008)
d
- F-test p-value for down market interactive terms = ***(.000)

Interestingly, in examining the temporal subsamples (Panels B - E), the pattern of causality that emerges
is different than in the aggregate sample. In two of the four studies (High Growth, New Normal), there is
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no VAR system observed. Furthermore, there is no two-way causality evident and the only period in which
Granger causality is observed running from the credit to the equity markets is the Pullback period (Granger
p-value = .059; Wald test = .100). However the documented relationship is weak, with both the causality
and Wald test only weakly significant at 10%. Moreover, Granger causality running from the equity to the
credit markets is only evident during the Crisis period (Granger p-value = .008; Wald test = .000), although
the level of significance is very strong at 1%. This result suggests events with default risk implications
priced in by the credit markets were efficiently picked up by the equity markets while there was a delay
in informational flow in the opposite direction.
This dynamic that the strong aggregated results were not documented in the subsample analysis and no
VAR system was identified in two of the four periods, suggests there could be significant asymmetry in
the vector with respect to market conditions. In investigating this, I split the data into up and down days
as outlined in the methodological discussion. As suspected (Panels F & H), there is a marked asymmetry
depending on investor sentiment. Specifically, on down days (Panel F) there is a very strong causality
running from the credit to the equity market at the 1% significance level (Granger p-value = .003; Wald
test =.000) while in the opposite direction, no causality is observed (Granger p-value = .32; Wald test
=.000). Conversely, on up market days (Panel H), there is no causality running from the credit to the equity
markets (Granger p-value = .41; Wald test =.000) while from the equity to the credit markets, causality is
observed (Granger p-value = .098; Wald test =.000), albeit at a weak level of significance of 10%.
This finding is significant, as it indicates cross market informational flow in the high yield market is
dependent on the nature of the news/movement, i.e., whether it is positive or negative. Given the
relevance of this result, which jibes with prior observations made by Acharya and Johnson (2007) and
Marsh and Wagner (2012), I perform the additional robustness tests outlined in Table 3. First, to check
the robustness with respect to the definition of negative investor sentiment, I run the same tests using
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Fung, Sierra et al’s definition of negative investor sentiment. Following this definition, the results do not
differ and are not included in Table 14 to avoid redundancy. In addition, as part of the up market study, I
perform the Wald test on the down market dummies to ascertain whether they are jointly significant.
However, as indicated in the footnotes to Table M, the null hypothesis of no significance is rejected at a
level of 1% significance with a p-value = .000, providing comfort that the asymmetry exists.
I perform one last test of asymmetry on the split subsamples, namely on down market days during the
Crisis (Panel G). Interestingly, within this subsample I observe a very strong Granger causality running
from the credit to the equity markets at the 1% level of significance (Granger p-value = .006; Wald test =
.000) while in the opposite direction, causality is observed, although not as strong at the 5% significance
level (Granger p-value = .040; Wald test = .000). This heterogeneity in the down market result, especially
with respect to the findings in Panel C (no causality from the credit to the equity market) suggests that
during that time of heightened fear, negative information could be impounded in either market first,
subsequently flowing to the other. This is consistent with the construct of a negative feedback loop during
this time, a phrase coined by Fed Chairman Bernanke25 and one which differs from the broader down
market finding (Panel F) in which no causality is documented flowing from the equity to the credit sector.
Finally, I check the robustness of the headline result for omitted variable bias (Panel I), with the results
being substantially the same, indicating that bias has not influenced the findings. Two-way causality is
documented with Granger causality running from the credit to the equity markets at the 1% level (Granger
p-value = .010; Wald test = .000) and in the opposite direction at the 1% level (Granger p-value = .001;
Wald test = .000). Additionally, I test for the form of model (Panel J) and the weekend effect (Panel K) and
find that there is no substantive impact, as strong two-way Granger causality is observed.
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Based on these results, a cross market informational flow between the high yield synthetic credit and S&P
500 indices which differs greatly with respect to the prior findings related to the investment grade sector
is documented. There is a general two-way flow compared to the persistent market efficiency in the
investment grade sector. Significant heterogeneity is also evident within the high yield panel, especially
with respect to the different behaviors on up and down market days, indicating asymmetry in the
impounding of positive vs. negative news. As such, both parts of H6 hold along with H8 and H9 within the
context of this study.
CDX.NA.HY 5Y and Matched Portfolio of High Yield Stocks
I then test H7 using the CDX.NA.HY and a closely matched portfolio of high yield stocks. This eliminates
any bias in the results from the first section by matching the credit quality of the indexes, ensuring the
firms are the same to control for differences in business risk and weighting each firm equally in the
calculation of index returns. While very relevant in its own right, this construct arguably also functions as
a type of robustness test for the results presented in the prior section. The findings are presented in Table
15. All models in which autoregression is detected are specified as VAR (1) as per the applied information
criterion, indicating no price stickiness difference in the closely matched portfolios vis-à-vis the S&P 500.
Interestingly, the pattern which emerges corroborates the findings in the prior section. This is significant
in that it indicates systematic high yield investors do not necessarily discriminate in terms of the credit
quality in equity indexes when taking positions/hedging in the stock market. Specifically, in the aggregated
sample (Panel A), two-way Granger causality is once again observed, with a strong level of significance at
5% running from the credit to the equity market (Granger p-value = .03; Wald test = .022) and an even
stronger level running in the opposite direction at 1% (Granger p-value = .008; Wald test = .000).

75
Table 15: CDX.NA.HY 5Y Index and Matched Portfolio of HY Stocks

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2004-2015
HY PORTt
CDX HYt
Panel B: High Growthb
HY PORTt
CDX HYt
Panel C: Crisis
HY PORTt
CDX HYt
Panel D: Pullbackb
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

Lagged CDS Index Lagged Equity Index Lagged VAR System
a
a
CDX HYt-1 p-value HY PORTt-1 p-value
chi2
p-value
-0.031 (**0.030)
0.071 ***(0.002)
-

-

-0.001
(0.97)
0.144 ***(0.00)
`
-

-

0.004
(0.85)
-0.098(***0.008)
-

-

0.016
(0.74)
-0.139 (**0.012)
-

-

7.63 ***(0.022)
37.30 ***(0.00)
-

-

0.16
(0.92)
26.08 ***(0.00)
-

-

Panel E: New Normal
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.051 (**0.026)
0.037
(0.40)

-0.022
-0.037

(0.61)
(0.65)

6.73 **(0.035)
2.59
(0.27)

Panel F: Down Marketc
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.069 (***0.001)
0.118 ***(0.00)

-0.001
-0.049

(0.99)
(0.32)

17.91 ***(0.00)
45.20 ***(0.00)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.001
(0.97
0.167 ***(0.00)

0.016
(0.74)
-0.141 (**0.048)

4.72
(0.32)
30.78 ***(0.00)

Panel H: Up Marketd
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

0.011
-0.015

(0.57)
(0.65)

0.034
(0.32)
-0.175(***0.001)

17.91 ***(0.00)
45.20 ***(0.00)

Panel I: Exogenous Vars
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.041 (***0.010)
0.093 ***(0.00)

0.028
(0.31)
-0.152(***0.000)

29.17 ***(0.00)
45.46 ***(0.00)

Panel J: VARMA
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.032 (**0.031)
0.072 ***(0.002)

0.090
(0.93)
-0.092 (**0.013)

43.30 ***(0.00)
43.30 ***(0.00)

Panel K: Weekend Effect
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.034 (**0.029)
0.057
(0.02)

-0.011
(0.67)
-0.117(***0.003)

18.50 ***(0.001)
41.31 ***(0.00)

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded
b
- Time period is not autoregressive
c
- Results are robust to defining down market days = the equity market is down a la Fung et al (2008)
d
- F-test p-value for down market interactive terms = **(.026)

Additionally, an examination of the temporal subsamples (Panels B - E) reveals a similar pattern as in the
prior section although it differs in some relevant aspects. Again, in two of the panels, High Growth and
Pullback (Panels B and D, respectively) there is no autoregressive relationship detected. However, in
contrast to the prior section, the new Normal (Panel E) is specified as autoregressive whereas the High
Growth is not.
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Regarding the New Normal panel, there is a strong level of causality running from the credit market to the
equity market (Granger p-value = .026; Wald test = .035) with no causality detected in the opposite
direction (Granger p-value =.65). This is relevant in that the New Normal is the most recent period and
indicates that the high yield synthetic market remains relevant despite all of the changes to the CDS
market structure related to mortgage crisis and subsequent Dodd-Frank legislation. In addition, the level
of credit related causality is stronger than in any of the temporal subsamples in the previous section.
However, it is interesting to note that there is no causality during the Crisis period market (p=.97) while a
strong lead-lag relationship is observed running from the high yield equity index to the credit index
(Granger p-value = .012; Wald test = .000). This result is consistent with that of the prior study.
Given the similar pattern in the aggregate and temporal subsample results vis-à-vis the S&P 500, it is
reasonable to expect once again that asymmetry exists with respect to market conditions. Thus, I perform
the same set of tests as in the prior panel and report on the same level of detail with respect to robustness.
The results related to the down market (Panel F) suggest the presence of such an asymmetry, with a very
strong level of Granger causality running from the credit to the equity markets (Granger p-value = .001;
Wald test =.001) while no causality is observed in the opposite direction (Granger p-value = .32). This
result is also robust to the alternative definition of market conditions in which down market days are
defined as days on which the equity index return in negative. Furthermore, as can be seen in the
asymmetrical study of up market days (Panel H), the lead-lag relationship originating from the credit
market disappears when the market return is positive (Granger p-value =.57) while a strong level of
causality is observed flowing from the equity to the credit markets (Granger p-value = .001; Wald test =
.000). Also once again, the Wald test performed on the down day dummies employed in the up market
analysis reveal that the dummies are jointly significant, providing additional credence to the observed
informational flow. Together with the findings from the prior section, the results provide compelling
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documentation of a pervasive asymmetry in the systematic high yield markets related to the nature of the
news, i.e., whether it is positive or negative and the associated investor reaction to that news.
Also as in the prior section, the final asymmetry panel (Panel G) involves the testing of down market days
during the crisis. Interestingly, I do not observe the negative feedback loop evident in the last section with
the S&P 500 but rather, only document Granger causality originating from the equity to the credit markets
at the 5% level of significance (Granger p-value = .048; Wald test = .000). This indicates that negative news
was absorbed more efficiently during this time by the equity market, which picked up on movements in
the CDX index quickly and impounded additional information over that priced in by the credit markets.
Rounding out the study, I perform the test for omitted variable bias (Panel I) and find no difference in the
results and in fact, observe an even stronger level of causality running from the credit to the equity
markets (1% vs. 5%). This lends additional credence to the documented trend. In addition, tests for the
VARMA specification and weekend effect (Panels J and K) reveals no substantive difference in the
documented lead-lag relationship.
Against the backdrop of these results, the pattern of causal heterogeneity evident in the first section of
this essay is repeated. Clearly, there is a difference in the cross market informational flow between the
systematic high yield credit and equity markets vis-à-vis the investment grade sector, where efficiency
was observed. In addition, the lead-lag relationship is clearly asymmetrical with respect to prevailing
market conditions. This observed heterogeneity suggests that there is often incremental default risk
related information found in the synthetic credit markets and that any subsequent lead-lag relationship
originating in the credit markets generally is the result of adverse news affecting lower rated entities. As
such, H7 holds partially as the results generally mirror those of the S&P 500 and within the context of this
study, H8 and H9 also once again hold.
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CDX.NA.HY 10Y and S&P 500 Indexes
Next, I reexamine H6 using the longer maturity 10-year CDX high yield index and the S&P 500 in order to
determine whether there is any heterogeneity with respect to both the 10-year CDX investment grade
index explored earlier as well as the five-year high yield index investigated in the first section.
As stated in the prior chapter, the reason for investigating the behavior of the ten-year maturity is rooted
in its longer average life than the five-year maturity, a time outstanding which theoretically is more
consistent with the indefinite asset life of a stock. In addition, because the CDX.NA.HY is the headline
index for the high yield sector, its 10-year maturity warrants examination for asymmetrical investor
behavior vis-à-vis the bellwether five-year maturity. For example, it would be instructive to observe
whether this index behaves like the 10-year CDX.NA.IG index in that it prices in events efficiently along
with the equity markets, or more like the five-year CDX.NA.HY often appearing to contain incremental
information vis-à-vis the high yield equity sector, particularly under adverse market conditions. The
empirical results of this analysis are presented in Table 16. All models with autoregressive characteristics
have been specified as VAR (1) as per the applied information criterion.
An examination of the table reveals a different pattern of cross market interaction than that involving the
bellwether five-year maturity. While an overall level of two-way Granger causality is documented (Panel
A), the level of causality running from the credit to the equity market is much weaker at only 10%
significance (Granger p-value = .076; Wald test = .000) while the lead-lag relationship in the other direction
remains very strong at the 1% level of significance (Granger p-value = .000; Wald test = .000). This finding
suggests a comparatively lesser amount of incremental information efficiently priced in by the credit
market at this maturity although it is still asymmetrical to the investment grade sector.
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Table 16: CDX.NA.HY 10Y Index and S&P 500

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2004-2015
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

Lagged CDS Index Lagged Equity Index Lagged VAR System
a
a
CDX HYt-1 p-value S&P 500t-1 p-value
chi2
p-value
-0.027 (*0.076)
0.171 ***(0.00)

-0.165 ***(0.00)
-0.154(***0.000)

47.14 ***(0.00)
117.55 ***(0.00)

Panel B: High Growth
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

0.063
(0.26
0.278 **(0.02)

-0.007
-0.231

(0.95)
(0.33)

1.93
(0.38)
13.70 ***(0.00)

Panel C: Crisis
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

0.027
(0.51
0.391 ***(0.00)

-0.216 ***(0.00)
-0.201 (***0.00)

24.52 ***(0.00)
124.37 ***(0.00)

-0.011
(0.70
0.111 **(0.04)

-0.168 *(0.09)
-0.228 **(0.019)

3.99
(0.14)
30.33 ***(0.00)

Panel D: Pullback
S&P 500t
CDX HYt
Panel E: New Normal b
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-

-

-

-

-

-

Panel F: Down Marketc,d
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-0.111(***0.000)
0.232 **(0.04)

-0.301 ***(0.00)
-0.091 *(0.098)

91.56 ***(0.00)
125.54 ***(0.00)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-0.085 (*0.088)
0.386 ***(0.00)

-0.396 ***(0.00)
-0.138 (**0.047)

47.44 ***(0.00)
126.75 ***(0.00)

Panel H: Exogenous Vars
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-0.029
(0.14)
0.176 ***(0.00)

-0.181 ***(0.00)
-0.212(***0.000)

53.25 ***(0.00)
121.73 ***(0.00)

Panel I: VARMA
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-0.026 (*0.089)
0.171 ***(0.00)

-0.163 ***(0.00)
-0.153(***0.000)

163.89 ***(0.00)
163.89 ***(0.00)

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded
b
- Time period is not autoregressive
c
- Results not robust to defining down market days = the equity market is down. a la Fung et al (2008)
d
- F-test p-value for down market interactive terms = ***(.000) however up results not asymmetrical

Furthermore, there is no causality observed in any of the credit markets running to the equity market in
the temporal subsamples (Panels B - E) while in two periods, Crisis and Pullback, a strong lead-lag
relationship in the other direction is evident. This informational flow is significant at the 1% level during
the Crisis (Panel C: Granger p-value = .000; Wald test = .000) and at the 5% level during the Pullback during
which Dodd-Frank was being legislated (Panel D: Granger p-value =.000; Wald test = .000). Together, these
empirical findings indicate that credit investors behave more reactively regarding the 10-year high yield
maturity than the five-year.
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However, given that the headline result shows at least a modicum of informational flow from the high
yield credit market to the S&P 500 index, it is reasonable to conjecture that a level of asymmetry exists
with respect to market conditions. Against that backdrop, I perform the test for down market asymmetry
(Panel F) and in fact, observe a very strong Granger causality originating in the credit market and flowing
to the equity index (Granger p-value = .000; Wald test = .000) while in the opposite direction, only a weak
level of causality is observed (Granger p-value = .098; Wald test = .000). However, upon further testing
the result is not robust to the down market test using the alternative definition for investor sentiment
employed by Fung, Sierra et al in which down market days in the equity market are used (Granger p-value
= .108 for causality originating in the credit markets). In addition, while the down market dummies utilized
in the up market test for asymmetry are significant at the 1% level (p=.000), the overall results of the up
test are not indicative of a persistent asymmetry as two-way causality is observed under these conditions
(results not included in the table for purposes of simplicity), casting further doubt on the existence of an
up/down bifurcation related to market conditions.
Finally, in the robustness test for omitted variable bias (Panel H), the headline result showing weak
causality running from the credit to the equity market does not stand up (Granger p-value = .140) while
the original result regarding a strong lead-lad relationship flowing from the equity and the credit market
hold firm (Granger p-value = .000; Wald test = .000). Also, the results are the same under the VARMA
specification (Panel I). As such, viewed in totality the results indicate the 10-year CDX.NA.HY index is
characterized by a different cross market informational flow than the bellwether 5-year index, generally
reacting to events occurring in the systematic equity markets. As a reason for this difference in behavior,
I would proffer that the lower relative liquidity of the index (BIS December 2014) is indicative of a lower
level of monitoring and hence, lower efficiency in impounding relevant information. In other words,
proactive investors prefer to use the five-year instrument. H6 holds along with H8 while H9 does not.
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CDX.NA.HY 10Y and Matched Portfolio of High Yield Stocks
I retest H7 by repeating the above analysis using the 10-year maturity with the closely matched portfolio
to eliminate any bias once again associated with the mismatch of credit quality, non-matching of firms
and calculation methodology. The results are presented in Table 17 and all models in which autoregression
is present are specified as VAR (1) as per the applied information criteria.
Interestingly, even a cursory glance at the table reveals a much different pattern of results than observed
with respect to the five-year maturity and one which based on the cumulative results, largely corroborates
the results of the prior section related to the S&P 500 index.
Specifically, throughout the panels, there is a persistent level of Granger causality observed flowing from
the closely matched equity portfolio to the 10-year high yield synthetic index. Conversely, no causality is
observed in the opposite direction in any of the studies, not even a weak indicative level as was
occasionally observed in the prior section, and there is absolutely no indication of any asymmetry related
to market conditions. In fact, in no instance does the null hypothesis of no causality flowing from the
credit to the equity market even come close to being rejected, with the Granger p-values in the headline
aggregated sample and associated robustness test including exogenous factors being .70 and .89,
respectively.
As a result of this persistent pattern, I limit the amount of tests conducted in this study and conclude that
the 10-year high yield index is not used by investors to proactively monitor risks and put on positions but
rather, is completely reactive to events occurring in the high yield equity sector. Within the context of this
study, H7 holds along with H8 while H9 does not.
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Table 17: CDX.NA.HY 10Y Index and Matched Portfolio of HY Stocks

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2004-2015
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

Lagged CDS Index Lagged Equity Index Lagged VAR System
a
a
CDX HYt-1 p-value HY PORTt-1 p-value
chi2
p-value
0.009
(0.70)
0.138 ***(0.00)

0.049 *(0.06)
-0.159(***0.000)

Panel B: High Growth
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

0.081
(0.31
0.335 ***(0.00)

0.015
-0.005

Panel C: Crisis
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

0.044
(0.43
0.328 ***(0.00)

0.098 *(0.06)
-0.215(***0.000)

3.51
(0.17)
136.58 ***(0.00)

Panel D: Pullback
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

0.009
(0.84
0.221 ***(0.01)

0.011
(0.84)
-0.114 (**0.032)

0.05
(0.97)
29.54 ***(0.00)

Panel E: New Normal b
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-

Panel F: Down Market
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-

-

(0.89)
(0.97)

-

4.10
(0.13)
134.72 ***(0.00)
1.24
12.65

(0.53)
**(0.02)

-

-

-0.034
(0.23)
0.125 ***(0.00)

-0.002 (0.905)
-0.061(***0.004)

380.51 ***(0.00)
2011.65 ***(0.00)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

0.044
(0.43
0.328 ***(0.00)

0.098 *(0.06)
-0.215(***0.000)

3.51
(0.17)
136.58 ***(0.00)

Panel H: Exogenous Vars
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

0.003
(0.89)
0.143 ***(0.00)

0.067 **(0.02)
-0.181(***0.000)

13.53 ***(0.00)
138.25 ***(0.00)

Panel I: VARMA
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

0.009
(0.69)
0.138 ***(0.00)

0.049 *(0.06)
-0.159(***0.000)

138.88 ***(0.00)
138.88 ***(0.00)

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded
b
- Time period is not autoregressive

CDX.NA.HY 5Y and Equally Weighted S&P 500 Index
In testing H10, I reexamine the relationship between the five-year CDX.NA.HY and S&P 500 using an
equally weighted version of the latter index. This enables identification of any size bias given the S&P 500
is subject to large capitalization stock bias since contributions are weighted based on constituents’ market
capitalizations. By weighting firms equally, contributions are normalized and results distilled of any size
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related bias26. The results are presented in Table 18. All models in which autoregressive properties are
detected are once again specified as VAR (1). Equally weighted index data runs from 2006-201527.
Table 18: CDX.NA.HY 10Y Index and Equally Weighted S&P 500 Index
Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2006-2015
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

Lagged CDS Index Lagged Equity Index
a
a
CDX HYt-1 p-value S&P 500t-1 p-value
-0.026 (*0.057)
0.053***(0.030)

Panel B: High Growthb
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-

Panel C: Crisis
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

0.006
0.136

(0.87
(0.00)

-0.037
0.116

(0.186)
*(0.06)

Panel D: Pullback
S&P 500t
CDX HYt
Panel E: New Normal b
S&P 500t
CDX HYt
Panel F: Down Marketc
S&P 500t
CDX HYt
Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-

-

-

-0.037 (**0.021)
0.044 *(0.08)

-0.99 ***(0.00)
-0.127 (***0.004)
-

-

-0.161 **(0.02)
-0.183 (***0.001)
-0.115
0.085
-

Lagged VAR System
chi2

16.54 ***(0.00)
28.66 ***(0.00)
-

-

6.43 ***(0.04)
31.41 ***(0.00)

*(0.06)
(0.51)
-

p-value

3.63
5.15
-

(0.16)
*(0.08)
-

-0.121 ***(0.00)
-0.065
(0.062)

448.79 ***(0.00)
531.98 ***(0.00)

0.028
0.025

(0.55)
(0.57)

-0.156 ***(0.00)
-0.073 (*0.089)

66.76 ***(0.00)
378.72 ***(0.00)

Panel H: Up Marketd
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

0.017
-0.015

(0.38)
*(0.08)

-0.055
(0.00)
-0.214 (***0.001)

26.02 ***(0.00)
35.89 ***(0.00)

Panel I: Exogenous Vars
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-0.029 (**0.042)
0.081 ***(0.00)

-0.083 ***(0.01)
-0.229 (***0.000)

22.09 ***(0.00)
39.30 ***(0.00)

Panel J: VARMA
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.025 (*0.061)
0.054 ***(0.03)

-0.99 ***(0.00)
-0.127 (***0.005)

44.92 ***(0.00)
44.92 ***(0.00)

Panel K: Weekend Effect
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-0.036 (**0.014)
0.039 ***(0.01)

-0.135 ***(0.01)
-0.136 (***0.005)

29.71 ***(0.00)
30.32 ***(0.00)

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded
b
- Time period is not autoregressive
c
- Results are substantially robust to defining down market as the equity market per Fung et al (2008)
d
- F-test p-value for down market interactive terms = ***(.028)

26

Although any bias related to the index being constituted of large companies to begin with is not eliminated,
however because the CDX indexes are too, this is an immaterial issue within the context of this study.
27
In substance, this affects only the High Growth temporal subsample and because this subsample has proven to
of minimal interest in terms of findings, does not substantively impact the overall findings.
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Generally speaking, the results are in line with those of the market capitalization weighted index, however
there are a few minor, yet noteworthy differences. While in the aggregated sample (Panel A), a two-way
cross-market causality is observed, the effect running from the credit to the equity market is dampened,
with the level of significance of 10% (Granger p-value = .057; Wald test = .000) falling materially short of
the 1% observed under the traditional weighting scheme (Granger p-value p=.006), Additionally, whereas
the prior Granger causality originating in the equity market was strong at a 5% significance level (Granger
p-value = .04), it is even stronger now at 1% l(Granger p-value =.004). Moreover, while the pattern with
respect to the temporal subsamples (Panels B - E) is generally the same, with the main finding a very
strong level of Granger causality running from the equity to the credit markets during the crisis (Granger
p-value = .001; Wald test = .000), there is no causality observed running from the credit to the equity
market. Previously, a weak level (Granger p-value = .059) had been documented.
The tests for down market asymmetry also generally yield similar results. However, once again the level
of causality flowing from the credit to the equity market on down days is somewhat weaker at a 5% level
of significance (Granger p-value = .021; Wald test = .000) whereas in the previous analysis it was 1%
(Granger p-value = .003). In addition, in contrast to the prior analysis, flow is also observed running from
the equity to the credit sector (Granger p-value = .062; Wald test = .000), albeit at a 10% significance. With
respect to the up market test, the level of informational flow from the equity to the credit market
strengthens from the prior 10% significance (Granger p-value = .098) to a very strong 1% (Granger p-value
= .001; Wald test = .000) while in the down market during the crisis, a weakened effect from the credit
sector to the S&P 500 index is observed. However, this time the reduction is material, decreasing from a
1% level of significance (Granger p-value = .006) to insignificance (Granger p-value = .55). Interestingly,
only weak Granger causality is documented running from the equity to the credit market at 10%
significance (Granger p-value = .089; Wald test = .000) whereas previously the lead-lag relationship was
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stronger at 5% (Granger p-value = .040). Still, the overarching trend remains clear with the level of flow
from the credit to the equity market being dampened while flow in the opposite direction is stronger.
Not surprisingly, this trend is also evident in the robustness test controlling for omitted variable bias (Panel
I), as the level of Granger causality originating in the credit market and flowing to the equity is reduced
from 1% significance (Granger p-value = .010) to 5% (Granger p-value = .042; Wald test = .000) while in
the opposite direction, causality remains at the 1% level. This pattern is also evident in the VARMA
specification test (Panel J) and partially in the weekend effect check (Panel K). Against this backdrop, the
empirical results suggest the presence of a slight size bias in the previous findings. Observed informational
flow from the credit to the equity market is dampened while in the opposite direction, it often is
strengthened. This pattern indicates the existence of asymmetry with respect to how larger firms
influence returns. Default related information for these firms may be priced in more efficiently by the
credit market, whereas general information priced into in the equity market is captured quickly by the
credit market. In the latter case the dynamic is consistent with the larger analyst following and greater
investor attention observed by Hong, Lim et al. (2000). In the former, it suggests the high yield credit
market often contains incremental information on large cap firms, underscoring its relevance in the
investment opportunity set. As such, H10 holds, although the effect is slight. H6, H8 and H9 also hold
within the context of this study.
CDX.NA.HY 10Y and Equally Weighted S&P 500 Index
I then retest H10 employing the 10-year CDX.NA.HY in place of the 5-year. Based on prior results involving
the 10-year high yield maturity, I do not expect to observe any meaningful heterogeneity since the general
lead-lag relationship is much different than that observed vis-à-vis the bellwether five-year maturity.
However, for the sake of fulsomeness and in order to further explore the modest size effect observed in
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the prior section, it is instructive to conduct the panel analysis. To that end, the results are presented in
Table 19. All autoregressive specifications remain VAR (1).
Table 19: CDX.NA.HY 10Y Index and Equally Weighted S&P 500 Index

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2006-2015
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

Lagged CDS Index Lagged Equity Index
a
a
CDX HYt-1 p-value S&P 500t-1 p-value
-0.017
(0.33)
0.161 ***(0.00)

-0.122 ***(0.00)
-0.168 (***0.00)

Lagged VAR System
chi2

p-value

26.64 ***(0.00)
125.79 ***(0.00)

Panel B: High Growth
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

0.052
(0.38
0.251 **(0.03)

0.018
-0.312

(0.88)
(0.19)

0.94
(0.63)
14.58 ***(0.00)

Panel C: Crisis
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

0.036
0.381

(0.43
(0.00)

-0.161 ***(0.00)
-0.207 (***0.000)

14.35 ***(0.00)
131.55 ***(0.00)

Panel D: Pullback
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

0.001
(0.97
0.107 **(0.04)

-0.168
(0.30)
-0.211 **(0.015)

2.12
(0.35)
30.75 ***(0.00)

Panel E: New Normal b
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-

-

-

-

-

-

Panel F: Down Marketc,d
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-0.041 (*0.052)
0.144 **(0.04)

-0.157 ***(0.00)
-0.075 ***(0.006)

329.52 ***(0.00)
593.24 ***(0.00)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-0.001
(0.98)
0.268 ***(0.00)

-0.237 ***(0.00)
-0.085 (**0.020)

64.69 ***(0.00)
421.29 ***(0.00)

Panel H: Exogenous Vars
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-0.017
(0.35
0.171 ***(0.00)

-0.119 ***(0.00)
-0.231 (***0.000)

32.12 ***(0.00)
131.54 ***(0.00)

Panel I: VARMA
S&P 500t
CDX HYt

-0.016
(0.36)
0.161 ***(0.00)

-0.120 ***(0.00)
-0.167 (***0.00)

151.70 ***(0.00)
151.70 ***(0.00)

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded
b
- Time period is not autoregressive
c
- Results are robust to defining down market days = the equity market is down a la Fung et al (2008)
d
- F-test p-value for down market interactive terms = ***(.000)

In general the results are the same in that they indicate investors in the 10-year credit index are mostly
reactive. In addition, any observed causality flowing from the credit market is dampened while causality
flowing from the equity market is mostly stronger. Specifically, the modicum of causality observed in the
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aggregate sample in the original results at the 10% level (Granger p-value = .057) is no longer evident
(Granger p-value = .33) while causality in the opposite direction remains very strong at 1% (Granger pvalue = .000; Wald test = .000). In addition, there is no causality observed during the temporal subsamples
(Panels B - E) originating in the credit market and crossing over into equities, whereas in the opposite
direction, the levels of causality observed remain the same at the 1% significance level during the Crisis
(Panel C) and Pullback (panel D) periods.
Regarding the tests for investor sentiment related asymmetry, the down market results once again show
a diminution in the effect of information flowing from the credit to the equity market, with the level of
significance reducing from 1% (Granger p-value = .000) to 10% (Granger p-value = .057; Wald test = .000).
Moreover, the effect in the opposite direction strengthens from a weakly significant 10% (Granger p-value
= .098) to a very strong 1% (Granger p-value = .006; Wald test = .000). Finally, in the panel test of the down
market during the mortgage crisis, the weak level of causal flow initially observed from the credit flow
(10% with a Granger p-value = .088) completely disappears (p=.98) while flow in the opposite direction
remains strong at a level of 5% (and the Granger p-value improving from .047 to .02). These results are
also robust to the alternative definition of investor sentiment employed by Fung, Sierra et al.
Lastly, the test for omitted variable bias (Panel H) yields the same result as in the first panel (Panel A) and
the model is correctly specified (Panel I), underscoring the robustness of the headline result and not
differing in substance with respect to the prior market capitalization weighted result28. Against this
backdrop, the cumulative result of the study supports the finding in the preceding section of a slight size
bias in the informational flow between these markets. H10 holds along with H6 and H8 while H9 also holds
although not as strongly, within the context of this study.

28

Although the failure to reject the null of no credit market causality is more firmly established with a p-value =.35,
vs. .14 previously
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CDX.NA.HY.BB 5Y and Matched Portfolio of BB Rated High Yield Stocks
In the testing of H11, the investigation moves to the sub-indexes of the CDX.NA.HY, first the CDX.NA.HY.BB
comprised of BB-rated entities. This parsing based on rating allows for study of heterogeneity within
default risk based categories of the high yield sector. In examining flow, I limit the analysis to the matched
portfolio due to the lower liquidity of the sub-index vis-à-vis the umbrella index (DTCC 2014) and
attendant presumed lack of investor interest to arbitrage or hedge positions in the S&P 500 (also evident
in only the five-year maturity being available as with the sub-indices of the CDX.NA.IG in the third chapter).
The results are presented in Table 20. As with the headline index, all systems are specified as VAR (1).
While the pattern of cross market information flow is largely consistent with that of the broader umbrella
index, there are some notable exceptions. As with the headline index, there is strong two-way causality
observed in the aggregated sample (Panel A) with the level of causality running from the credit to the
equity market at 5% (Granger p-value = .015; Wald test = .022) and from the closely matched portfolio to
the credit sector at 1% (Granger p-value = .000; Wald test = .000). However, in the temporal subsamples
(Panels B - E), a much more persistent Granger causality is documented flowing from the equity market.
This stronger level of flow is evidenced by the results during the Crisis (Panel C), Pullback (Panel D) and
New Normal (Panel E) periods, all of which are significant at the 1% level. Conversely, informational flow
in the opposite direction is only strongly evident during the New Normal period at a 5% level of
significance and while the Granger p-value = .048 during the Crisis period, I refrain from citing this result
as strongly significant given the Wald test p-value = .014. Still, some level of cross market flow is evident,
albeit at a reduced level vs. the New Normal period. Furthermore, while the overall credit result jibes with
that of the CDX.NA.HY, clearly there is a much stronger level of causality flowing from the equity market.
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Table 20: CDX.NA.HY.BB 5Y Index and Matched Portfolio of HY.BB Stocks

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2004-2015
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

Lagged CDS Index
Lagged Equity Index
a
a
CDX HY BBt-1 p-value HY BB PORTt-1 p-value

Lagged VAR System
chi2

p-value

-0.025 (**0.015)
-0.074 ***(0.00)

-0.032 **(0.03)
-0.331(***0.000)

7.66 ***(0.022)
62.49 ***(0.00)

Panel B: High Growthb
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

-

-

-

Panel C: Crisis
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

-0.073 **(0.048
0.144
(0.00)

-0.039
(0.41)
-0.039(***0.001)

3.94
(0.14)
32.31 ***(0.00)

Panel D: Pullback
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

-0.003
-0.204

(0.86
(0.00)

-0.035
(0.41)
-0.031(***0.000)

0.70
(0.71)
29.08 ***(0.00)

Panel E: New Normal
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

-0.059 (**0.019)
0.209 ***(0.00)

-0.085 **(0.03)
-0.148(***0.009)

6.89 **(0.032)
73.44 ***(0.00)

Panel F: Down Marketc
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

-0.058(***0.000)
0.209 ***(0.00)

-0.085
(0.97)
-0.314 (***0.00)

21.47 ***(0.00)
52.22 ***(0.00)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

-0.103
-0.046

(0.04
(0.12)

-0.026
(0.66)
-0.184 (**0.016)

5.26
37.99

Panel H: Up Marketd
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

0.013
(0.37)
-0.077 ***(0.01)

-0.057 **(0.04)
-0.232 (***0.00)

23.02 ***(0.00)
51.83 ***(0.00)

Panel I: Exogenous Vars
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

-0.023 (**0.033)
-0.084 ***(0.00)

-0.034
(0.19)
-0.278(***0.000)

13.64 **(0.033)
66.85 ***(0.00)

Panel J: VARMA
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.024 (**0.016)
-0.073***(0.000)

0.090 **(0.03)
-0.329 (**0.013)

69.51 ***(0.00)
69.51 ***(0.00)

Panel K: Weekend Effect
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

-0.028 (**0.011)
-0.084 ***(0.00)

-0.074 (0.001)
-0.328(***0.000)

20.10 ***(0.000)
69.79 ***(0.00)

-

-

-

(0.26)
**(0.00)

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded
b
- Time period is not autoregressive
c
- Results are robust to defining down market days = the equity market is down a la Fung et al (2008)
d
- F-test p-value for down market interactive terms = ***(.001)

This pattern once again suggests that asymmetry exists with respect to up/down market conditions and
not surprisingly, that is the case. There is a very strong level of causality flowing from the high yield BBrated credit to the equity markets on down market days at 1% significance (Panel F: Granger p-value =
.000; Wald test = .000), bolstering the view that the high yield CDS market is comparatively more efficient
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in capturing adverse news. However interestingly, and something not evident in the broader index, there
is also a strong level of causality flowing from the equity to the credit market (Granger p-value = .000;
Wald test = .000) on these days. This indicates that different types of incremental information may be
more efficiently impounded by either of the markets, depending on the nature of that information. This
result also is supported by the robustness test involving the alternative definition of adverse sentiment.
Adding further credence to the asymmetry is the up market test (Panel H) in which causality originating
in the credit market disappears (Granger p-value = .37) while that in the equity market remains very strong
at the 1% level (Granger p-value = .000; Wald test = .000). Finally, the robustness test regarding the joint
significance of the down market dummies is strongly significant at the 1% level (p-value = .001).
Interestingly, the results for the down market days during the crisis (Panel G) are in line with the findings
during the study of this time period in general. Specifically, there is a strong level of causality running from
the equity to the credit sector at 5% (Granger p-value = .016; Wald test = .000), although this is lower than
the 1% in the total subsample, while in the opposite direction (Granger p-value = .040) the initially
significant level of information flow does not hold up robustly to the Wald test (p-value = .26).
Rounding out the study, I perform the robustness test for omitted variable bias (Panel I), with the results
being unaffected as the same level of two-way causality is observed. Also, the examinations of the VARMA
and weekend effect yield substantially the same results as in the initial analysis (Panels J & K). On the basis
of these results, I conclude that like the CDX.NA.HY, the CDX.NA.HY.BB often contains incremental
information vis-à-vis the BB-rated high yield equity sector and this effect is particularly relevant during
adverse market conditions. Interestingly however, regarding counter-flow from the equity markets, the
level of causality is stronger than observed in the umbrella index. As such, this finding underscores the
heterogeneity present across the investment grade and high yield markets as well as within each market
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segment. It also suggests that within the high yield segment, investors prefer the CDX.NA.HY more than
the granular BB-rated index in expressing their views. H11 holds along with H8 and H9 in this study.
CDX.NA.HY.B 5Y and Matched Portfolio of B Rated High Yield Stocks
In the further testing of H11 along with now H12, I study the CDX.NA.HY.B and its closely matched portfolio
comprised of B-rated firms. Because default risk for B-rated credits is higher than for BB-rated ones,
heterogeneity may exist between these two high yield markets. Once again, this study is limited to the
closely matched index. The results are presented in Table 21. All autoregressive models remain VAR (1).
Table 21: CDX.NA.HY.B 5Y Index and Matched Portfolio of HY.B Stocks
Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2004-2015
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

Lagged CDS Index Lagged Equity Index
a
a
CDX HY Bt-1 p-value HY B PORTt-1 p-value

Lagged VAR System
chi2

p-value

-0.009
(0.56
0.046 **(0.03)

0.061 ***(0.00)
-0.201(***0.000)

12.01 ***(0.003)
96.52 ***(0.00)

Panel B: High Growthb
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

-

-

-

Panel C: Crisis
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

-0.032 **(0.048
0.114 **(0.02)

Panel D: Pullback
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

-

-

-

-0.073
(0.12)
-0.174(***0.000)

4.00
(0.14)
30.66 ***(0.00)

0.016
0.007

(0.69
(0.87)

0.034
(0.47)
-0.204(***0.000)

0.52
(0.77)
20.37 ***(0.00)

Panel E: New Normal
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

-0.028
0.007

(0.29
(0.84)

0.052
(0.16)
-0.331(***0.000)

5.94 *(0.051)
55.65 ***(0.00)

Panel F: Down Marketc,d
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

-0.066(***0.008)
0.107 ***(0.00)

0.023
(0.40)
-0.155(***0.000)

21.47 ***(0.00)
52.22 ***(0.00)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

-0.069
0.12

(0.29
*(0.06)

0.021
(0.72)
-0.151(***0.008)

22.23 ***(0.000)
105.37 ***(0.00)

Panel H: Exogenous Vars
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

-0.016
(0.36
0.043 **(0.04)

0.095 ***(0.00)
-0.192(***0.000)

20.07 ***(0.003)
96.18 ***(0.00)

0.172
(0.59)
0.046 **(0.03)

0.061 ***(0.00)
-0.199(***0.000)

108.37 ***(0.00)
108.37 ***(0.00)

Panel I: VARMA
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded
b
- Time period is not autoregressive
c
- Results not robust to defining down market days = the equity market is down a la Fung et al (2008)
d
- F-test p-value for down market interactive terms = ***(.009)
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From the pattern which emerges, it is immediately clear that the documented causality is completely
different than observed in the high yield sector to this point. Moreover, it is also different than expected
for these comparatively higher default risk based firms. Throughout the analysis there is a persistent and
very strong causality running from the equity to the credit sector, in each case at the 1% significance level
with all Granger p-values being less than .009 and all Wald tests = .000, while in the opposite direction,
no causality is observed in the headline (Panel A: Granger p-value = .56), temporal subsample (Panels B E) and exogenous factor (Panel H: Granger p-value = .36) panels29. The only exception is the Crisis period
(Panel C) in which Granger p-value equates to a 5% level of significance (.048), however as was with the
BB-rated panel, the significance does not hold up to the Wald test (p-value = .14).
In fact, the only area in which Granger causality originating in the credit market is documented is with
respect to up/down asymmetry, however even then, the result is not as generally robust as in the prior
studies. While the initial down market test indicates a level of strong level of asymmetry (Granger p-value
= .008; Wald test = .000), the result disappears under the alternative definition (Granger p-value = .107).
Moreover, the initial finding in the other direction remains robust at a 1% level of significance. Still, the
result does stand up in the up market panel (not included in table for simplicity) as well as joint test of
down market dummies, which is significant at the 1% level (p-value = .009). Given this semi-robustness,
coupled with the p-value in the down market test using the equity based definition bordering on
significance, albeit weak, I conclude there is some degree of down market asymmetry in the behavior this
sub-index. However, clearly the effect is not as strong as previously observed in the high yield sector.
Based on the overall results, I conclude that the B-rated high yield credit index is almost completely
reactive to developments in the equity sector. The only exception is under adverse market conditions, or

29

I do not test for the weekend effect given that the headline result does not document causality running from the
credit to the equity market.
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when investor sentiment is negative, although the effect is not as strong as observed in the headline or
CDX.NA.HY.BB indexes. As reasons for this unexpected result, I cite the lower relative liquidity of the Brated index vis-à-vis the two indexes just referenced and especially the headline index, based on
information available (BIS and DTCC). I also attribute the lower level of credit investor interest to the
comparatively lower number of firms in the index, which on average is approximately half the number of
the BB-rated index30. As a final plausible explanation, I cite Blume, Keim et al. (1991), who observed that
low-grade bonds are particularly sensitive to equity market movements31.
As such, both H11 and H12 hold. Interestingly, H8 and H9 do not generally hold. These results demonstrate
that credit related investors in the high yield market prefer to express their views in the broader
bellwether CDX.NA.HY and to a lesser extent, CDX.NA.HY.BB indexes, largely eschewing the CDX.NA.HY.B.
CDX.NA.HY 5Y and Matched Portfolio Thresholds
In the final three sections, H13 is tested, the potential for asymmetry in observed down market Granger
causality originating in the credit markets based on the size of market movements. Again, I limit the
analysis to closely matched portfolios. To my knowledge, this type of Granger causality analysis has never
been performed before in the literature. The first examination involves the CDX.NA.HY for which a very
strong Granger causality was observed (p-value = .006), with none documented in the opposite direction.
As such, I employ the V-STAR methodology outlined in (4) which enables a general picture of the
difference – if any -- between smaller and larger down market movements. The empirical results are
presented in Table 22. As expected, the lag order of the specification remains (1).

30

Based on index constituent information found on Bloomberg.
While the current study involves credit derivatives, the linkage between synthetic and cash markets warrants
generalization of the finding to the CDS market.
31
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Table 22: CDX.NA.HY 5Y and Matched Portfolio AR Thresholds
Lagged CDS Index
a
CDX HYt-1 p-value

Lagged Equity Index
a
HY PORTt-1 p-value

Lagged VAR System

-0.078(***0.001)
0.138***(0.002)

0.002 ***(0.00)
-0.053
(0.33)

17.11 ***(0.002)
37.29 ***(0.00)

Panel B: 1.0%
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.907(***0.000)
0.155***(0.000)

-0.025
-0.078

(0.52)
(0.18)

15.89 ***(0.003)
41.09 ***(0.00)

Panel C: 1.5%
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.109(***0.000)
0.193***(0.000)

-0.037
-0.085

(0.42)
(0.23)

17.19 ***(0.002)
47.13 ***(0.00)

Panel D: 2.0%
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.120(***0.000)
0.213***(0.000)

-0.041
-0.927

(0.42)
(0.23)

18.91 ***(0.001)
50.11 ***(0.00)

Panel E: 2.5%
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.125(***0.000)
0.241***(0.000)

-0.034
-0.120

(0.57)
(0.19)

23.81 ***(0.001)
53.01 ***(0.00)

Panel F: 3.0%
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.105(***0.004)
0.218
(0.00)

0.135 *(0.052)
-0.173 *(0.099)

27.93 ***(0.00)
48.94 ***(0.00)

Panel G: 3.5%
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.112(***0.003)
0.215
(0.00)

0.135
-0.178

*(0.08)
(0.12)

25.35 ***(0.00)
45.66 ***(0.00)

Panel H: 4.0%
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-0.107 (**0.021)
0.212
(0.00)

0.148 *(0.07)
-0.221 *(0.077)

20.36 ***(0.00)
42.59 ***(0.00)

Panel I: 5.0%b
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-

-

-

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 0.5%
HY PORTt
CDX HYt

-

-

chi2

p-value

-

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded
b
- Time period is not autoregressive

As can be seen, the level of causality flowing from the high yield credit to the equity market is very
persistent, remaining at the 1% level of significance up to and including the 3.5% threshold (Panels A - G)
with the Wald tests being significant at that level. However, thereafter there is a reduction in significance
to 5% (Panel H: Granger p-value = .021; Wald test = .000) and once the 5% threshold is breached, the
autoregressive characteristics of the system disappear. Viewed holistically, these results suggest very
large downward movements (or greater negative investor sentiment) are associated with less Granger
causality. This makes sense in that information causing extreme movements is more likely to be
impounded efficiently by investors, especially given the default risk related implications in the high yield
sector. This result of the credit market losing its asymmetrical informational advantage vis-à-vis the equity
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market as down market movements increase is also supported by the pattern of causality running in the
opposite direction. To illustrate, there is no causality observed up until the 3% threshold (Panels A - E), at
which point a general level is documented up until the 5% threshold (Panels F - H), albeit at a 10%
significance level. Simply stated, as smaller movements are gradually eliminated from the data, the
dominance of the credit market generally begins to dissipate. As such, H13 holds, although not strongly.
CDX.NA.HY.BB 5Y and Matched Portfolio Thresholds
The results for the CDX.NA.HY.BB are presented in Table 23. In the initial down market analysis, a very
strong and robust two-way Granger causality was observed at a significance level of 1%.
Table 23: CDX.NA.HY.BB 5Y and Matched Portfolio AR Thresholds
Dependant Variable
Panel A: 0.5%
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

Lagged CDS Index
Lagged Equity Index
a
a
CDX HY BBt-1 p-value HY BB PORTt-1 p-value

Lagged VAR System
chi2

p-value

-0.064(***0.000)
-0.051 *(0.10)

0.001
(0.97)
-0.377 (***0.00)

23.47 ***(0.00)
55.81 ***(0.00)

Panel B: 1.0%
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

-0.071(***0.000)
-0.056 *(0.08)

0.017
(0.64)
-0.449 (***0.00)

27.56 ***(0.00)
60.93 ***(0.00)

Panel C: 1.5%
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

-0.066(***0.000)
-0.074 **(0.03)

-0.008
(0.85)
-0.539 (***0.00)

17.72 ***(0.001)
66.32 ***(0.00)

Panel D: 2.0%
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

-0.071(***0.000)
-0.101***(0.001)

0.037
(0.44)
-0.661 (***0.00)

22.83 ***(0.00)
74.03 ***(0.00)

Panel E: 2.5%
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

-0.065(***0.001)
-0.135***(0.001)

0.051
(0.33)
-0.788 (***0.00)

19.52 ***(0.00)
83.40 ***(0.00)

Panel F: 3.0%
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

-0.062(***0.003)
-0.173 ***(0.00)

0.088
(0.13)
-0.844 (***0.00)

20.77 ***(0.00)
86.30 ***(0.00)

Panel G: 3.5%
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

-0.055 (**0.013)
0.203 ***(0.00)

0.105 (0.103)
-0.933 (***0.00)

17.69 ***(0.001)
91.07 ***(0.00)

Panel H: 4.0%
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

-0.055 (**0.038)
0.338 ***(0.00)

0.064
(0.35)
-0.963 (***0.00)

11.77 **(0.019)
107.28 ***(0.00)

Panel I: 5.0%
HY BB PORTt
CDX HY BBt

-0.059 (**0.042)
-0.373 ***(0.00)

0.051
(0.52)
-1.059 (***0.00)

10.34 **(0.035)
107.22 ***(0.00)

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded
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Interestingly, unlike in the CDX.NA.HY analysis above, there is a clear persistence in the level of causality
flowing from the equity sector to the credit sector at 1% significance. This suggests that flow is
independent of the materiality of the news. Moreover, while in the other direction there is also a
persistent level of causality documented, the relative strength begins to reduce from the 1% significance
level to 5%, once the 3.5% movement threshold is breached (Panels G-I), with the associated p-values
gradually becoming weaker. This pattern is once again suggestive of the dissipating effect of incremental
adverse information being impounded more efficiently by the credit market as the materiality of news
increases.
Also, while this market segment often captures negative news more efficiently, the effect is not as strongly
persistent as in the prior section, where there is no flow observed from the equity to the credit sector.
Thus, some heterogeneity is evident in the asymmetrical Granger causality relationships between the high
yield bellwether and its sub-indexes, an observation consistent with the previous analyses. As such, I
attribute this difference again to credit investors preferring to express their views more in the headline
index, resulting in a lower level of liquidity in the sub-index. This notwithstanding, the observed dissipation
of causality associated with larger down market movements also is evident here. H13 holds along with
H11.
CDX.NA.HY.B 5Y and Matched Portfolio Thresholds
Given the differing nature of the down market asymmetry identified in the initial analysis of the
CDX.NA.HY.B, I expect heterogeneity in the results of this final test of H13 and in fact, this is the case.
In examining Table 24, while very strong levels of Granger causality flowing from the B-rated credit to the
equity sector are evident at lower threshold levels (Panels A - E), the strength of the causality begins to
dissipate at higher levels and virtually disappears above the 4.0% threshold. However, the breakdown
also begins to occur earlier, once the 2.5% threshold is surpassed as opposed to 3.5% in the prior analysis.
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Also, causality running from the B-rated equity to the credit sector remains very strong throughout the
study, at the 1% level of significance suggesting no relationship with the size of the down market
movement.
Table 24: CDX.NA.HY.B 5Y and Matched Portfolio AR Thresholds
Dependant Variable
Panel A: 0.5%
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

Lagged CDS Index
Lagged Equity Index
a
a
CDX HY Bt-1 p-value HY B PORTt-1 p-value

Lagged VAR System
chi2

p-value

-0.084(***0.002)
0.131 ***(0.00)

0.032
(0.29)
-0.185 (***0.00)

24.33 ***(0.00)
109.01 ***(0.00)

Panel B: 1.0%
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

-0.101(***0.001)
0.163 ***(0.00)

0.113
(0.29)
-0.241 (***0.00)

37.27 ***(0.00)
120.58 ***(0.00)

Panel C: 1.5%
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

-0.171(***0.000)
0.229 ***(0.00)

0.117 (0.006)
-0.293 (***0.00)

51.03 ***(0.00)
138.64 ***(0.00)

Panel D: 2.0%
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

-0.178(***0.000)
0.241 ***(0.00)

0.183 (0.000)
-0.318 (***0.00)

63.86 ***(0.00)
140.23 ***(0.00)

Panel E: 2.5%
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

-0.183(***0.001)
0.183***(0.001)

0.159 ***(0.00)
-0.428 (***0.00)

19.52 ***(0.00)
83.40 ***(0.00)

Panel F: 3.0%
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

-0.085 (*0.085)
0.092
(0.13)

0.479 ***(0.00)
-0.692 (***0.00)

77.65 ***(0.00)
151.78 ***(0.00)

Panel G: 3.5%
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

-0.119 (**0.025)
0.108
(0.09)

0.415 ***(0.00)
-0.671 (***0.00)

62.65 ***(0.00)
143.95 ***(0.00)

Panel H: 4.0%
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

-0.113 (*0.069)
0.145 *(0.06)

0.439 ***(0.00)
-0.747 (***0.00)

52.94 ***(0.00)
149.62 ***(0.00)

Panel I: 5.0%
HY B PORTt
CDX HY Bt

-0.057
-0.098

0.541 ***(0.00)
-0.928 (***0.00)

52.88 ***(0.00)
145.16 ***(0.00)

(0.44)
(0.27)

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded

Again, I attribute this to the greater level of attention (and fear) associated with such market conditions.
As such, H13 holds along with H11 and H12 in this study.
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2.4

Conclusions

In this chapter, I examine the systematic lead-lag relationship between the high yield credit and equity
markets and the potential for heterogeneity with respect to the investment grade market results e first
chapter as well as endogenously within the sector. This examination is rooted in the different default risk
characteristics of the non-investment sector and implications thereof under the Merton model (Merton
1974). Theoretically, these firms should be more sensitive to adverse news and changing investor
sentiment given the shorter distance to default (Fung, Sierra et al. 2008).
The empirical results support this heterogeneity. There is a different lead-lag relationship between the
systematic high yield credit and equity markets than observed in the investment grade sector, where
cross-market efficiency generally was observed. High yield credit investors often price in certain types of
incremental information more efficiently than equity investors. A persistent amount of informational flow
from the equity to the credit sector also is observed, resulting in a casual framework not documented in
the investment grade sector. Furthermore, the observed nature of the flow from the credit to the equity
sector is regime dependent based on investor sentiment. When such sentiment is negative, the level of
flow increases, suggesting that credit investors price in incremental information during adverse times.
Conversely, stronger flow from the equity market is observed when sentiment is positive. However, this
credit market effect decreases as the size of the downward movement becomes very large, indicating
extreme default related news may be impounded by equity investors more efficiently.
However, with these general results in mind a few caveats are in order. For one, this effect is limited to
the five-year CDX maturities as the ten-year CDX index, where extant is almost completely reactive to
developments in the equity sector. This indicates that high yield investors express their views almost
exclusively in the five-year point along the synthetic credit curve. In addition, the general causal
relationship is limited to the bellwether CDX.NA.HY and the BB-rated indexes, with only a modicum of
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causality documented in the B-rated credit sector. While a level of heterogeneity within the differential
credit rating categories was expected, this result is surprising in that these credits are of a comparatively
lower rating and hence, should be more sensitive to news under the theoretical construct. However, upon
further review this dynamic makes sense for two reasons. The first is the differential liquidity levels
between this index and the CDX.NA.HY and CDX.NA.HY.BB indexes based on available information
generated by the DTCC. In general in this macro-analysis, lower levels of liquidity imply a certain
reactiveness on the part of credit investors to events in the equity sector. The second is that, as noted by
(Blume, Keim et al. (1991)), lower rated high yield credit instruments tend to trade like stocks, a result
entirely consistent with the finding in this essay.
One area in which the high yield and investment grade sectors are similar is in exhibiting a slight size bias.
In addition, the credit market is more reactive when sub-indexes are examined, a result consistent with
the examination of the sector based sub-indices of the bellwether CDX investment grade index in the next
chapter. Finally, where autoregression is present, the price stickiness does not last beyond one day. Still,
these similarities are relatively minor within the broader context of the results, which demonstrate a very
clear heterogeneity with respect to the investment grade sector and one in which incremental information
is often impounded more efficiently in credit markets, especially under adverse conditions. While this
result theoretically suggests the potential for investors to earn arbitrage profits, given the observed
asymmetry, successful arbitrageurs would need to possess the ability to predict the nature of the news
affecting the market on a given day, i.e., whether positive or negative. However, if news follows a random
pattern, consistent profits would not be practically realizable.
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ABSTRACT
In the third chapter, I examine the lead-lag relationship between the industry sector sub-indexes of the
bellwether CDX.NA.IG index and closely matched portfolios of stocks comprised of the constituents of
those indexes. This is the first effort in the literature specifically examining these sub-indexes. As such, I
investigate for heterogeneity in the inter-market informational flow between the sub-indices and
aggregated CDX.NA.IG as well as within the sub-indices themselves based on their different types of
business risks and exposures to systematic risk factors. There is clear heterogeneity observed in how
information flows compared to the headline systematic index. Whereas no cross market Granger causality
was observed in the CDX.NA.IG and associated equity markets, there is a persistent causality evident in
the sub-indexes flowing from the equity to the credit sectors. This suggests very different behavior on the
part of investors as they react to developments in the equity sector rather than efficiently impounding
information, giving rise to the potential for arbitrage. The only exception is in the technology, media and
telecommunications sector in which causality is also observed running from the credit to the equity
market. This difference is attributed to the greater growth prospects for these firms, thus resulting in a
different risk/reward paradigm and greater attention paid to growth companies by sell-side analysts, as
documented by Jegadeesh, Kim et al. (2004).
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CHAPTER 3
SYSTEMATIC INFORMATION FLOW IN INVESTMENT GRADE INDUSTRY SECTORS
In the final chapter I examine the potential for asymmetries with respect to the headline results in the
first chapter by dividing the umbrella CDX.NA.IG index into its five industry sector based components.
Together with the headline index and a high volatility index of the 30 most volatile names in the CDX.NA.IG
(of which an analysis is beyond the scope of this document), these indexes comprise the CDX.NA.IG family
of indexes. This analysis is the first of its kind to employ the actual CDX sub-indices as prior efforts
examining industry sectors have not used traded indexes but rather, manually constructed aggregations
of single-name CDS settlements or have focused on geographies other than North America.
The five industry sectors represented by the sub-indices of the CDX.NA.IG, several of which are
amalgamations of multiple sectors, and analyzed in this essay are Consumer Cyclical (CDX.NA.IG CONS),
Energy (CDX.NA.IG ENRG), Financials (CDX.NA.IG FIN), Industrial (CDX.NA.IG INDU) and Telecom, Media
and Technology (CDX.NA.IG TMT).
Conceptually, as these sub-indices capture a wide diversity of industries with differing levels of business
risk, they should also have differing exposure to systematic risk factors. For example, as noted by Byström
(2006), credit spreads in the automotive sector, which feed into the Industrials sub-index in this study
behaved differently than the other sectors he studied covering the March-May 2005 timeframe.
According to the author, the reason for this was related to the performance difficulties experienced by
General Motors at the time and concomitant anticipation of a downgrade in the company's credit rating.
Naturally, because of the bellwether position of GM in the automotive sector, this had significant
implications beyond just the company and resulted in industry wide contagion and pressure on CDS
premiums. This period of anticipatory turbulence ultimately culminated in the downgrading to junk status
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of both GM and Ford’s credit ratings on June 5th of that year, despite the relative health of the broader
economy at that time.
Another relevant example of differing business risk is provided by Narayan, Sharma et al. (2014). In their
study of individual, mostly investment grade CDS and stocks grouped into sector based, the authors
observed marked differences in the mean and standard deviation of log CDS spreads across the 10 sectors
under study, as illustrated in Figure 7. For example, the standard deviation of log spreads during the time
period under study in the Information Technology, Financials and Consumer Discretionary sectors, all of
which were approximately 1.1, were significantly higher than for Utilities, Healthcare and Industrials, all
of which were around 0.8. Beyond that, the mean log of spreads also varied significantly across the
sectors, with the highest (Consumer Discretionary) being almost 50% higher than the lowest (Healthcare).
As a result, a significant amount of risk based heterogeneity is evident in the industry panels studied by
the author.
Figure 7: Sector Based Mean CDS Spreads and Standard Deviations in Narayan (2014) Study

As a final example, the need to examine sector spreads for asymmetries can be demonstrated though the
updating of the risk profile of one of the sectors of generally average business risk during the time of the
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Narayan, Sharma et al study based on current events. To illustrate, during the study which ended in 2012
the energy sector was characterized by an average level of default risk vis-à-vis the other nine sectors
examined on the basis of its standard deviation. However, on July 12th, 2016 the Wall Street Journal noted
that while overall 12-month trailing default rates in the economy had hit a six year high of 4.9%, the energy
sector was disproportionately contributing to this number. In fact, the industry default rate was 15%,
including an astounding 29% rate in the E&P segment, all the while the U.S. stock market was setting
record highs32. The reason for this, of course was related to the steep decline in oil prices, which had
hovered around $100/barrel in July 2014 (at which time producers were cash rich and loaded up on debt),
only to fall to the $28/barrel level by the beginning of 2016. Clearly, this example shows how fortunes can
vary over time for given industry sectors and underscore the need to examine them over an extended
time period, which I do in this document.
Against this backdrop, I examine a series of research questions/hypotheses exploring the potential for
heterogeneity in the relative price discovery of the CDX.NA.IG sub-indices and their sensitivity to news. In
addition, I investigate for heterogeneity in the sub-index related results relative to the composite
CDX.NA.IG, since industry specific attributes aggregated into a composite index generally are smoothed
out, resulting in a whole different than the sum of many of its parts.

3.1

Literature Review

Once again, a summary of relevant papers in the overall lead-lag literature can be found in Section 1.1 of
the first chapter. These works include Longstaff, Mithal et al. (2003), Norden and Weber (2004), Acharya
and Johnson (2007), Fung, Sierra et al. (2008), Forte and Pena (2009), Norden and Weber (2009), Ni and
Pan (2011), Han and Zhou (2011), Marsh and Wagner (2012), Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013),

32

“Junk Bond Defaults Keep Climbing,” Wall Street Journal, July 12th, 2016.
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Hilscher, Pollet et al. (2015) and Xiang, Chng et al. (2015). However, with respect to the present chapter,
the most relevant efforts are the two reflected in Table 25 and discussed in more detail below. This
relevance is based on the authors’ examination of the behavior of specific industry sectors.
Table 25: Most Relevant Lead-Lag Literature and Findings for Third Chapter
Authors/Year

Timeframe

Sample Studied

Methodology

Observed Results

Byström (2006)

2004-2006

Itraxx Europe IG Indices

OLS

Implied CDS lead stocks

Narayan, Sharma et al. (2014)

2004-2012

212 S&P 500 firms

VECM

Stocks lead CDS

To illustrate, in Byström (2006), the author studied the lead-lag relationship between cross market
spreads for the entire family of Itraxx Europe CDS indices, including subsectors. In doing so, he examined
implied index spreads generated by a popular structural risk based model, CreditGrades, which used stock
prices as an input into the calculation of the theoretical equilibrium spread along with firm specific data
(analogous to VECM based studies).
The specific timeframe under study covered June 2004 – March 2006 and the indices consisted of the
bellwether iTraxx Europe index comprised of 125 investment grade reference entities (like the CDX.NA.IG
for North America) as well as seven sector related sub-indices derived from these names. These subindices encompassed the Industrials, Autos, TMT, Energy, Consumers, Senior Financials and Subordinate
Financials sectors. To this group, the Itraxx Crossover Index was added, which consisted of a limited
number (30) of sub-investment grade names which had previously been rated investment grade.
Methodologically, Byström examined cross-serial correlations and then regressed one-day lagged values
of the structural model implied spreads on observed market spreads and vice versa using OLS, finding that
for all but one sub-index, the model implied spreads lead the subsequent observed spreads. From this
result he concluded that implied CDS demonstrate a level of predictability with respect to information
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contained in the stock market (although of course, subject to the assumptions of the model). The author
subsequently tested this predictability by implementing three basic trading strategies which took either
long or short positions in the respective Itraxx indices based on the directionality of the lagged spread
changes implied by the model. While all three strategies produced significant positive returns over the
21-month period under study, these mostly did not hold when transaction costs in the form of bid-ask
spreads were considered.
In the only other paper exploring this issue, Narayan, Sharma et al. (2014) examined sector related spreads
over a longer period of time than Byström and within a different geographic region, the North American
market. Specifically, the authors divided the S&P 500 index into its ten constituent industry sectors and
then constructed CDS portfolios of matching names on which single name CDS were written (using
information available on Bloomberg) which they tested within a VECM framework since the data nonstationary and co-integrated. The industries studied were Telecommunication, Energy, Information
Technology, Materials, Utilities, Healthcare, Consumer staples, Industrials, Financials and Consumer
discretionary.
They observed that for nine of the ten industry sectors, the stock market contributed to price discovery
in the CDS market (with Telecommunications being the exception), whereas the CDS market only
contributed to price discovery in the stock market in six sectors. Furthermore, within the context of these
six sectors, the effect of the stock market still was more dominant (VECM models are able to extract
relative levels of causality when flow is bidirectional).
While the results of these two studies are mixed on the surface, the stock market appears to be
characterized by greater efficiency in impounding information given the broader timeframe covered by
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Narayan, Sharma et al (Byström only studied 21 months and didn’t employ a VAR based framework) 33.
However, even with this result it is important to note that the authors’ data was comprised of single name
CDS prices aggregated into industry sector portfolios and not indexes which can actually be bought and
sold. As a result, this characteristic of the methodology introduces firm-specific idiosyncrasies into the
data and thus biases the results. Furthermore, the fact that only two studies in the literature have
examined this issue and sector based investing is popular amongst certain investors, makes this substrand of the lead-lag literature an auspicious candidate for further research.

3.2

Hypotheses Development and Econometric Methodology

Based on the results obtained in the first chapter coupled with the research case introduced above, the
specific hypotheses examined in this essay are follows:
H14: There is heterogeneity in the lead-lag relationship between the industry sector sub-indices of
the CDX.NA.IG and matching portfolios of stocks vis-à-vis the aggregate CDX.NA.IG index
H15: There is heterogeneity in the lead-lag relationship within individual industry sector subindices of the CDX.NA.IG and their respective matching portfolios of stocks
In investigating whether these research questions, the analysis follows the same general protocol as in
the investigation of the CDX.NA.IG, first examining the aggregate sample during the 2004-2015 timeframe,
then the temporal subsamples representing the High Growth, Crisis, Pullback and New Normal periods,
followed by asymmetry with respect to down markets, in particular during the mortgage crisis and finally,
the robustness of the headline results via the inclusion of exogenous control variables, specification of

33

In addition, Byström’s work actually can be interpreted as the stock market containing incremental information
over the CDS since the implied model relies on stock prices as one of its inputs.
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the form of model and testing for the weekend effect. As such, I rely on the methodological framework
introduced in the first chapter in section 1.2 and augmented in the second chapter as per section 2.2,
employing equations (1), (2), (3), (4) and where applicable (6), with three notable exceptions discussed
below.
First, I only compare the CDX sub-indices to closely matched sector portfolios since the S&P 500 is too
broad of an indicator against which to juxtapose specific sectors of the economy. Such a comparison
could lead to spurious results and associated erroneous conclusions driven by the significant mismatch.
Second, I only examine the five-year maturity of the sub-indexes given that this was the only point on the
curve in the data set provided by Markit (as was also the case for the sub-indices of the CDX.NA.HY in the
second chapter). However, given the generally lower liquidity associated with longer-dated CDS, this does
not detract materially from the research orientation of this chapter and in fact, the very absence of the
longer-dated maturity elucidative in terms of how sector based synthetic credit risk is traded by investors.
Lastly and most relevantly, although I examine the cross market lead-lag relationships during the crisis, as
discussed in the general introduction to this document a significant amount of data is missing for each
sub-index during that time. Specifically, the missing elements are primarily associated with the three
month period from January 1st, 2008 to March 26th, 2008 and the ten-month period from May 23rd, 2008
to March 15th, 2009. Presumably, market makers did not report sector based bid ask spreads and/or
settlements during these periods given the general lack of liquidity in these instruments, which can be
explained by the fact that the crisis was systematic in nature. This means that sector based positions would
not have provided the same level of diversification benefits as is generally the case, so investors eschewed
them. However, if so then this circumstance, like the absence of the 10-year maturity in and of itself
illustrates a meaningful asymmetry within the CDX family of indexes, given this is the only instance of
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systematically missing data in the entire data set in all three chapters. It also underscore the severity of
the financial crisis.
Summary statistics from the description of the overall data set in the introduction for the sector based
sub-indexes are reflected in Table 26. Recapping the highlights, the Financial sector has the highest mean
credit spread and standard deviation along with the highest equity index deviation, which is not surprising
given the data included for the financial crisis. Conversely, the Consumer Cyclical sector has the lowest
average credit spread and return standard deviation along with the lowest equity index return standard
deviation, which also is not surprising given its link to consumer spending. Finally, and somewhat
anomalous amongst the industries, while the Technology, Media and Telecommunications sector is
characterized by the second highest mean credit spread, the equity index return standard deviation is the
second lowest (by far).
Table 26: Summary Statistics for Third Chapter

Time Series

Obs

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

Returns
Mean
Std Dev

CDS
CDX.NA.IG.CONS
CDX.NA.IG.ENRG
CDX.NA.IG.FIN
CDX.NA.IG.INDU
CDX.NA.IG.TMT

2,433
2,432
2,436
2,435
2,435

70.7
78.5
101.5
74.9
82.9

21.5
41.4
82.2
29.2
33.5

35.4
12.6
17.1
23.2
31.7

203.3
207.6
674.6
235.3
249.2

-0.000620
-0.000350
-0.000600
-0.000180
-0.000380

0.01954
0.02216
0.02365
0.02252
0.02209

2,433
2,432
2,436
2,435
2,435

52.0
52.4
55.3
59.2
44.7

14.8
7.3
11.9
12.0
12.5

30.4
31.4
14.4
26.7
20.6

92.6
71.7
80.9
87.6
72.3

0.000533
0.000385
0.000560
0.000580
0.000473

0.00889
0.01263
0.01417
0.01216
0.01041

EQUITY
CONS IG PORT
ENRG IG PORT
FIN IG PORT
INDU IG PORT
TMT IG PORT
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3.3

Results

CDX.NA.IG CONS and Matched Portfolio of CONS Stocks
The first examined sub-index is the Consumer Cyclical sector, a broad sector in terms of business risk in
that it contains both cyclical and non-cyclical consumer product related components. At an average of
29% of the aggregate index, it is the largest subsector represented. The results of the analysis are reflected
in Table 27. As with the prior two chapters, all autoregressive panels are specified as VAR (1).
Table 27: CDX.NA.IG CONS 5Y and Matched Portfolio of CONS Stocks

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2004-2015
CONS IG PORTt
CDX IG CONSt

Lagged CDS Index Lagged Equity Index Lagged VAR System
CDX IG
CONS IG
a
a
CONSt-1 p-value
PORTt-1 p-value
chi2
p-value
0.009
(0.34)
0.266 ***(0.00)

-0.041
*(0.06)
-0.244 ***(0.000)

7.24 **(0.03)
295.42 ***(0.00)

Panel B: High Growth
CONS IG PORTt
CDX IG CONSt

0.020
(0.23)
0.265 ***(0.00)

0.000 ***(0.00)
-0.265 ***(0.004)

1.46
(0.48)
63.73 ***(0.00)

Panel C: Crisis
CONS IG PORTt
CDX IG CONSt

0.016
(0.53)
0.24 ***(0.00)

-0.061
(0.38)
-0.603 ***(0.001)

2.12
(0.34)
46.93 ***(0.00)

Panel D: Pullback
CONS IG PORTt
CDX IG CONSt

-0.006
(0.82
0.282 ***(0.00)

-0.101
-0.073

**(0.03)
(0.41)

5.82
*(0.06)
63.13 ***(0.00)

Panel E: New Normal
CONS IG PORTt
CDX IG CONSt

-0.006
(0.76)
0.265 ***(0.00)

-0.007
(0.85)
-0.173 ***(0.007)

0.09
(0.96)
109.38 ***(0.00)

Panel F: Down Market
CONS IG PORTt
CDX IG CONSt

0.032
0.139

(0.37)
(0.12)

-0.024
(0.82)
-0.589 **(0.045)

2.56
(0.63)
51.01 ***(0.00)

-0.005
0.269

(0.73)
(0.00)

-0.403
(0.21)
-0.134 **(0.037)

9.82 **(0.04)
301.76 ***(0.00)

Panel H: Exogenous Vars
CONS IG PORTt
CDX IG CONSt

0.011
(0.31)
0.274 ***(0.00)

-0.037
(0.22)
-0.275 ***(0.000)

9.85
(0.13)
293.88 ***(0.00)

Panel I: VARMA
CONS IG PORTt
CDX IG CONSt

0.009
(0.35)
0.266 ***(0.00)

-0.038
*(0.09)
-0.246 ***(0.000)

303.67 ***(0.00)
303.67 ***(0.00)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
CONS IG PORTt
CDX IG CONSt

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded
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As is readily apparent from the table, there is a clear lead-lag relationship flowing from the equity to the
credit market, indicating a more efficient impounding of information in the equity index. Specifically, for
the aggregate time period 2004-2015 (Panel A), the level of significance of this relationship is very strong
at 1% (Granger p-value = 0.00; Wald test = 0.00) while the null of no causality in the other direction fails
to be rejected with a p-value = 0.34. This relationship also is strongly evident in three of the four temporal
subsamples, namely High Growth (Panel B), Crisis (Panel C) and New Normal (Panel E), with all of the
relevant Granger p-values being significant at the 1% level along with all Wald tests. Interestingly, during
the Pullback period (Panel D) during which time Dodd-Frank was being discussed and legislated, there was
no causality (Granger p-value=0.41), indicating a regime change during that time.
The demonstrated relationship also is independent of investor sentiment as observed in the test for
asymmetry in a down market (Panel F), although it should be noted that it is somewhat dampened with
the significance level being only 5% (Granger p-value = 0.045; Wald F-test = 0.00). Furthermore, it is
interesting to observe that the effect also is not as strong during the crisis, with the significance level also
being 5% (Granger p-value = 0.037; Wald F-test = 0.00), although to be fair, due to the omitted data the
result is not broadly generalizable. Still, these findings indicate that in sum, the effect is not quite as strong.
Finally, causality running from the equity to the CDS sector is robust to the inclusion of the suite of
exogenous variables, with the level of significance vis-à-vis the headline result also being strong at 1%
(Granger p-value = 0.000; Wald F-test = 0.000) and results do not differ with the addition of a moving
average component (Panel I).
On the basis of these observations, I conclude that there is a strongly persistent level of Granger causality
flowing from the consumer cyclical stock sector to the CDS sector. This result is in direct contrast to the
headline CDX.NA.IG index in which a persistent semi-strong cross-market level of efficiency is observed.
Such heterogeneity suggests that consumer cyclical sector based investors in the CDS index market differ
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from those in the headline index in that they tend to react to developments in the equity sector as
opposed to pricing in events efficiently. As such, H14 holds.
CDX.NA.IG ENRG and Matched Portfolio of ENRG Stocks
The next sub-index is the Energy sector comprised of a diverse set of firms from the oil and gas, power
and mining industries. At 11% of the aggregate index, it represents the smallest subsector of the
CDX.NA.IG. The results of the analysis are reflected in Table 28. All autoregressive panels remain VAR (1).
Table 28: CDX.NA.IG ENRG 5Y and Matched Portfolio of ENRG Stocks

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2004-2015
ENRG IG PORTt
CDX IG ENRGt

Lagged CDS Index Lagged Equity Index
CDX IG
ENRG IG
a
a
ENRGt-1 p-value
PORTt-1 p-value

Lagged VAR System
chi2

p-value

0.011
(0.41)
0.343 ***(0.00)

0.006
(0.78)
-0.238 ***(0.000)

0.69
(0.71)
500.13 ***(0.00)

0.027
(0.31)
0.368 ***(0.00)

0.018
(0.64)
-0.121 **(0.027)

1.16
(0.56)
109.26 ***(0.00)

(0.57)
(0.00)

-0.241
(0.71)
-0.461 ***(0.001)

0.37
(0.83)
67.55 ***(0.00)

0.038
(0.20
0.251 ***(0.00)

0.002
(0.95)
-0.287 ***(0.000)

2.24
(0.33)
104.48 ***(0.00)

Panel E: New Normal
ENRG IG PORTt
CDX IG ENRGt

-0.005
(0.82)
0.356 ***(0.00)

0.023
(0.53)
-0.242 ***(0.000)

0.79
(0.67)
226.26 ***(0.00)

Panel F: Down Market
ENRG IG PORTt
CDX IG ENRGt

-0.009
0.458

-0.037
(0.23)
-0.165 ***(0.001)

5.31
(0.25)
542.54 ***(0.00)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
ENRG IG PORTt
CDX IG ENRGt

-0.037
(0.35)
0.529 ***(0.00)

Panel H: Exogenous Vars
ENRG IG PORTt
CDX IG ENRGt
Panel I: VARMA
ENRG IG PORTt
CDX IG ENRGt

Panel B: High Growth
ENRG IG PORTt
CDX IG ENRGt
Panel C: Crisis
ENRG IG PORTt
CDX IG ENRGt
Panel D: Pullback
ENRG IG PORTt
CDX IG ENRGt

-0.016
0.356

(0.57)
(0.00)

-0.151
-0.057

*(0.08)
(0.75)

5.14
(0.27)
86.92 ***(0.00)

0.013
(0.30)
0.344 ***(0.00)

0.011
(0.67)
-0.207 ***(0.00)

3.57
(0.73)
501.31 ***(0.00)

0.010
(0.41)
0.343 ***(0.00)

0.007
(0.75)
-0.238 ***(0.000)

501.40 ***(0.00)
501.40 ***(0.00)

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded
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As can be seen in the table, the results are very similar to those of the prior panel study, although there
are some differences, of which a few are particularly interesting. For the aggregate sample (Panel A), a
very strong Granger causality at the 1% significance level is observed running from the equity sector to
the CDX index (Granger p-value = 0.00; Wald test = 0.00). However, not only does the corresponding
Granger p-value = 0.41 running in the opposite direction reject any cross market relationship, but also the
Wald test = 0.71 indicates that the autoregressive characteristics of the overall VAR system are
attributable solely to the CDS market. Moreover, this same result is evident in all the panels. Expressed
differently, no price stickiness is observed in the equation with the closely matched equity portfolio as the
dependent variable, indicating a persistent level of market efficiency in that equity sector.
In addition and somewhat in contrast to the prior study, all four temporal subsamples reflect a significant
level of causality running from the equity to the credit sector, meaning that unlike in the consumer cyclical
sector, there was no regime change during the Pullback period (Panel D: Granger p-value = 0.00; Wald Ftest = 0.00). Additionally, in two of the three remaining temporal subsamples, Crisis (Panel C) and New
Normal (Panel E), the level of one-way causality is consistent with the headline result of 1% significance
(Granger p-values of 0.001 and 0.000, respectively with similar Wald F-test p-values). However, with
respect to the High Growth period (Panel B), significance is only observed at the 5% level (Granger p-value
= 0.027; Wald F-test = 0.00).
Once again, there is no asymmetry observed in down markets (Panel F) in the aggregate sample,
suggesting that this sector of the equity market impounds efficiently more efficiently, even when CDS risk
premiums are increasing. In other words, on down days in the CDS market, the observed movement is
actually the result of prior day movements in energy stocks.

However, interestingly and also in

contravention to the consumer cyclical study, the leading nature of the equity market breaks down on
down market days during the mortgage crisis, with both markets impounding information efficiently. This
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dynamic appears to indicate heightened vigilance on the part of CDS investors and/or hedgers alike when
markets were down during the crisis (at least based on available data), a not so surprising result given the
distressed environment. Still the potential presence of this dynamic in the energy sector is interesting in
that it was hit particularly hard by diminished demand. To illustrate, oil and gas prices collapsed from July
2008 to February 2009, from $148/barrel to $33/barrel and from $14/mmbtu to $4/mmbtu,
respectively34.
Based on these results and notwithstanding the referenced differences vis-à-vis the first sub-index, the
general trend in the energy sector is clear and largely consistent with that of the consumer cyclical study.
Specifically, I observe that the equity market leads the synthetic credit market. This result once again
appears to underscore the difference in approach taken by CDS investors with respect to sector trading,
which is reactive in nature compared to the more efficient headline CDX.NA.IG index. In addition, it is
interesting to note the complete absence of price stickiness in the energy sector equity prices documented
in the lagged VAR system, belying a certain level of inter-day sectorial efficiency. As such, H14 holds while
H15 does not at this point.
CDX.NA.IG FIN and Matched Portfolio of FIN Stocks
Next I turn my attention to the CDX.NA.IG.FIN, or Financial sub-index comprising 18% of the overall index.
It is important to note that because its constituents consist primarily of non-bank firms such as insurance
and finance companies, it may not be fulsomely representative of the level of systemic risk in the US
economy (although it should be correlated). The results of the analysis are reflected in Table 29.
Interestingly and for the first time in this document, the autoregressive model for the aggregated sample
is specified as VAR (2) as per the applied information criterion, indicating a generally more prolonged

34
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stickiness in prices in this sector. However, with respect to the temporal subsamples as well as
asymmetrical down market tests, the autoregressive models are specified as VAR (1).
Table 29: CDX.NA.IG FIN 5Y and Matched Portfolio of FIN Stocks

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2004-2015
FIN IG PORTt
CDX IG FINt
Panel B: High Growth
FIN IG PORTt
CDX IG FINt

Lagged CDS Index
Lagged Equity Index
CDX IG
CDX IG Granger FIN IG
FIN IG Granger
a
a
FINt-1
FINt-2 p-value
PORTt-1 PORTt-2 p-value
-0.028
0.200

0.014
0.007

(0.12
n/a

-0.015
-0.271

0.014
n/a
-0.155 ***(0.000)

Lagged VAR System
chi2

p-value

46.46 ***(0.00)
275.86 ***(0.00)

0.003
0.228

-

(0.83)
***(0.00)

-0.052
-0.115

-

(0.21)
(0.19)

1.83
(0.40)
39.17 ***(0.00)

Panel C: Crisis
FIN IG PORTt
CDX IG FINt

-0.044
0.263

-

(0.32)
***(0.00)

-0.238
-0.282

-

*(0.01)
***(0.004)

12.23 ***(0.00)
40.98 ***(0.00)

Panel D: Pullback
FIN IG PORTt
CDX IG FINt

-0.135
0.207

-

(0.66
***(0.00)

-0.167
-0.171

-

(0.00)
**(0.020)

15.13 ***(0.00)
53.00 ***(0.00)

Panel E: New Normal
FIN IG PORTt
CDX IG FINt

-0.009
0.243

-

(0.65)
***(0.00)

-0.028
-0.195

-

(0.49)
***(0.013)

0.48
(0.78)
95.66 ***(0.00)

Panel F: Down Market
FIN IG PORTt
CDX IG FINt

-0.264
0.314

-

(0.17)
***(0.00)

-0.158
-0.109

-

***(0.00)
**(0.033)

59.07 ***(0.00)
270.28 ***(0.00)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
FIN IG PORTt
CDX IG FINt

0.007
0.263

-

(0.90)
***(0.00)

-0.207
-0.132

-

**(0.03)
(0.29)

15.11 ***(0.01)
42.13 ***(0.00)

Panel H: Exogenous Vars
FIN IG PORTt
CDX IG FINt

-0.021
0.207

0.010
0.016

(0.38
n/a

-0.163
-0.245

-0.016
n/a
-0.104 ***(0.000)

51.56 ***(0.00)
270.52 ***(0.00)

Panel I: VARMA
FIN IG PORTt
CDX IG FINt

-0.019
0.235

0.014
0.000

(0.15
n/a

-0.015
-0.207

0.014
n/a
-0.155 ***(0.000)

312.25 ***(0.00)
312.25 ***(0.00)

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded

Other than the VAR specification, the results are broadly consistent with those of the prior sectors and
once again suggest a persistent level of one-directional Granger causality running from the equity to the
credit market. Specifically, for the aggregated sample (for which both the first and second lags are
reflected in the table in Panel A), the causal flow from the subject equity to the credit sector is very strong
at a 1% significance level (Granger p-value = 0.00; Wald test = 0.00). Significance is also evident in three
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of the four temporal subsamples, namely Crisis (Panel C: Granger p-value = .004; Wald F-test = 0.00),
Pullback (Panel D: Granger p-value = .02; Wald F-test = 0.00) and New Normal (Panel E: Granger p-value =
.013; Wald F-test = 0.00), although during two of those periods (Pullback, New Normal) the level of
significance was lower at 5% (however, this is still considered to be strong). Interestingly though, during
the run-up to the mortgage crisis (Panel B), there was a level of cross-market efficiency in the financial
sector as evidenced by the insignificant Granger p-values in both directions, a time in which risk appetite
in the economy had increased.
The one-way effect is robust to the testing for down market asymmetry (Panel F), indicating a persistence
through differing market conditions although the level of significance is once again lower at 5% (Granger
p-value = .033; Wald F-test = 0.00). However, it is of great interest to note that during the mortgage crisis
(Panel G), there is no cross-market effect observed on down days (as with the energy sector). This is
particularly relevant in the case of the financial sector since it would appear to support Fed Chairman
Bernanke’s reference to “negative feedback loops” originating in the financial markets during that time35.
In this instance (and different than the one observed in the second chapter), this may have been
attributable to the heightened scrutiny in financial markets and related greater sensitivity to news, as
evidenced by the previously referenced higher average levels of the VIX experienced during this time.
Such scrutiny would have been all the more prevalent in the financial sector given this was the industry in
which the distress originated, which over time spread to the remaining sectors of the economy.
Mechanically, the negative feedback loop works as follows: negative news affecting financial firms in the
equity market is almost immediately transmitted to the credit market, of which the negative effect is
immediately transmitted to the equity market, etc., until such time positive news reestablishes the status
quo of the cross-market relationship. Naturally, because the lags in the VAR specification are defined in

35

“Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to Congress,” February 24, 2009.
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terms of days and this down market effect may be intraday during crisis periods, this specific type of
feedback loop would not be detected by the model but rather, manifests itself as a failure to reject the
null of no causality in both directions. However again, it is important to caution against making
generalizations in light of the systematically missing data on sub-indexes during the crisis (which as stated,
I attribute to reduced investor demand for sector related protection).
Regarding the last two studies in this section (Panel H & I), Granger causality running from the equity to
the credit sector is very robust to the inclusion of the exogenous factors, indicating that the headline
results were not attributable to omitted variable basis. Specifically, one-way causality running from the
equity sector is observed at the 1% level of significance (Granger p-value = .000; Wald F-test = 0.00), while
the null of no causality in the other direction cannot be rejected (p=.38). In addition, results under the
VARMA specification are substantially the same.
Against this backdrop, the cumulative result of this section is broadly supportive of the referenced
difference in informational efficiency between the headline CDX.NA.IG index and its sector based subindexes. Specifically, sub-indexes appear to be consistently reactive to developments in their equity sector
counterparts, i.e., lag the stock market. Nonetheless, the absence of such a lead-lag relationship on down
market days during the crisis may evidence the heightened sensitivity to bad news related to this sector
during that time, which was picked up quickly by credit investors under a negative feedback loop.
Accordingly, H14 holds while H15 does not.
CDX.NA.IG INDU and Matched Portfolio of INDU Stocks
The Industrials subsector of the CDX.NA.IG index comprises 26% of the overall headline index, the second
largest component behind the Consumer Cyclical sector. Given the manufacturing nature of the sector,
one would expect it to be sensitive to the general health of the economy. The results of the analysis are
reflected in Table 30. All models are specified at the VAR (1) level. Once again, the findings are broadly in
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line with the general trend observed in each sub-index examined to this point, namely a decided Granger
causality running from the equity to the CDS sector with no causality in the opposite direction.
Table 30: CDX.NA.IG INDU 5Y and Matched Portfolio of INDU Stocks

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2004-2015
INDU IG PORTt
CDX IG INDUt
Panel B: High Growth
INDU IG PORTt
CDX IG INDUt

Lagged CDS Index Lagged Equity Index
CDX IG
INDU IG
a
a
INDUt-1 p-value
PORTt-1 p-value
0.008
(0.51
0.247 ***(0.00)
-0.017
(0.41)
0.368 ***(0.00)

Lagged VAR System
chi2

p-value

0.007
(0.97)
-0.230 ***(0.000)

0.55
(0.76)
289.38 ***(0.00)

-0.032
-0.151

(0.43)
*(0.057)

1.86
(0.40)
116.55 ***(0.00)

Panel C: Crisis**
INDU IG PORTt
CDX IG INDUt

0.032
(0.32)
0.123 ***(0.00)

-0.033
(0.63)
-0.516 ***(0.000)

1.19
(0.37)
28.85 ***(0.00)

Panel D: Pullback
INDU IG PORTt
CDX IG INDUt

0.008
(0.77
0.268 ***(0.00)

-0.010
-0.137

(0.84)
*(0.083)

0.31
(0.85)
74.09 ***(0.00)

Panel E: New Normal
INDU IG PORTt
CDX IG INDUt

-0.003
(0.86)
0.260 ***(0.00)

-0.026
(0.50)
-0.166 ***(0.008)

0.85
(0.65)
107.85 ***(0.00)

Panel F: Down Market
INDU IG PORTt
CDX IG INDUt

-0.264
(0.17)
0.314 ***(0.00)

-0.158 ***(0.00)
-0.109 ***(0.001)

59.07 ***(0.00)
270.28 ***(0.00)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
INDU IG PORTt
CDX IG INDUt

-0.022
(0.18)
0.271 (***0.00)

-0.035
(0.30)
-0.181 ***(0.045)

6.48
(0.17)
319.45 ***(0.00)

Panel H: Exogenous Vars
INDU IG PORTt
CDX IG INDUt

0.008
(0.51
0.256 ***(0.00)

0.016
(0.59)
-0.272 ***(0.00)

4.59
(0.59)
288.21 ***(0.00)

Panel I: VARMA
INDU IG PORTt
CDX IG INDUt

0.009
(0.48)
0.247 ***(0.00)

0.004
(0.87)
-0.230 ***(0.000)

290.15
(0.76)
290.15 ***(0.00)

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded

Specifically, in the aggregate sample (Panel A), there is a very strong level of one-way casualty suggesting
a lead-lag relationship flowing from the equity to the credit market (Granger p-value = .000; Wald test =
0.00). In fact, based on the Wald test level (p=.76) in the VAR system equation with the industrial equity
portfolio as the dependent variable, there does not appear to be any price stickiness at all in the equity
sector, belying a defined level of efficiency. A level of one-way causality is also evident in all four of the

118
temporal subsamples, although the significance levels differ, with the Crisis (Panel C: Granger p-value =
.000; Wald test = 0.00) and New Normal (Panel E: Granger p-value = .008; Wald test = 0.00) periods being
characterized by very strong significance at 1% while in the High Growth (Panel B: Granger p-value = .057;
Wald test = 0.00) and Pullback periods (Panel D: Granger p-value = .083; Wald test = 0.00), a much weaker
relationship is observed, at only the 10% level.
Also once again, this effect is completely independent of prevailing conditions in the marketplace in the
down market asymmetry test, as the same level of significance is observed (1%) in the one-way Granger
causality from the equity sector (Panel F: Granger p-value = .001; Wald test = 0.00). Somewhat
interestingly though, the level of significance lessens to 5% on down markets during the crisis (Panel F:
Granger p-value = .045; Wald test = 0.00), so while the effect does not disappear as with some of the other
sectors, it does dissipate. This dynamic appears to be a general trend in all of the sectors during that
timeframe, indicating a certain level of heightened scrutiny. Finally and has been the case throughout the
analyses, the one-way causality for the aggregate sample is robust to the inclusion of systematic
exogenous variables in the VAR system (Panel H) and specification of the model as a VARMA (Panel I). In
fact, the calculated statistics are almost completely unaffected in both instances.
Based on the foregoing, the results in this study lend further credence to the observed difference in
investor behavior regarding CDX sub-indexes and by extension, resultant cross-market lead-lag
relationship. Specifically, CDX sub-index investors react to developments in the equity sector rather than
price in news efficiently, although the effect is lessened somewhat during the crisis period. H14 holds
while H15 once again does not as no inter-sector heterogeneity has been observed to this point.
CDX.NA.IG TMT and Matched Portfolio of TMT Stocks
The final sub-index is the Technology, Media and Telecommunications sector comprising 16% of the
CDX.NA.IG. Based on its composition (as well as comparatively anomalous nature of summary statistics),
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some level of heterogeneity with respect to the foregoing sectors would not be surprising. This is because
the firms in this index are driven more by technological innovation and as such, have greater growth
prospects than typical firms in the broader economy. Naturally, this growth potential results in more risk
and consequently, the risk/return trade-off of instruments issued by these firms is different than for older
economy companies. The results are reflected in Table 31. Once again, all models are specified as VAR (1).
Table 31: CDX.NA.IG TMT 5Y and Matched Portfolio of TMT Stocks

Dependant Variable
Panel A: 2004-2015
TMT IG PORTt
CDX IG TMTt
Panel B: High Growth
TMT IG PORTt
CDX IG TMTt
Panel C: Crisis
TMT IG PORTt
CDX IG TMTt

Lagged CDS Index
CDX IG
a
TMTt-1 p-value

Lagged Equity Index
TMT IG
a
PORTt-1 p-value

Lagged VAR System

-0.025 **(0.012
0.262 ***(0.00)

-0.086 ***(0.00)
-0.215 ***(0.000)

16.29 ***(0.00)
271.07 ***(0.00)

-0.001
(0.89)
0.251 ***(0.00)

-0.051
-0.195

0.003
(0.90)
0.227 ***(0.00)

chi2

p-value

(0.20)
(0.11)

1.62
(0.45)
47.13 ***(0.00)

-0.044
(0.49)
-0.639 ***(0.000)

0.58
(0.74)
47.47 ***(0.00)

Panel D: Pullback
TMT IG PORTt
CDX IG TMTt

-0.034
(0.19
0.269 ***(0.00)

-0.070
-0.101

(0.14)
(0.24)

2.51
(0.28)
63.13 ***(0.00)

Panel E: New Normal
TMT IG PORTt
CDX IG TMTt

-0.082 ***(0.000)
0.329 ***(0.00)

-0.182 ***(0.00)
-0.072
(0.24)

28.88 ***(0.00)
129.42 ***(0.00)

Panel F: Down Market
TMT IG PORTt
CDX IG TMTt

-0.028 **(0.050)
0.254 ***(0.00)

-0.158
(0.11)
-0.173 ***(0.009)

18.35 ***(0.001)
266.87 ***(0.00)

(0.83)
(0.30)

-0.061
(0.54)
-0.546 ***(0.004)

0.73
(0.94)
57.61 ***(0.00)

Panel H: Exogenous Vars
TMT IG PORTt
CDX IG TMTt

-0.022 **(0.041)
0.269 ***(0.00)

-0.124
(0.00)
-0.229 ***(0.000)

23.43 ***(0.00)
267.2 ***(0.00)

Panel I: VARMA
TMT IG PORTt
CDX IG TMTt

-0.026 (**0.013)
0.262 ***(0.000)

0.083 ***(0.00)
-0.216 (***0.000)

287.28 ***(0.00)
287.28 ***(0.00)

Panel J: Weekend Effect
TMT IG PORTt
CDX IG TMTt

-0.028 (**0.011)
0.237 **(0.012)

-0.098 ***(0.00)
-0.204 (***0.000)

18.05 ***(0.00)
273.04 ***(0.00)

Panel G: Down Mkt/Crisis
TMT IG PORTt
CDX IG TMTt

0.007
0.069

***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
a
- Intermarket causalities are bordered; significant ones are shaded with those >= 5% bolded
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As is readily apparent, the pattern of cross market causality emerging from this panel study is much
different than those documented in the preceding studies in this chapter as well as with respect to the
CDX.NA.IG. Whereas in the prior examinations, there was no Granger causality observed running from the
credit to the equity markets, in this panel a significant level is observed. In addition, causality running in
the opposite direction is also observed, indicating an alternating and sometimes concurrent two-way leadlag relationship across markets.
Specifically, in the aggregated sample (Panel A), strong two-way Granger causality is observed with the
flow from the credit to the equity markets falling just short of the 1% significance level (Granger p-value
= .012; Wald test = .000) while in the opposite direction the effect is documented at 1% (Granger p-value
= .000; Wald test = .000). With this in mind, I immediately turn my attention to the robustness test
including exogenous factors to ensure this heterogeneity is not driven by factors not captured by the VAR
framework. If so, then the result would be biased and examination of the remaining panels rendered
moot. However, as evidenced in Panel H, the baseline level of observed two-way cross market causality is
robust to the inclusion of these factors, with the relationship running from the credit to the equity market
(Granger p-value = .041; Wald test = .000) and vice versa (Granger p-value = .000; Wald test = .000) once
again significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Additionally, I test for the potential for the model
specification (Panel I) and weekend effect (Panel J) to have biased the results and find that there no
material impact, as strong two-way Granger causality remains.
This differing result is also evident in the temporal subsamples (Panels B - E) in which only one (Panel C:
Crisis) documents Granger causality running from the equity to the credit sector (Granger p-value = .000;
Wald test = .000), whereas in the prior panels such an effect was observed in at least three of the four
subsamples. In addition and for the first time, cross market informational flow is documented in the New
Normal period (Panel E) running from the credit to the equity sector at a very strong level of 1%

121
significance ((Granger p-value = .000; Wald test = .000). Together with the aggregated sample results,
these tests suggest a very different cross market relationship in this sub-index, meaning that investor
behavior is also different.
This general result is also evident in the test for asymmetry based on prevailing market conditions (Panel
F). Specifically, on down market days I again observe a strong level of two-way cross market causality,
indicating that the effect is generally independent of the nature of news, i.e., whether it is positive or
negative and that no asymmetry exists. However interestingly, I only observe Granger causality running
from the equity to the credit sector on down market days during the crisis (Granger p-value = .004; Wald
F-test = .000) while the test in the other direction results in a clear failure to the reject the null hypothesis
of no causality (Granger p value=.83). This suggests that bad news during the crisis in the credit markets
was picked up immediately by equity investors, belying a certain efficiency due to the heightened fear
and scrutiny. However, as with previous findings, results during the crisis should be viewed with some
caution.
In sum, the cross market lead-lag relationship observed in the TMT subsector is very different than those
documented in the other subsectors. Specifically, there is a strong level of Granger causality flowing from
the credit to the equity sector which is not present in any of the other samples. In addition, while causality
is observed in the other direction, generally speaking it is not as strong or persistent as in the other
subsectors. This dynamic indicates that investors in this sector differ significantly in their behavior with
respect to how they view and operate within the context of both markets and in particular, the credit
market. This likely is due to the mentioned different business risk and growth prospects associated with
technology, media and telecom firms vis-à-vis the constituents of the other sub-indexes and related
heterogeneity in the investor risk/return tradeoff. Interestingly, this finding is consistent with Narayan,
Sharma et al. (2014) in which the authors found that the telecommunications sector behaved differently
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than the other nine sectors in the study. In addition, the result is broadly consistent with the findings of
Jegadeesh, Kim et al. (2004) who documented greater attention given by analysts to growth stocks, a
concept which can be extended to their credit related instruments. Both H14 and H15 hold.

3.4

Conclusions

In this chapter, I examine the lead-lag relationship between the industry subsectors of the CDX.NA.IG
index and closely matched portfolios of stocks comprised of the constituents of those indexes.
Specifically, I investigate whether there is heterogeneity in the inter-market informational flow between
the industry sector sub-indices of the CDX.NA.IG and matching portfolios of stocks from two different
perspectives. The first is vis-à-vis the aggregate systematic CDX.NA.IG index examined in the first chapter
while the second is within the subsectors themselves based on their differing types of business risks and
exposure to systematic risk factors.
In comparison to the umbrella CDX.NA.IG index, there is clear heterogeneity observed in how information
is impounded and subsequently flows on a cross-market basis. Whereas in the case of the bellwether
investment grade index, no cross market Granger causality is observed, there is a generally definitive and
persistent Granger causality evident in the sub-indexes flowing from the equity to the credit sectors. This
empirical result documents a distinct difference in how investors view and utilize these indexes vis-à-vis
the broader systematic umbrella index. Specifically, investors in sectorial sub-indexes appear to be
reactive to developments in their respective equity sectors rather than proactive in expressing their views
as in the bellwether index. Put another way, the consistent and persistent capital market efficiency
observed in the first set of panel studies clearly is absent from this cross market segment, indicating the
potential for capital market arbitrage. However, this effect does not appear to be as strong during the
financial crisis period, implying that during times of extreme market turbulence, sector based investors
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are less reactive in their actions. Still, given the systematically missing data during the crisis period,
generalized conclusions from the results should be made with caution. I attribute the absence of the data
to a general lack of interest on the part of investors in sector specific positions and associated liquidity in
these instruments given that the crisis was systematic and diversification benefits had broken down.
As for the potential for heterogeneity across sub-indexes, the aforementioned effect is generally observed
across all industry sectors, despite the differences in business risk. The only exception to this trend is the
technology, media and telecommunications related sector in which Granger causality running from the
equity to the credit market is much less persistent and a significant level of causality is observed running
from the credit to the equity sector. This latter causality suggests the existence of heterogeneity in how
investors impound information in this sector, a finding that is particularly relevant given the distinctly
different nature of the business risk inherent in this sub-index vis-à-vis the other indexes.
This difference is driven by the fact that the TMT sub-index consists primarily of companies with much
greater growth prospects than for example, the consumer product, industrial and financial sectors,
resulting in a different risk/reward paradigm. Given this different paradigm, investors behave differently
with this sub-index, creating a heterogeneous cross-market informational flow. Beyond this difference,
a plausible explanation is given by Jegadeesh, Kim et al. (2004), who observed that high growth stocks
receive comparatively greater attention from sell-side analysts and by extension, buy-side stakeholders
who rely on such research such as mutual fund managers, institutional investors, etc. Naturally, this
greater level of attention extends to the credit instruments issued by these firms, both cash and synthetic,
resulting in a unique cross market informational flow vis-à-vis stocks in lower growth sectors. However,
other than for the TMT sub-index, the overall results clearly document that closely matched sector based
equity portfolios dominate their credit market counterparts in terms of lead-lag relationship.
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CONCLUSIONS
In this document I undertake a comprehensive analysis of the lead-lag relationship between the
systematic credit derivative and equity markets. In performing this analysis, I operationalize a broad set
of liquidly tradable credit derivative indices produced by Markit (the “CDX Family of Indices”) and compare
them to both bellwether equity indexes such as the S&P 500 as well as closely matched equity portfolios
from which I manually construct indexes. This effort is particularly relevant in that prior efforts with
respect to the nature of informational flow between these two capital markets have focused almost
exclusively on the unsystematic, or firm-specific relationship between single-name CDS and their
respective stocks. As a result, these efforts did not consider the potential for heterogeneity in the
systematic markets.
By employing a unique combination of a differenced VAR, asymmetrical Granger causality, V-STAR and
VARMA methodological framework across 22 panels covering 208 different studies, I observe a series of
distinct patterns and trends yielding valuable insight into the heterogeneous nature of systematic
informational flow. This insight is of interest to academics and practitioners alike as it balances a robust
theoretical framework with research questions and specific hypotheses having practical application and
implications.
Specifically, I conclude that there is no cross market causality observed in the bellwether investment grade
rated systematic credit and equity markets in either direction, suggesting they efficiently impound
information. This finding is in direct contrast to studies involving unsystematic informational flow in which
Granger causality is observed flowing from the equity to the credit market, e.g., Fung, Sierra et al. (2008),
Norden and Weber (2009), Narayan, Sharma et al. (2014) and (Hilscher, Pollet et al. 2015). I also observe
that Investor behavior and associated market efficiency related to the industry based sub-indexes of the
bellwether investment grade index is much different than for the umbrella index. In four of the five sectors
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examined, a strong level of Granger causality is documented running from the equity to the credit sector,
suggesting that CDS sector investors are reactive in nature to developments in the equity sector rather
than pricing in news efficiently. The only exception to this trend is the technology, media and
telecommunications sector in which strong levels of two-way Granger causality is observed, implying that
this credit sector often impounds incremental information more efficiently. Given the nature of this
industry, the finding suggests that synthetic credit investors view instruments related to higher growth
industries much differently than for example, consumer product and “older economy” sectors (Jegadeesh,
Kim et al. 2004).
With respect to the high yield systematic credit and equity markets, there is a strong two-way Granger
causality observed in the bellwether indexes, suggesting that cross-market information flows much
differently than in the investment grade sector. This means that incremental information may be priced
in more efficiently in either of these markets at a given time, depending on the nature of that information.
This heterogeneity is primarily attributed to the higher risk of default associated with these firms and
ostensibly greater sensitivity to news as put forward by Fung, Sierra et al. (2008). Additionally, the
propensity for the high yield credit market to impound Incremental information is asymmetrical in nature
and more pronounced during adverse market conditions. This suggests that investors in the systematic
synthetic credit market price in negative news more efficiently, a result which is consistent with prior
findings in the literature (Acharya and Johnson 2007) (Fung, Sierra et al. 2008). However, this
asymmetrical causality tends to dissipate when market movements are very large, indicating a greater
level of attention paid to such movements on the part of investors. Finally, in the study of the high yield
sub-indexes, the aforementioned effects hold more persistently in the case of the BB-rated sub-index,
with the B-rated sub-index trading similarly to the industry subsectors of the bellwether investment grade
index. Put another way, credit investors do not appear to use this sub-index as a means by which to
proactively express their views despite the relative lower credit quality of its constituents.
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Interestingly, in both the investment grade and high yield sectors, a slight size bias is observed, implying
that information with respect to larger stocks often is impounded more efficiently. This is attributed to
larger analyst following and greater investor attention as observed by Hong, Lim et al. (2000). Also, where
informational advantages exist, they appear to be rapidly exploited by investors, as in almost every
instance in which a VAR system is identified, the order of the model is only one day. This level of price
stickiness is generally shorter in duration than observed in previous related studies ((Hilscher, Pollet et al.
2015), (Fung, Sierra et al. 2008), (Norden and Weber 2009)) and underscores the difference in the trading
of systematic vs. unsystematic risk.
As opportunities for future research, the investigation of intraday movements in the CDX and S&P 500
indexes, particularly with respect to the investment grade bellwether index, would be instructive once
such data becomes available on the credit indices. This could shed more light on the observed efficiency
in this segment and whether one of the markets reacts more quickly than the other. In addition, the robust
methodological framework utilized in this document could be extended to international markets,
especially in geographies such as Europe and Japan in which more than sufficient historical credit index
related data should exist. Finally, more research into asymmetrical Granger causality is needed as
highlighted by Hatemi-j (2012) among others. This would be greatly facilitated by the development of an
endogenously determined V-STAR econometric process, as the construct I use in this analysis to mimic
autoregressive threshold behavior in a vector based environment is exogenous in nature.
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